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This dissertation employs recent developments in the cognitive sciences to 
explicate competing social and religious undercurrents in Beowulf.  An enduring 
scholarly debate has attributed the poem’s origins to, variously, Christian or 
polytheistic worldviews.  Rather than approaching the subject with inherited terms 
which originated in Judeo-Christian assumptions of religious identity, we may 
distinguish two incongruous ways of conceiving of agency, both human and divine, 
underlying the conventional designations of pagan and Christian.  One of these, the 
poly-agent schema, requires a complex understanding of the motivations and 
limitations of all sentient individuals as causal agents with their own internal mental 
complexities.  The other, the omni-agent schema, centralizes original agency in the 
figure of an omnipotent and omnipresent God and simplifies explanations of social 
interactions.  In this concept, any individual’s potential for intentional agency is 
limited to subordination or resistance to the will of God.  The omni-agent schema 
relies on social categorization to understand behavior of others, whereas the poly-
agent schema tracks individual minds, their intentions, and potential actions.  
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Whereas medieval Christian narratives, such as Bede’s Life of St. Cuthbert and 
Augustine’s Confessions, depend on the omni-agent schema, Beowulf relies more 
heavily on the poly-agent schema, which it shares with Classical and Norse myths, 
epics, and sagas.  While this does not prove that the poem originated before the 
conversion of the Anglo-Saxons, it suggests that the poem was able to preserve an 
older social schema which would have been discouraged in post-conversion cultures 
were it not for a number of passages in the poem which affirmed conventional 
Christian theology.  These theological asides describe an omni-agent schema in 
abstract terms, though they accord poorly with the representations of character 
thought and action within the poem.  This minimal affirmation of a newer model of 
social interaction may have enabled the poem’s preservation on parchment in an 
age characterized by the condemnation, and often violent suppression, of non-
Christian beliefs.  These affirmations do not, however, tell the whole story. 
 
 vi 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
NAME OF AUTHOR:  Eric Luttrell  
 
 
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 
 University of Oregon, Eugene 
 University of Denver, Colorado 
 University of California, Los Angeles  
 University of Louisiana, Monroe 
 
 
DEGREES AWARDED: 
 
 Doctor of Philosophy, English, 2011, University of Oregon 
 Master of Arts, English, 2005, University of Denver 
 Bachelor of Arts, English, 2000, University of Louisiana, Monroe 
 Bachelor of Arts, Media Production, 2000, University of Louisiana, Monroe 
 
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
 
 Old English and Old Norse Literature 
 Cognitive Approaches to English Literature 
 Structural and Post-Structural Literary Theory 
 Religious Studies – History of Christianity 
 Myth and Literature – Classical, Norse, and Celtic 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
 
 Graduate Teaching Assistant, University of Denver, 2003-2005 
 
 Graduate Teaching Fellow, University of Oregon, 2005-2011 
 
 
  
 vii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I wish to extend my sincere thanks to my adviser and committee chair, James 
Earl, for his constant encouragement, patience, and editorial attention throughout 
my project and my time at the University of Oregon.  I am also grateful for the 
insight and cautionary advice from my committee members and teachers, Lisa 
Freinkel and Mark Johnson.  I am especially grateful for Molly Westling’s willingness 
to join the committee with little notice and for her ongoing work connecting 
literature and the natural sciences.   Similarly, I must thank Glen Love and Michelle 
Scalise Sugiyama for their encouragement and advice in my project and for 
establishing a precedent for consilience at the University of Oregon.  I greatly 
appreciate input from members of the Institute for Cognitive and Decision Sciences 
who read and discussed the third chapter as part of the focus group on evolution, 
religion and war.  These include Holly Arrow, Azim Shariff, John Orbell, Robert 
Gordon, Mitzi Barker, Bill McConochie, and Bob Bumstead.  My project has also been 
greatly enhanced by input from my fellow graduate students at the University of 
Oregon who have provided encouragement, posed challenging questions, and 
suggested revisions.  These include (but are not limited to) Josh Magsam, Tristan 
Sipley, Chelsea Henson, Nick Henson, Melissa Sexton, Thomas Nail, Sarah Stoeckl, 
Chris McGill, Marcus Hensel, and Britta Spann.  The current dissertation grew from 
work begun under the tutelage of Alexandra Olsen at the University of Denver who 
gave me the best criticism a teacher can give a student: “I like what you’re doing, but 
you still have some work to do.”  The work is easy as long as brilliant people like it.   
  
 viii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my grandmother, Oreatha Saterfiel Luttrell Bond. 
 
Bona mea instituta tua sunt et dona tua, mala mea delieta mea sunt. 
 
  
 ix 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT WOULD BEOWULF THINK? ................................................. 1 
II. THE PAGAN QUESTION .......................................................................................................... 20 
 Unity of Scholarly Consensus ............................................................................................. 20 
 Defining by Opposition ......................................................................................................... 26 
 Authorial Intent ....................................................................................................................... 26 
 Manufactured Opposition .................................................................................................... 28 
 Tolkien: Critics as Monsters ............................................................................................... 31 
 Threat of Disintegration ....................................................................................................... 35 
 Mere Stories vs. Great Man ................................................................................................. 40 
 Klaeber’s Foundation ............................................................................................................ 47 
 Beowulf as Christ Figure ...................................................................................................... 57 
III. TWO MODELS OF GOD CONCEPTS ................................................................................... 63 
 Inherited Definitions ............................................................................................................. 66 
 Reflective and Intuitive Beliefs .......................................................................................... 75 
 Allzumenschliches .................................................................................................................. 79 
 Monotheism and Early Agent Concepts ......................................................................... 89 
 Faith ............................................................................................................................................. 94 
 Theory-of-Mind and Limited Gods ................................................................................... 97 
 Human and Divine Agency in Narrative Representation ........................................ 104 
 Beowulf in the Strange Situation ...................................................................................... 110 
 x 
 
Chapter Page 
 
 
IV. TWO MODELS OF THE SOCIAL SELF ............................................................................... 116 
 Emerging Hierarchy and the Limits of Social Cognition .......................................... 116 
 The Dunbar Number .............................................................................................................. 121 
 Cheaters, Bullies, and Rulers .............................................................................................. 126 
 Deferred Authoritarianism: The Unapproachable Superior .................................. 135 
 The Social Function of the Self ........................................................................................... 141 
 Social Intelligence in Heorot ............................................................................................... 145 
 Beowulf, Lofgeornost ............................................................................................................. 148 
 Hrothgar’s Sermon I: Heremod ......................................................................................... 168 
 Crediting Providence as Pro-Social Signal .................................................................... 175 
V. INGELD, CHRIST, AND BEOWULF ...................................................................................... 177 
 Hierarchy ................................................................................................................................... 177 
 Panoptic Monotheism ........................................................................................................... 181 
 Syncretism and Conversion ................................................................................................ 187 
 Augustine ................................................................................................................................... 197 
 Ingeld and Christ ..................................................................................................................... 213 
 Reduction of Social Relations ............................................................................................. 215 
 Herem .......................................................................................................................................... 219 
 Charlemagne and the Saxons ............................................................................................. 222 
 Olaf Tryggvason ....................................................................................................................... 228 
 St. Brice’s Day ........................................................................................................................... 232 
 Hrothgar’s Sermon II: Mind as Fiefdom, Self as Vassal ............................................ 237 
 xi 
 
Chapter Page 
 
 
 Beowulf and Ingeld ................................................................................................................ 241 
 How to Read the Poem: Is Syncretism Disintegration? ............................................ 251 
REFERENCES CITED ..................................................................................................................... 256 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION: WHAT WOULD BEOWULF THINK? 
 
 A recent trend in literary criticism has adopted observations from cognitive 
and evolutionary psychology as an approach to analyzing the production and 
consumption of literary texts.  In particular, this approach views literature as the 
product of the human preoccupation with learning about others, understanding how 
particular people think, empathizing or condemning them based not only on their 
actions but also their motivations.  The ability to take another’s point of view is such 
an integral and frequently employed aspect of human cognition that it might seem 
deceptively simple.  The reason it seems simple is that the human brain has evolved 
with large neural networks dedicated to keeping track of our fellow humans and 
figuring out their intentions, trustworthiness, limitations, and power to affect our 
own lives.  Other animals share our ability to observe behavior.  The dogs Ivan 
Pavlov used in his pioneering behavioral conditioning experiments could learn to 
expect one of Pavlov’s actions to follow another.  They might expect his ringing of a 
bell to be followed by his delivery of food.  However, this does not require that they 
recognize Pavlov’s purpose in either action, or even that he has a purpose. Pavlov’s 
dogs may be aware, at least to some degree, of their own desires and how they 
intend to pursue them.  That is to say they have a first-order intentionality.  Only 
higher primates have the capacity to go the next step and imagine that behind an 
individual’s action lies another thinking process. To investigate, or even to speculate 
about another’s motivations requires a metarepresentation—a mental 
2 
 
representation of another person’s mental representation relevant to the action or 
situation at hand.  This ability to metarepresent another’s thought process (second-
order intentionality, also called mindreading, or theory-of-mind) depends on 
specialized cognitive architecture resulting from evolutionary selection.  Of course, 
like most aspects of human cognition, it can be cultivated by social interaction.  
However, social interaction does not create the natural human fascination with 
other humans.  If we did not have such a predisposition, we would not be able to 
learn much at all from others.  Research with people with autism, whose ability to 
engage in metarepresentation is impaired, has taught us as much about this ability 
as the observation of its use in social interaction.  Because it is so foundational to 
conscious thought, we might not even realize that it existed at all if it did not 
occasionally fail to develop.   
 Anthropologist Robin Dunbar (“The Social Brain Hypothesis”) has argued 
that metarepresentation was a leading factor in the evolution of human 
consciousness.  With the recognition that other people have intentions and 
limitations similar to our own comes the realization that they can be deceived.  With 
the emergence of deception, the individual must learn to spot and second-guess 
such deception attempts.  The deceiver who learned to fool even these second-
guesses stood a greater chance of dominating resources and procreating.  The ability 
to track these increasingly complex levels of intentionality are the result of a 
cognitive arms race which took place over the course of hominid evolution.  The 
preoccupation with social self-promotion and capacity for intrigue implicit in social 
cognition has led some ethologists to dub it Machiavellian Intelligence (Byrne & 
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Whiten).  Dunbar has further suggested that the survival benefits afforded by social 
intelligence (forming alliances, deceiving rivals, etc.) led to the development of 
language and the human preoccupation with gossip (Grooming, Gossip, and the 
Evolution of Language).  These last two factors contributed, at last, to the 
emergeance of the human art of story-telling.  After all, there are benefits to hearing 
and remembering untrue stories, especially if we do not know which information 
we hear is true.  The individual who can recall and compare multiple versions of a 
story has a better grasp of actual affairs.  We may hear stories about people we will 
never meet and whose actions will never directly impact our lives.  Even in these 
cases, we are offered models of human interaction which inform our own actions 
and refine our own theory-of-mind.   
 Dunbar observes that the communication of narrative from one person to 
another requires third-order intentionality (two metarepresentations, e.g. “I know 
she thinks he’s hiding something”).  He further points out that literature, as an art 
form, requires at least fourth-order intentionality (e.g. “The reader understands that 
the author represents the protagonist as naïve of the antagonist’s true intentions”).  
In her exploration of the function of metarepresentation in literature, Why We Read 
Fiction, Lisa Zunshine traces the levels of metarepresentations which communicate 
to the reader how characters imagine each other.  While she points out that modern 
authors such as Virginia Woolf and Vladimir Nabokov construct high orders of 
intentionality, she underestimates the extent of such mindreading in some earlier 
works. 
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An example of a work of fiction that does not (and perhaps could not, due to 
material realities of its time's textual reproduction) play with multiply 
embedded levels of intentionality the way Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway does [is 
the] Old English epic Beowulf.  Beowulf may never be able to embed more 
than three levels of intentionality, but it still engages our Theory of Mind in 
ways that vary—within certain parameters—from one moment to another 
and from one reader to another (73). 
While I agree with Zunshine’s cognitive approach to literature, I believe that she 
heavily underestimates the use of metarepresentation in Beowulf.  She devotes a 
short section to an explication of the mindreading between Beowulf and Unferth.  
Unlike Dunbar, Zunshine cuts the author out of the levels of intentionality, which 
might be justified.  Readers do not necessarily factor in the author’s thought process 
as they read.  However, limiting this interaction to only the third level of 
intentionality fails to account for the fact that Beowulf knows Unferth’s intent.  We 
know that he knows Unferth’s mind because he adjusts his speech and his self-
representation to the Danish court.  These two engage in a complicated dual of 
representation in which each not only understands the other, but re-represents the 
other before an audience.  In other words, Unferth wants Hrothgar’s court to think 
that Beowulf is overconfident—that Beowulf thinks he is more ready for the fight 
with Grendel than he really is.  Beowulf recognizes what Unferth wants the court to 
think that he thinks and begins to redescribe himself before the Danes.  This, 
however, is not the most complex demonstration of metarepresentation in the poem.  
Later in the poem, Beowulf tells Hygelac a story about Hrothgar’s hopes for a peace 
with the Heathobards.  To ensure peace, Hrothgar bequeathed his daughter to 
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Ingeld, his former enemy.  Beowulf weaves a story in which one Heathobard 
provokes another to violence by metarepresenting the intentions of their new 
Danish allies.  The number of minds which must be read to understand the import of 
this story-within-a-story cannot be reduced below six, which Dunbar suggests is 
likely the maximum number of intentional levels any person can keep in mind at one 
time.  Zunshine uses Beowulf as the primitive first cultural product in a historicist 
progression, demonstrating that theory-of-mind, though it might have evolutionary 
roots, requires local historical development.  While it is true that culture cultivates 
nature, scholars in the humanities are frequently predisposed to overestimate the 
causal power of culture in human thought.  While a particular society may cultivate 
an evolved trait, it cannot create it.  Nor should we expect that human social 
cognition was waiting for Wolfe or Nabokov to light the way to the sixth level of 
intentionality.   
 Focusing on levels of intentionality poses a challenge to the rule of literary 
criticism that a reader should not treat characters as if they were real people.  
Because metarepresentation is so integral to human consciousness, it does not 
require conscious reflection.  As a result, it takes very little to provoke what 
philosopher Daniel Dennett calls the intentional stance.  When we adopt the 
intentional stance, we instantaneously interpret ambiguous stimuli to indicate a 
human or anthropomorphic agent with specific desires, limited beliefs about the 
world, and “enough common sense to do the rational thing given those beliefs and 
desires” (Dennett, 110).  The reflection that the thing we instantly treated as a 
person is non-existent comes only after we have gone a long way in defining the 
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intentional agent.  We may think of reading a book like listening to gossip.  If the 
gossiper is a trusted friend, we process the story as true.  Afterward, if confronted 
with contradictory information, we might remind ourselves that our trusted friend 
might not have his facts straight or might have particular prejudices or motives for 
his representation.  In other words, we remember that the gossiper is actually a link 
in the chain of intentionality.  Before that, however, we likely imagined the story by 
making inferences based on the information presented.   
In their study of reader inference, “What Belongs in a Fictional World?” 
psychologists Deena Skolnick Weisberg and Joshua Goodstein point out that no 
story could be transmitted without a huge number of inferences on the part of the 
reader or listener.  Most of these are so basic that it would seem ridiculous to point 
them out.   
All stories are necessarily incomplete. For example, the Sherlock Holmes 
stories never fully describe Holmes’ appearance or anatomy. Yet it would 
absurd to assume that Holmes can walk through walls, lacks a lung, or digests 
food through his circulatory system just because the stories have left these 
matters unspecified. Readers of the Holmes stories automatically assume 
that he is solid, has two lungs, and has a functioning digestive system even 
though there is not enough explicit information in the text to draw these 
conclusions (69). 
In other words, we cannot read a text without reference to information outside the 
text.  We do not leave Holmes’ anatomy to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s caprice.  If we 
read that Holmes had an octopus tentacle where his left hand should be, we would 
expect an explanation.  If Doyle failed to explain the anomaly, and if it had no 
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relevance to the plot, the reader’s ability to disregard the author as author is 
disrupted, and the extended levels of intentionality are broken.  We are left 
wondering, not what Holmes thinks of his octopus arm, but what Doyle is thinking.  
However, as long as the story fits the majority of the reader’s expectations, the 
author is less prominent in the levels of intentionality.  Though the particular rules 
governing reality may differ in works recognized as fiction, even fantasy stories 
depend on an internal reality that is not left to the author’s caprice.  Our 
expectations of reality extend to social realities.  Not surprisingly, Weisberg and 
Goodstein found that test subjects remembered stories which depict familiar 
thought patterns, emotions, reactions, etc., are far more than they did those which 
violate their expectations.  While, obviously, many social expectations vary from one 
cultural context to another, those which do not (i.e. those which are constrained by 
evolved predispositions) possess an intuitive edge.  Thus, a reader may claim that an 
author doesn’t understand his character, even in a work of fiction.  In such a 
situation, a literary critic should be interested in both the author’s motivation and 
the reader’s expectation.  In other words, a critic would metarepresent the author’s 
metarepresentation of a fictional character and then compare this with a 
metarepresentation of the reader’s metarepresentation of that character.   
The author’s authority in the composition of a narrative is tenuous enough in 
modern fiction.  In the age of oral transmission, it would have been even more so.  
Such is the case in which we find ourselves in relation to Beowulf.  While it is natural 
to refer to the poem as the work of a poet, as nearly every Beowulf scholar does, we 
have no way of knowing if it was the work of one or multiple minds in its current 
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physical, linguistic, or narrative forms.  The story, at least, almost certainly had an 
oral prehistory.  Whether the majority of the verse structure had such a prehistory 
is open to debate.  Oral-formulaic theorists such as Francis Magoun have employed 
theories of ethnographers such as Albert Lord to argue that the majority of the 
poem could have existed in oral form for centuries before it was committed to 
parchment.  In this light, we are forced to admit a gap in our chain of intentionality.  
We may construct a designer based on our own appraisal of the design.  However, 
this is metarepresentation.  In fact, it is a much more tenuous metarepresentation 
than imagining the characters as actual people.  We need not assume than an author 
in Anglo-Saxon England had ideas of human thought which would be 
incomprehensible today.  Though the objects which trigger greed, joy, or loyalty 
differ, no reader or audience would accept a character who was enraged to boredom 
or baffled by monotony.  An author could portray a character who repaid kindness 
with revenge, but she could not expect any reader in any culture to read of such an 
act with approval, at least not without extensive explanation.  Metarepresentation 
functions similarly across place and time, though the trappings may change slightly.  
This is why our own metarepresentations of the characters in Beowulf is not only 
permissible, but unavoidable.  In a parallel argument to that posed by oral-formulaic 
theory, we may observe that stories can be transmitted and retransmitted with 
relative fidelity insofar as they resemble the expectations of the individuals who 
transmit them.  Though the objects and associations that trigger human 
intentionality may change, those that do not may be so obvious that we forget them.   
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This is not to say that culture cannot change the way an individual employs 
cognitive predispositions.  A key tenet of the current argument is that culture can 
profoundly influence cognition, but it cannot eliminate or create cognitive biases 
which have no grounding in evolved, task-specific, mental mechanisms.  Culture, as 
cultivation, must work with what nature provides.  Moreover, culture does not 
originate outside of nature but is constituted by the aggregation of individuals 
acting on inherited cognitive predispositions that have been honed through 
interaction in their lived environments (Pinker; Cosmides & Tooby).  The model of 
social intelligence that underlies the interactions in Beowulf has clear analogues in 
small-scale societies as distant in culture and time as modern hunter-gatherers.  It 
exploits cognitive predispositions which are, statistically speaking, species 
universals.  Contrary to Zunshine’s appraisal, Beowulf illustrates extended and 
complex levels of metarepresentation.  Like like its Germanic and Norse analogues, 
the story represents characters who metarepresent other characters as a matter of 
necessity in a society not governed by social institutions large enough or strong 
enough to enforce pro-social behavior in all of its population.  The world depicted in 
the poem and its analogues is a world in which the individual must protect himself 
by forming alliances, guarding against deceit, assessing and outwitting violent rivals, 
and negotiating peace agreements which are enforced by nothing other than the 
perceived self-interest of those involved.  While these characteristics are not 
unfamiliar today (especially since the cognition that enables them is universal), we 
do not have to employ this kind of thinking to avoid theft and murder on an 
individual level today due to strong centralized governments which are able to 
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investigate and prosecute violence and exploitation.  When we speak of peace 
negotiations today, we nearly always refer to negotiations between nation states, a 
level of human organization which is not subject to any higher authority.  Within 
each nation state, peace is not negotiated but enforced.  Enforcement is 
asymmetrical in that implies recourse to an infrastructure with far greater agency 
than any individual or component group.  In the world depicted in Beowulf, the 
highest level of social organization is not a state or even, strictly speaking, a 
monarchy.  While Hrothgar and Hygelac are designated as kings (cyning, hlaford, 
dryhten), the authority they exercise is not immanent or unassailable.  They must 
manage a complex social network of warrior retainers which remains in a state of 
flux due to the retainers’ capacity for defection, usurpation, and self-motivated in-
group hostility.  In such populations, lacking recourse to higher authorities, the 
ability to know what an ally or enemy knows that you know serves as a clear 
survival skill. 
As these small-scale societies were eventually absorbed into larger units, 
individuals could no longer keep track of the intentions of their fellow group 
members.  The limits of social intelligence were stretched beyond the breaking point.  
Because people in larger populations can exploit their own anonymity to avoid 
retribution for the abuse of others, metarepresentation as a means of avoiding 
exploitation became less effective.  These congealing populations were still 
centuries away from the sort of criminal justice infrastructure which could enable 
the level of law enforcement taken for granted today.  The political structure of early 
Iceland, in many ways analogous to that depicted in Beowulf, could do little more to 
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punish murder than to designate an individual as an outlaw.  This allowed others to 
kill the outlaw without worrying about further retribution, but this strategy could 
not guarantee the capture of the individual or that the outlaw’s kin would not 
succeed in reprisal for his death.  Somewhere between the emergeance of inter-
group anonymity and the establishment of Scotland Yard, a social strategy was 
required that would encourage pro-social behavior between individuals who were 
complete strangers. 
Because this model of social interaction was rooted in evolved 
predispositions, it could not simply be discouraged by a society in which it no longer 
functioned.  It had to be replaced with another sort of social intelligence equally 
grounded in the evolved psyche.   This shift in cognitive models of social interaction 
is evident in the shift of religious conceptions from those of polytheism to those of 
monotheism.  The fact that the spread of Christianity in Northern Europe originated 
with missions from Rome, or that alliances between Anglo-Saxon and Norse kings 
with the Roman and Holy Roman Empires coincided with conversion to Christianity, 
hints at an underlying compatibility in the way centralized religious and political 
institutions cultivate their constituents.  Conversion to Christianity and the growth 
of centralized monarchial states both reduced the need for extensive 
metarepresentation as a means of insuring trust and cooperation.  The use of 
metareprentation in duplicity may have even led those societies to discourage its 
use.    
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This is not to say that religion causes the political amalgamation of tribes into 
empires or that political amalgamation causes monotheism.  Rather, each originates 
independently, but when they emerge in the same social group, each bolsters and 
reinforces the other.  Obviously large scale populations emerged under centralized 
leaders while remaining polytheist, just as monotheism has existed in small 
autonomous socities.  Following the sack of Christian Rome by the Visigoths, many 
remaining polytheists blamed Christianity for the Empire’s dissolution.  However, 
though the unity of the political empire faded, the unity of Christendom replaced it 
as the highest level of social organization.  Though Christendom lacked the level of 
political and economic infrastructure enjoyed by the Roman Empire, especially in its 
ability to enforce pro-social behavior between individuals or factions, it had 
recourse to a deterrent against anti-social behavior.  If an individual believed in 
divine reward or punishment, he might be less likely to abuse his fellow Christian, 
even if he had never seen that fellow Christian or formed any other personal bond 
with him.  This hypothesis, argued by psychologists Azim Shariff, Ara Norenzayan, 
and Joseph Henrich (Birth of the High Gods), helps to explain the religious and 
political transformation of Northern Europe over the five centuries between the 
conversion of Anglo-Saxon England and the conversion of the furthest reaches of 
Scandinavia.  Beowulf depicts a society on one side of this double-conversion (the 
historical Hygelac dating to the early 6th century; Bjork & Obermeier).  The lettering 
used in the manuscript dates its production to the first decade of the eleventh 
century (Dumville), within a decade of the violent conversion of the last 
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Scandinavian polytheists.  As a result, the poem offers a glimpse at a society in the 
midst of the process of centralization of political and theological social structures.  
The shift from a polytheistic to monotheistic explanation requires more than 
the exchange of one creed or one god for another.  Mark Kleiman, Professor of Public 
Policy at UCLA and former Director of Policy and Management Analysis for the 
Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice, as well as an independent Hebrew 
Bible scholar, in an interview with Evolution of God author Robert Wright, offers an 
unconventional appraisal of the different social intelligence schemas espoused by 
polytheism and monotheism: 
I was taught in gradeschool a kind of folk anthropology of religion that said, 
“Back when people were stupid, they believed in many gods.  But now we 
know there’s one God, and that is ethical progress.”  It seems to me that a 
religion that acknowledges that there are multiple forces in the universe that 
are superior to you and possibly beneficent towards you and to whom you 
owe a kind of reverence, and acknowledges that they might come into 
conflict with each other—that your service to Aphrodite or Dionysus might 
exceed the mean and might lead you to violate the principle of justice and 
therefore piss off Zeus—that seems to me a more grown-up set of beliefs 
than the belief that there is a single father in the sky and as long as you are 
right with him, everything is fine.  And your entire moral universe consists of 
doing what he wants.  (Interview, “The Evolution of God: Jewish Edition”) 
In this view, polytheism recognizes contingency and conflict in the natural world 
which even abstract monotheism, such as Deism, has difficulty explaining.  Kleiman 
uses the term reverence to describe polytheism.  Its cognates in monotheism—
devotion, obedience, Islam (“submission”), faith—imply a much stricter 
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subordination of man to god.  Faith requires a more absolute, all-or-nothing regard 
for a god, whereas we may revere those who surpass us while still acknowledging 
their flaws.  As a social marker, faith evokes a binary between the faithful and the 
infidel “faithless.”  Fewer crusades have been waged against the irreverent than 
against the infidel.  Kleiman contrasts “grown-up beliefs” with “single father in the 
sky.”  Father-child imagery permeates monotheistic literature, referring to God as 
“the Father,” and advocating “faith like a child” (Mark 10:15, Luke 18:17) in its 
adherents.  This metaphorical schema evokes the sense of personal security that 
children feel in the presence of parents.  However, it also isolates the moral compass 
in a single entity other than the believer.  As Kleiman says, “as long as you’re right 
with Him, everything is fine.”  The idea that one mind, the mind of God, establishes 
Right and Wrong, is a source of comfort in the faithful.  This source of comfort is, 
however, a problem for Socrates in Plato’s Euthyphro.  If goodness is the result of 
divine will, is it not arbitrary?  Socrates’ charge of arbitrariness depends on an 
understanding of a god as psychically human—having a human understanding.  It is 
an example of metarepresentation.  Polytheism allows for the metarepresentation of 
unseen powers.  Whether a polytheist actually believes in an anthropomorphic 
agent or simply imagines ambiguous phenomena as if it was work of an unseen 
agent, the diversity of gods or phenomena require the individual to deal with 
ontological variability.  Even a polytheist as zealous as Euthyphro must confront the 
Socrates’ division between objectivity and divine will.  If the polytheistic city council 
of Athens was cold in forcing Socrates to choose between exile and hemlock, the 
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papacy’s response to Giordano Bruno’s philosophy may have been warmer, but it 
was hardly preferable.   
 Kleiman’s description carries a value judgment in a modern context.  The 
modern world values an openness to other individuals that requires the 
development of metarepresentation.  However, metarepresentation enables deceit 
and selectivity in pro-social behavior.  Monotheism propounds a universalism which 
promotes cooperation among strangers, turning believers into imagined brothers 
and sisters as children of the same divine father, however genetically heterogeneous 
they may be.  Then again, this universalism requires the whole human universe to 
not only cooperate, but believe.  Enforcing universal belief turns out to be an ugly 
business.  To ensure universal brotherhood under God, mere reverence does not 
suffice, and questioning the reasoning process of divine and human authorities 
threatens the belief which makes the system work.  Conversion is very different 
from inclusion.  The history of the conversion of Northern Europe to Christianity is 
full of initial confusion on this point.  Christian missionaries brought the faith to 
polytheistic kings, and these kings mistakenly offered reverence.  Reverence for one 
god does not decrease the reverence offered to others in a polytheistic schema.  
Over five centuries, the reverence first offered to the Christian God as one among 
others was replaced by exclusive faith, sometimes by the peaceful admonition of 
missionaries and apologists such as Augustine of Hippo and Augustine of 
Canterbury, sometimes by the sword of jingoist despots such as Charlemagne and 
Olaf Tryggvason.   
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 Beowulf originated somewhere during this transition from reverence to faith.  
For two hundred years, scholars have contended over the “Pagan Question”—the 
debate as to what extent elements of the poem express the pre-Christian world of 
the poem’s characters or the Christian world of the manuscript’s production.  Nearly 
every edition and book about the poem published in the 20th and 21st centuries has 
addressed the issue, but nearly all of these have employed expectations about 
“religion” and “paganism” that originate in Christian apologetics.  This frame sends a 
scholar searching for non-Christian parallels to values and beliefs espoused in 
Christian orthodoxy.  We expect that all religions have creeds, that individuals 
identify themselves by these beliefs, that they distinguish these beliefs from more 
mundane beliefs and practices, and, above all, that they devote themselves to gods.  
However, anthropological and cognitive research with modern people from a 
variety of cultural backgrounds and worldviews reveals that these expectations are 
frequently absent from beliefs and practices we normally call religious.  Religion is 
not fundamentally distinct from the rest of our social intelligence.  The way we 
imagine each other is connected to the way we imagine other entities.  The social 
cognition underpinnning monotheism differs from that underpinning both 
polytheism and secular social intelligence.  If we look at the interaction of humans 
and gods in literature from or reflecting Classical and Norse polytheism, we see that 
all characters have similar minds, similar desires, and similar limitations.  Gods and 
humans alike are subject to metarepresentation.  The thoughts and actions of 
humans originate largely within themselves.  Though gods may provoke or oppose 
human thought, their power of influence differs in degree but not in kind from that 
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of mortals.  Most importantly, no single intentional agent acts as the moral absolute.  
Some are more selfish and deceitful than others, but they are praised or condemned 
by moral imperatives external to any particular god.  In this schema, the division 
between human and god is relatively fluid.  In the Eddas, a god is not more divine 
than a jotun; nor is a Homeric titan more so than an Olympian. This schema, which I 
will hereafter refer to as the poly-agent schema of social intelligence, underlies 
polytheism, but it is not limited to theology.   
Its alternative is the omni-agent schema—an imagined social cosmos in 
which all intentional agents are seen as orbiting a central omnipotent, omniscient, 
omnipresent God who is wholly other in all of his aspects from any other agent in 
that cosmos.  In Christian literature, such as that of Augustine of Hippo and the 
Venerable Bede, God’s mind is off limits.  His actions are representable, but his own 
representations are not open to metarepresentation.  We may know his will, but 
only through his own deliberate communication.  We may not second-guess Him.  
Furthermore, since God, as the omniscient and omnipotent punisher of wrongs, 
stands to replace extended social intelligence as a guarantor of social harmony, the 
interest in metarepresenting other humans is diminished in Christian narrative.  
Human will is reduced to the single choice of obedience or disobedience.  Even an 
author as renowed for introspection as Augustine, who metarepresents his former 
self in all of the desires, sensations, frustrations, and emotions, nonetheless 
dismisses these intricacies and reduces them to various forms of human sinfulness.  
God, as Creator, Prime Mover, Heavenly Father, and arbiter of human moral 
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imperatives, by his omniscience and omnipotence, necessarily reduces the agency 
and intentional complexity of other agents in His world.   
Beowulf demonstrates a preoccupation with action, reaction, self-promotion, 
social maneuvering, and a genuine understanding of intricacies of the human mind 
in terms irreducible to sin or faith.  It shares this focus with Classical and Norse 
myths, epics, and sagas to a far greater extent than it resembles the dualistic 
categorization of Christian and heathen which defines the majority of medieval 
Christian narrative.   The world of the poem resembles the world of polytheism 
insofar as it, in Kleiman’s terms, “acknowledges that there are multiple forces in the 
universe that are superior . . . and possibly beneficent . . . and to whom you owe a 
kind of reverence [but which] might come into conflict with each other.”  However, 
the five centuries from the time of the poem’s setting (6th century) to that of the 
manuscript’s production (11th century) saw a confluence of institutions (religious, 
political, and literary) structured on the omni schema.  If the poem can be shown to 
persist in its coherence with the poly-agent schema, this would indicate that it 
preserved much more pre-conversion thinking than has been previously 
acknowledged.    At the time of the manuscript’s production, even the Scandinavians, 
whom the Christian Anglo-Saxons collectively derogated as “heathen Danes,” were 
facing the choice of baptism or death at the hands of ascendant Christian monarchs 
in their own lands.  The survival of Norse myths in this cultural climate was due 
largely to the clever use, by Snorri Sturluson and others, of the frame of euhemerism.  
In this frame, the gods were thought to be mythologized memories of historical 
figures that excelled their contemporaries in political and occult power.  This was 
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enough of a reduction of the gods’ former agency to permit their preservation in the 
relatively inclusive cultural world of Iceland.  It is possible that the inclusion of 
overtly Christian assertions of God’s omni-agency, which are sprinkled throughout 
Beowulf, served a similar function for the poem which would have otherwise stood 
out as quasi-mythical in the near superhuman agency of some of its characters.  In 
opposition to scholars who have argued that Beowulf is a deeply and inexorably 
Christian work, I argue that it preserves a myth incompatible with a belief system 
structured around divine Providence.   
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CHAPTER II 
THE PAGAN QUESTION 
 
Unity of Scholarly Consensus 
If there was a single poet responsible for the poem and written text of Beowulf, 
we don't know anything about him (or her).  We don't know for sure in what 
century he lived.  We do not know what stories, poems, or traditions were extant in 
oral or written form before the poem’s commitment to the Cotton Vitellius A. xv 
manuscript, or to what degree the written poem replicated or redacted that material.  
Still, Anglo-Saxonists for the majority of the 20th century have dutifully affirmed 
that the poem could be nothing other than the work of a singular poetic genius.  
Kevin Kiernan (1981) notes that the manuscript's handwriting changes at line 1939 
and the page shows signs that portions of text were expunged and written over in a 
different script.  Though he argues that the poem was not only written but probably 
composed by at least two authors,  he rushes to assure us that "the essential unity of 
Beowulf is not in question here. . . . Beowulf as it has come down to us is now 
unquestionably unified" (250).  Kiernan knew from scholarly precedent that his 
palimpsest theory risked the label of liedertheorie.   This was the term adopted by 
19th century scholars who, following methods originating in Biblical and Homeric 
criticism, suggested Beowulf could have resulted from the redaction of separate 
preexisting heroic lays by unknown authors in unknown centuries.  Since the 
beginning of the twentieth century when such theories fell out of academic favor, 
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this same term has been used to condemn any similar criticism.  Of liedertheorie, 
Kiernan continues:   
These arguments are systematically rejected by other scholars almost as 
soon as they are made, and it is safe to say that the theory is generally 
repudiated by Beowulfians as a group.  Those who have argued for multiple 
authorship of the poem are characterized as "dissectors" usually with some 
justification (Kiernan, 250). 
Kiernan's argument does not support this affirmation of unity, and the reference 
serves less to compare his argument to specific interpretations than to accord it 
with the predispositions of "Beowulfians as a group."  As Arthur K. Moore observed 
in 1968,  
Since the decline of Liedertheorie the unity of the poem has been repeatedly 
proclaimed, but on the basis of very different relations. The seeming 
agreement between such statements as "The unity of Beowulf has long been 
taken for granted" and "This question of artistic unity need no longer be 
debated" is small agreement indeed, for these affirmations refer to different 
and doubtfully compatible readings (291). 
This perception of agreement seems more characterized by what it opposes than 
what it claims.   
Nowhere is this opposition more polemical than when liedertheorie is 
employed to attribute the poem's production to an era before the Anglo-Saxon 
conversion to Christianity.  The story the poem conveys does not seem to require 
the divine agency which various lines add to the description of the action.  Beowulf, 
who we are told has the strength of thirty men and a track-record as a monster 
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slayer before he arrives at Heorot, uses his unarmed strength to defeat a monster 
that, unbeknownst to the Danes, was protected by magic from weapons.  Grendel 
would have continued to wreak havoc upon the Danes "nefne him wītiġ God wyrd 
forstōde /ond ðæs mannes mōd" (had not wise God and that man's courage overcome 
that fate, 1056-7, Klaeber, 4th ed., my translation).  If it is not immediately clear that 
Grendel's defeat resulted from the dual agency of God and Beowulf, or God via 
Beowulf, the next lines remind us, "The Measurer ruled all mankind then as he does 
now” (Metod eallum wēold / gumena cynnes, swā hē nū ġīt dêð 1057-8).  Several 
passages in Beowulf similarly encase intuitive structures of cause and effect inside 
counterintuitive interpretations deferring agency from the actor to Metod, the 
Measurer, as if action was a commodity meted out by a central distributor.  Early 
scholars suggested that the addition of this interpretation could have come by the 
addition of the lines that articulate it when one or more pre-Christian poems were 
transcribed by Christian monks into the manuscript we have today.  The extent to 
which these Christian references were integral to the poem would indicate, for 
scholars, whether or not the poem could be attributed to a time and a culture before 
conversion and therefore contain lines of thought that did not otherwise survive in 
written form.   
As a result of the decline in popularity of this sort of reading, Old English 
scholars today spend a lot of time and ink explaining away recurring suggestions of 
Anglo-Saxon paganism.  Every comprehensive edition of Beowulf and every book of 
length on the poem has had to address the poem's religious nature and deal with an 
enduring notion among new readers that the poem belongs to a pre-Christian, 
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Germanic polytheism, in the same manner that the Iliad belongs to the world ruled 
by the pantheon on Olympus.  When University of Iowa professor Jonathan Wilcox 
read in a local college newspaper article that a potential student expressed 
excitement about his upcoming Beowulf class, he immediately suspected that this 
"young man, along with many students who take my classes, craves an unmediated 
world of paganism, of pre-Christian gods and goddesses, and of heroic action not 
circumscribed by Christian royal polity"(“Teaching Anglo-Saxon Paganism” 96).   
Wilcox quotes the newspaper article as follows:  "'Oh! Oh! Oh! Cool! Cool! Cool!' said 
an unshaven young man with the enthusiasm of a sweepstakes winner. The source 
of his enthusiasm? A new course offered in the English department. 'Just imagine,' 
he said, 'a whole semester on Beowulf?'"  Doubtlessly informed by experience, it is 
Wilcox, not the student, who introduces notions of paganism and presumes that it 
lies behind this unqualified excitement about the poem.  It is Wilcox who tacitly 
admits that such Christian circumscription is antithetical to enthusiasm.  "For the 
earliest period of Germanic literature, sentiment makes the reader expect to find a 
noble and ennobling Heroic Age, rude but grand" (Stanley 3), or so we're told by the 
conventional wisdom of 20th century Anglo-Saxonists.  At the very least, such a 
student may become too preoccupied with the setting and story communicated by 
the poem rather than with the wording of the poem itself, "the poem as poem," as 
Tolkien calls us to focus our attention.  It falls to the academy, therefore, to 
circumscribe the poem with scholarly conventions and warnings against corrosive 
alternatives.  
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In their 2007 edition of Klaeber's Beowulf, R. D. Fulk, Robert E. Bjork, and John 
D. Niles assure us that "few specialists in Beowulf studies now dispute the 
essentially Christian character of either the poem or the milieu in which it arose" 
(lxvii).  Larry Benson, in his essay "The Pagan Coloring of Beowulf," does the same: 
"The old theory that Beowulf is an essentially pagan work only slightly colored with 
the Christianity of a later scribe has now been dead for many years, and critics today 
generally agree that the poem is the unified work of a Christian author"(193).  In her 
essay "Paganism in Beowulf: A Semantic Fairy-Tale," Christine Fell assures us, "Since 
the first edition of Beowulf reached the public, or at any rate the learned, scholars 
have repeatedly pointed out that the Christianity of the poem is not a matter of 
scribal imposition but integral" (Fell, 20).  Although the arguments that follow these 
affirmations are less clear about what constitutes "Christianity" in a poem or how its 
"essence" is to be gauged, they agree that they agree that it is "Christianity" and it is 
"essential."   
The poem contains many references to metod, "the Measurer," wuldres 
wealdend, "the Wielder of Glory," halig dryhten, "Holy Lord," fæder alwalda, "Father 
Almighty," all of which resemble references to the Christian God in ecclesiastical 
texts.  We would not expect to find a specific name, such as Jehovah or Yahweh, 
though we may note the conspicuous lack of reference to Jesus in the poem.  In the 
absence of a name, we may take all references to an especially powerful 
anthropomorphic agent to specify the same god who dined on curds and veal with 
Abraham underneath the terebinth trees at Mamre (Genesis 18), whose archangel, 
Satan, rebelled and began an eternal war for the souls of humanity, and whose son, 
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Jesus, incarnated his "Logos" (John 1:1) and died to atone for humanity's inherited 
sin.  Even today, in modern English, the job description "God," unless begun with a 
lower-case g or prefaced by an indefinite article, is taken to be as specific in its 
referent as the names Jehovah, Yahweh, or Elohim.  This was enough for St. Paul, 
who tells the polytheistic Athenians, "as I walked around and looked carefully at 
your objects of worship, I even found an altar with this inscription: to an unknown 
god.  Now what you worship as something unknown I am going to proclaim to you" 
(Acts 17:23; all Biblical quotations from NRSV). What is not otherwise specified is 
interpreted as reference to the familiar. 
So too, in the absence of any specific identification, we must rely on the job 
description, "the Beowulf poet," to name our poem's intelligent designer.  
Beowulfians, as Kiernan says, have affirmed that it is a unified poem, and a unified 
poem must have a singular poet.  A singular poet will have a singular religious 
affiliation which will of necessity define his poem.  Such a reduction of the scholarly 
consensus does not bear the same power of persuasion as the reminder that it is 
scholarly consensus.  Introductions to the poem's religion, such as those above, are 
quick to offer this fact of consensus, somewhat tautologically, as its primary 
evidence for the claims of that consensus.  If such a consensus relies on what Moore 
called "small agreement indeed" in its claims, it can be defined more tangibly by 
what it is not.  Whatever problems Kiernan's palimpsest theory poses to arguments 
about the poem's ultimate unity, he inscribes his argument within the circumscribed 
scholarly consensus by dissociating it from the arguments of their common 
opposition, "the dissectors"—liedertheorists, oral-formulaic theorists, structuralists, 
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and others who see the poem as the result of a process rather than a singular 
purpose.   
Defining by Opposition 
Jacob Grimm and subsequent German folklorists and literary scholars 
throughout the 19th century, perhaps motivated by nationalist desires for a classical 
literature of their own, perhaps influenced by the discoveries of the histories of 
redaction of the Bible and Homeric epics, collected oral and literate fragments of 
Northern European antiquity wherever available.  They regarded Old English as 
linguistically close enough in its origin to German to potentially contain some 
vestigial references to pre-Christian (and therefore pre-Romanized) Teutonic 
culture discoverable by philological scrutiny.  They observed that, because nearly all 
surviving Old English literature owed its preservation on parchment or vellum to 
the labor and resources of the church, the conditions of this material production 
necessitated a particular ideological constraint.  They suggested that texts such as 
Beowulf could have had previous incarnations without the scattered references to 
Christian theology.  They suggested that a pagan heroic poem could have received a 
supplemental and superfluous "Christian coloring" by redactors and scribes bound 
by such ideological constraints.   
Authorial Intent 
In "Paganism in Beowulf: A Semantic Fairy-Tale," Christine Fell argues that 
the occasional references to paganism in contemporary Anglo-Saxon scholarship are 
little more than echoes from Grimm's time.  "[T]he nineteenth century laid the 
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foundations for much of what we think and the ways in which we today approach 
our material...much of their thinking is the foundation-stone of persistent 
mythologies in twentieth-century scholarship"(9).   According to Fell, references to 
Beowulf's pagan origins in the 20th century (specifically essays by her co-
contributors in the Cambridge Companion to Old English Literature, John Niles and 
Fred Robinson) mimic the "ur-factor" of early philological scholarship:  the 
preference for origins over intention as the goal of criticism.  "We have been taught 
to look at family trees and relationships not only in philology but also in mythology 
and legend"(9-10).  The alternative methodology she proposes would "shift the 
emphasis to use and meaning  [requiring] words to be accepted as meaning what 
people use them to mean, rather than letting etymology or the meaning of an earlier 
century or decade be the arbiter"(9).  Meaning, in this criticism, is determined by 
authorial intent.  Philology is taken as reductive, and thus an insult to the author 
whose intent it ignores. 
 Consequently, most 20th century scholarship has characterized redaction 
theories as not merely reductive but pejorative.  It is taken as a matter of course that 
redaction scholarship is anti-Christian.  Fell assures us that, when it appears in 
philological scholarship, a phrase such as “’Christian scribes’ is a pejorative phrase 
meaning nincompoops who did not grasp the significance and the quality of the 
works they were preserving” (13).  The phrase "Christian coloring" according to 
Fulk, Bjork, and Niles, "previously had been used in a pejorative manner to refer to 
the poem's religious content" (lxxi).  
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Manufactured Opposition 
Eric Stanley selected a large number of quotations he found to be offensive or 
pejorative in 19th and early 20th century scholarship, which he subsequently 
published as a series of articles (1964-5) and again in his book The Search for Anglo-
Saxon Paganism.  This book has been taken as a thorough review of the discussion of 
religion in Beowulf and is frequently recommended in introductions to the subject.  
Stanley tells us that: 
 The aim of these chapters is to point to the continuity of a critical attitude 
which exalts whatever in the Germanic literature of the Dark Ages is 
primitive (that is, pagan), and belittles or even fails to understand whatever 
in it is civilized, learned, and cosmopolitan (that is, inspired by Christianity). 
(Anglo-Saxon Paganism, 3, Stanley's parentheses) 
This introduction immediately couches a discussion of one perceived value-
judgment in terms of another and, in doing so, reveals the presumptions that led to 
the initial offense.  According to Stanley’s claim, if something in the poetry is 
attributed to anything other than Christianity, it cannot be civilized, learned or 
cosmopolitan.  “Christianity,” in that sense, simply means “good.”  Stanley is most 
distressed by the “refusal to read a profoundly Christian literature as the Christian 
writings of a Christian people”(79). 
Edward B. Irving Jr., in his essay "Pagan and Christian Elements," tells us that 
Stanley's "quotes tell their own undeniable and embarrassing story" (183).  Irving 
does not specify if it is the deceased authors of the passages that are to be 
embarrassed or if he personifies the quotations themselves, but the reference to 
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such a normative emotion draws our attention to the social-identity investments 
already active in the polemic.  Stanley, however, does not leave the quotes to tell 
their own story but circumscribes them with his own interpretations: 
As in Germany so in England the national poetic heritage was withered at the 
blighting touch of Christianity. That is how Jacob Grimm saw it: "After the 
introduction of Christianity the art of poetry took a religious turn, to which 
we owe many remarkable poems. But the freedom of the poetry and its roots 
in the people had perished." (10) 
The translation of Grimm's words in quotation marks is Stanley's own, yet it does 
not match the interpretation that precedes it.  Grimm's metaphor is one of 
restriction, invoking a schema akin to that chose by Wilcox when he says that the 
poem was “circumscribed [‘written around’ or ‘surrounded by written limits’] by 
Christian polity.”  Stanley's preface, on the other hand, adds the disease metaphor of 
"blighting touch," telling us rather than showing us that this "is how Jacob Grimm 
saw it."  Saying that Christianity prescribes limits on the content of poetry doesn't 
provoke quite the same sense of indignation produced by calling the religion as a 
whole a disease.  Stanley primes his reader's emotional reaction before the actual 
quote, and it becomes easy to forget the distinction.  In Desire for Origins, Allen J. 
Frantzen includes Stanley's interpolation as if it were a direct quote from Grimm:  
"According to Grimm, the history of native poetry, Dichtkunst, was drastically 
altered by 'the blighting touch of Christianity,' which caused 'the freedom of the 
poetry and its roots in the people' to perish"(Frantzen, 70).  In Frantzen’s text, 
Grimm’s actual argument has been wholly replaced by a straw-man of Stanley’s 
fabrication. 
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Elsewhere, Stanley accuses M. Bentinck Smith of “out and out disparagement” 
(71) when she illustrates the dependence of the Old English Andreas on imagery 
more closely tied to Northern European than Biblical Mediterranean contexts.  As 
Stanley quotes Bentinck Smith: “St Andrew, though professedly a Christian saint, is, 
in reality, a viking, though crusader in name he is more truly a seafarer on 
adventure bent. The Christ he serves is an aetheling, the apostles are folctogan 
captains of the people, and temporal victory, not merely spiritual triumph, is the 
goal.”  Stanley follows with his own interpretation: “In a context systematically 
disparaging Christianity the overtones of merely, in ‘merely spiritual’, must be taken 
to be the intended expression of a characteristic attitude to a saint's life, here 
desacralized as a romance of the sea” (71).  He does not allow that “merely” could 
merely mean “only,” as in “the goal is not only spiritual but also temporal victory.”  
Even if Smith showed a preference for the temporal story from which the spiritual 
narrative takes its allegory, her imagined intentions rather than her argument 
preoccupy Stanley’s analysis.   
Throughout The Search for Anglo Saxon Paganism, Stanley's decontextualized 
quotes and subjective over-interpretation create a straw-man for theologically-
minded scholars to castigate.  The redactionists are simply “thesis-mongers trained 
in the German universities” (63) who "followed Grimm and Vilmar, often with 
dutiful simple-mindedness”(67).  "Grimm and his followers were often led to pagan 
deities by fanciful etymologies"(70) resulting from "great gain in philological 
knowledge and great loss in literary good sense" (27) and motivated by "the wishful 
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thought that such Old English literature as is not obviously Christian in subject-
matter is pre-Christian and therefore early”(40).   
Though Stanley did little to prevent the tu quoque argument provided here, 
his own bias did not seem to complicate the authority he has been granted by later 
scholarship.  Christine Fell assures us that "Eric Stanley did us a great service in his 
collected essays on The Search for Anglo-Saxon Paganism in alerting us to the 
dedication and determination with which the nineteenth century pursued this 
demmed elusive Pimpernel. "(10-11).   In Desire for Origins, itself a widely 
referenced history of Old English scholarship, Allen Frantzen says, "Eric Stanley's 
The Search for Anglo-Saxon Paganism, a series of short notes published as a book in 
1975, demonstrates the many ways in which scholarship prior to our own time was 
misguided and amateurish" (Frantzen, 8). 
Tolkien: Critics as Monsters  
Stanley's search for an offense to justify his predetermined outrage is not 
unprecedented in Old English scholarship.  In arguably the most famous secondary 
text discussing Beowulf, J. R. R. Tolkien takes redaction criticism as a direct attack 
upon the value of the work itself and the author's unifying intent.  "Beowulf: the 
Monsters and the Critics" (cited here, unless otherwise noted, from the earlier "A" 
text, edited by Michael Drout) is rightfully remembered as a decisive contradiction 
of the position articulated by W. P. Ker's statement that the poem's focus on 
monsters instead of semi-historical human characters displays a "radical defect, a 
disproportion that puts the irrelevances in the centre and the serious things on the 
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outer edges" (Tolkien, 52, from Ker's Dark Ages).  However, Tolkien treats Ker 
relatively gingerly, compared to earlier critics.  These he rarely quotes directly, but 
paraphrases their references to the poet and poem as "half-baked," "feeble," 
"incompetent," "aping," and "silly."  Besides Ker's, the few quotations Tolkien 
includes do not contain such derisive terms.  In a note to the Gollancz Lecture 
edition published in the Proceedings of the British Academy, Tolkien explains this 
paraphrase by saying "I include nothing that has not somewhere been said by 
someone, if not in my exact words; but I do not, of course, attempt to represent all 
the dicta, wise or otherwise, that have been uttered"(289). 
Taking aim at passages from  Archibald Strong's 1921 A Short History of 
English Literature, Tolkien quotes Strong, "The main story deals with the adventures 
of Beowulf in his contest with ogres and dragons” and follows with his own surmise 
that “there is bias in these plurals" (34).  Without describing what the bias is or how 
it may be interpreted through the surrounding text or contextual material, Tolkien 
simply moves on as if the bias were self evident.  The sentence by Strong which 
seems to infuriate Tolkien the most, perhaps even provoking the essay itself, is the 
following: "The main interest which the poem has for us is thus not a purely literary 
interest. Beowulf is an important historical document, recreating for us a whole 
society, telling us, in most authentic fashion, of life as it was lived in far-off heathen 
days" (35, Tolkien's emphasis).  Tolkien takes this statement to mean either that "it 
is held that the literary merits of Beowulf are so small that its historical interest . . . is 
the only one which can today attract a rational person of culture" or that Strong 
insults the work by "confusing" the study of a work of art with the "quarrying" of 
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historical information.  Strong, at least in the quotes cited, does not attack the 
literary merits of the poem, as Tolkien suggests, nor does he define the "us" with 
whom he identifies himself to be every "rational person of culture" as Tolkien 
interpolates.   As with Stanley's interpretation of "merely spiritual" above, Strong's 
phrase "not a purely literary interest" is perceived as an attack solely on the 
grounds that it does not affirm "purely literary interest." 
Tolkien takes further offense at assumed condescension in the statement that 
Beowulf is "worth studying."    
The odd thing is that amidst all this Babel we catch one constant refrain: it is 
steadily said to be 'worth studying'. It is true that this is often qualified thus: 
'it is the most worthy of study amongst Anglo-Saxon remains' (this being said 
in sometimes in tones that suggest that Andaman-islanders could be 
substituted for Anglo-Saxons). (33, Tolkien's parentheses) 
The parenthetical phrase is difficult to decipher outside of a conceptual frame that 
presumes scientific detachment is an attitude reserved for rock strata and less-than-
English cultures.  This choice of peoples may have had less to do with the peoples 
themselves than the intellectual context in which they appeared in contemporary 
academic discourse.  Alfred Radcliffe-Brown’s 1922 The Andaman Islanders 
introduced Emile Durkheim’s functionalist approach to anthropology to the English-
speaking world.  The functionalist approach, focusing on social structures rather 
than individual self-explanation, may have resembled the detachment in Ker and 
Strong which Tolkien took as insulting in its lack of deference to authorial intent. 
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If Strong's statement that Beowulf is "worth studying" and primarily of 
interest as a historical text were insulting, Tolkien's value judgments are even less 
conditional.  He refers to scholars such as Strong as "fools who have trespassed in 
the confidence of their ignorance on paths too difficult for their dainty feet," (41) 
whose works "ought to be on an index expurgatorius or publicly burnt" (33, 
Tolkien's emphasis).  Besides obviously escalating the polemic, this choice of 
language introduces metaphors of authority and insubordination.  Redaction critics 
are trespassers, though the demarcation of the boundary they have crossed and 
upon whose authority that boundary was drawn remain unclear.  The reference to 
an index expurgatorius invokes assumptions of a canon to which such material is 
opposed and an authoritative body to decide that it is so. 
Tolkien, like Stanley, establishes the straw-man alternative which 
subsequent scholars may use to label all redaction scholarship, inverting a value-
laden polemic he perceived but failed to illustrate.  This alternative is relegated to 
the past, but remains present enough to serve as a label for similarly offensive 
scholarship as it occurs. 
But knowledge percolates slowly, and the dead dogmas of buried scientists 
often in mythopoeic perversion are the science of popular belief and the 
journalist today. So we can still hear of Grendel as symbolic of the sea, and 
Beowulf of the sun and of the redacting Christian monks in popular 
compendia still on the shelves of responsible book-shops. (Tolkien, 48) 
With Tolkien's authoritative precedent, scholars who demand a Christian Beowulf 
can, as Stanley and Fell eagerly do, likewise label subsequent structural and 
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anthropological study of the poem's mythic intertextuality as a "perversion" of the 
intended unity—a unity defined against a straw-man fabricated from 
decontextualized quotes and exaggerated interpretation (a phenomenon not so far 
removed from redaction).  All criticism which does not honor the authority of the 
author or the unprecedented artistic originality of the written text shares in what 
Tolkien dismisses as "willful stupidity" (63).  It is this characterization rather than 
the actual scholarly texts which survives in Kiernan's summary: 
The idea first surfaced as the so-called Liedertheorie, which held that the 
poem consists of many originally separate lays, loosely slapped together by 
carefree interpolators or enterprising scribes. Expressed in this way, the 
theory amounts to what most readers have rightly dismissed as an impotent 
assault on the artistic integrity of the poem. (248) 
Whether it is an "assault" depends on the fact that it is "expressed in this way," with 
terms such as "carefree" and "loosely slapped together."  This characterization, 
inherited from Tolkien, Stanley, and others, may depend less on what actual 
scholars were saying than on what they were perceived to be doing. 
Threat of Disintegration 
Stanley, like Tolkien, took historical or otherwise "scientific" approaches to 
the poem as an attack and an act of "disintegration."  He titles a chapter: "Stock 
Views Disintegrating Old English Poems and Finding Germanic Antiquities in them."  
For Stanley, "The history of the disintegration of Beowulf" was a lamentable time of 
crisis in which "scholars were hacking the poem about"(42).  This metaphor takes 
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for granted the initial unity of the poem and attributes evidence of redaction not to 
the actual process of redaction but to the "hacking" of that preexisting unity. 
 For Tolkien, "too much 'research' of the kind . . . is not so much criticism of 
the poem as mining in it"(32).  Tolkien's oft-cited allegory of criticism compares the 
poem to a rock-garden constructed from the ruins of an ancient edifice. 
A man found a mass of old stone in a unused patch, and made of it a rock 
garden; but his friends coming perceived that the stones had once been part 
of a more ancient building, and they turned them upsidedown to look for 
hidden inscriptions; some suspected a deposit of coal under the soil and 
proceeded to dig for it. They all said "this garden is most interesting," but 
they said also "what a jumble and confusion it is in!" — and even the 
gardener's best friend, who might have been expected to understand what he 
had been about, was heard to say: "he's such a tiresome fellow — fancy using 
those beautiful stones just to set off commonplace flowers that are found in 
every garden: he has no sense of proportion, poor man."(Tolkien, 32) 
Just in case this allegory failed to characterize the malicious destructiveness Tolkien 
felt in the criticism he targeted, his revision for the version presented in the Gollancz 
Lecture further polemicizes his argument: 
I would express the whole industry in yet another allegory.  A man inherited 
a field in which was an accumulation of old stone, part of an older hall. Of the 
old stone some had already been used in building the house in which he 
actually lived, not far from the old house of his fathers.  Of the rest he took 
some and built a tower. But his friends coming perceived at once (without 
troubling to climb the steps) that these stones had formerly belonged to a 
more ancient building. So they pushed the tower over, with no little labour, in 
order to look for hidden carvings and inscriptions, or to discover whence the 
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man's distant forefathers had obtained their 'building material.' Some 
suspecting a deposit of coal under the soil, began to dig for it, and forgot even 
the stones. They all said: 'This tower is most interesting.' But they also said 
(after pushing it over): 'What a muddle it is in!' And even the man's own 
descendants, who might have been expected to consider what he had been 
about, were heard to murmur: 'He is such an odd fellow! Imagine his using 
these old stones just to build a nonsensical tower! Why did not he restore the 
old house?  He has no sense of proportion.' But from the top of that tower the 
man had been able to look out upon the sea. (248-9)  
Tolkien goes on to explain the friends' insults in relation to scholars and quotations 
described above.  The gardener or tower-builder, we may assume, is the author, the 
garden and tower the poem, and the stones the jumbled fragments of past lays and 
legends that appear in the poem either as references or formal precedents.  The 
tenor behind both the flowers and the view of the sea is more ambiguous, but in 
either case, it is something that transcends the reductive scrutiny of the stone-
picking friends. 
This analogy is salient but somewhat misleading in its application.  Neither 
structural nor philological analysis actually destroys anything.  No preexisting 
whole has actually been reduced—a frequent confusion implicit in the use of the 
term "reductionist" in similar reactions.  More importantly, this parable is less 
occupied with the accurate representation of either of the critical methodologies 
under review than it is with the excitation of social empathy and reaction in the 
audience.  We sympathize with the gardener because his friends destroy his 
personal property and mock him behind his back.  As with Stanley's rewording of 
Grimm, above, the audience has been emotionally primed by images of persecution.  
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The critics have betrayed their friend, or even, in the final edition, their ancestor, the 
poet, by failing to subordinate their interpretations to his intent. 
In this context, Strong's "worth studying" can be more easily interpreted as 
an offense, given that his interest is not with authorial intent but with the poem’s 
pre-literate history.  As such, it is a destructive interest that can only destroy the 
transcendental mystery of what it studies.  "And behind this," Tolkien warns us, "lies 
the shadow of nineteenth-century 'research', modeled partly after, and directed 
according to the purposes of analytic science"(54).  The invocation of the threat of 
scientific reductionism invites the commonplace analogy of "dissection" to which 
Kiernan referred.  "The history of the disintegration of Beowulf" Eric Stanley tells us, 
"is well told by John Earle," who, in his 1892 book The Deeds of Beowulf, 
foreshadows Tolkien's and Stanley's fears of reductionism: 
The minute examination of the text has been stimulated by the passionate 
desire of demonstrating that the poem is not what it seems, a poetical unit, 
the work of an author, but that it is a cluster of older and later material 
fortuitously aggregated, in short, that it is not that highly organized thing 
which is called a Poem, the life of which is found in unity of purpose and 
harmony of parts, but that, on the contrary, it is a thing of low organism, 
which is nowise injured by being torn asunder, inasmuch as the life of it 
resides in the parts and not in the whole—a thing without a core or any 
organic centre. (John Earle, quoted approvingly by Stanley, 43) 
Earle anthropomorphizes the text in order to characterize its critics as those who 
would tear a living thing to pieces, insulting it first as "a thing of low organism."  
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Tolkien, in the explanation of his tower analogy (in which the text is an intentional 
artifact) mixes in the metaphor of the anthropomorphic text: 
A story cannot be judged from its summarized plot, but only from the way 
this is told, and from the ideas and feelings which are stirred in the author — 
whether ever consciously formulated by him or not — in the telling, and 
which breathe a life and purpose into it. To judge of Beowulf, to try indeed to 
form any conception of it from stuff of this sort is to attempt an estimate of a 
great man from his skeleton. (Tolkien 34) 
And later: 
One does not necessarily advance in acquaintance with a man, or 
understanding of his thought, either by studying his ancestors, or by 
dissecting his person. But dissection was for long the order of the day: 
dissection not only into heathen original and Christian interpolation, but into 
the component lays which had somehow — it never became clear quite how, 
fortuitously or arbitrarily — became conjoined into an "epic." (Tolkien, 45-6) 
Tolkien inverts a time frame in the second quote.  Redaction theory argues, in his 
terms, that component lays become conjoined into an epic.  This is a movement from 
parts to whole (technically from wholes to macro-wholes).  The dissection metaphor, 
to which Tolkien, Earle, and Stanley continually return, imagines a movement from 
whole into parts.  As with the tower metaphor, the unity is presupposed to predate 
the parts.  The parts are what is left over from the disintegration, dissection, or 
"pushing the tower over."  Though chronologically inconsistent, the metaphor, as 
illustrated in Earle's quote, takes as its tenor the giving or taking of life.  Without 
"ideas and feelings" which "breathe a life and purpose" into the work, we are left 
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with the unimaginable alternative of "cluster of older and later material fortuitously 
aggregated" (Earle), "fortuitously or arbitrarily...conjoined" (Tolkien).    
The terminology in the former Tolkien quote, where the author's ideas 
"breathe a life and a purpose" into the poem, are unmistakably derived from Biblical 
imagery of divine creation.  "The Lord God formed the man from the dust of the 
ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and the man became a living 
being"(Genesis 1:7).  Their application to the act of authorship, and the implication 
that those who do not affirm the individual sovereignty of the author are attacking 
him and destroying his great work, call attention to a parallel that runs, more or less 
conspicuously, throughout the debate about the unity of Beowulf and sheds light on 
the preoccupation of this debate with the importance of Christian passages to that 
whole.  The dichotomies of life-death, whole-parts, intention-origin, and poem-myth 
collapse into a single bifurcation of scholarship in which the first terms are united 
by a single authorial act of creation, and the second terms by hostility toward that 
creation. 
Mere Stories vs. Great Man 
What Tolkien opposes are the "beliefs about the accidental growth of epics" 
(46), not the fact of the epic's pre-Christian and pre-poem influences.  He admits 
that the name Ingwine, used for the Danes (lines 1044 and 1319, meaning friends of 
the god Ing or Freyr) has a pagan reference, but calls it "a fossil which may indicate 
the character of the stones used in the building, but says nothing of the use to which 
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the architect has put them" (39).  It is not pagan because the author did not mean it 
to be.   He further recognizes that: 
The old tale was not first told by our author. The sluggish bear's son with his 
hug who wakes up and becomes famous is a very old folk tale, the legendary 
association of the Danish and Heorot with a marauding monster, and of the 
arrival from abroad of a "champion" of the "bear-anger" was not invented by 
our poet. There are clear traces of it in Scandinavian tradition. The "plot" is not 
his, though he has poured feeling into it quite different from its simple crude 
essentials. And that plot is not perfect as the vehicle of the ideas aroused in the 
poet in making his poem. (77, my emphasis) 
Just as Adam, before his author breathed life into him, existed as mere dust, so the 
plot, the tradition, and the old folk tale are nothing but "simple crude essentials" 
without a authoritative will to make them a vehicle for his own ideas.  The value 
judgment is Tolkien's own, which may explain why his ire is excited by scholarship 
that values this material.   He frequently makes generalizations about a universal 
Germanic brooding on doom, adding the conditional clause "though in what plane 
such value was realized the Germanic North never found (and probably unaided 
never would have found) a coherent or explicit theory" (67).  The implication is that 
without a coherent or explicit theory, we have nothing authentic to contrast or 
compete with the author's presumed Christian allegory.   
Paganism is rarely a unified system, it is variable locally and in time; and its 
fragments in the North reach record in tattered form from times of confused 
or faulty memories, the periods of decay, or periods long after such things 
had become only conventional trappings of poetry and the amusements of 
antiquarians like Snorri — almost as far from real paganism as an 18th 
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century Jove or Mars. We glimpse there a heaven and a hell — the one rather 
the reward of courage the other the punishment of feebleness; but among 
much that is crude or unshapen, or confused with other ideas ill assimilated 
(possibly of extraneous, or Christian origin), the most dominant motive is 
that of courage, apprehended mystically as valuable in the war of Gods and 
men against their common enemy in Chaos and Darkness. (Tolkien, 67, my 
emphasis) 
We can see operative in Tolkien's description of recorded Icelandic myth a whole 
series of expectations derived from familiarity with Christianity.  Of the nine worlds 
in the cosmology described in the Eddas, he focuses only on the two he may 
translate into the Christian terms heaven and hell.  He searches for a counterpart to 
the Christian doctrine of salvation and seems disappointed only to find vague 
notions of courage and weakness.  Taking the "unified system" of Christian 
orthodoxy, recorded in text and preserved by a well-funded international institution, 
as the standard by which religion and religious narrative it to be gauged, Tolkien 
discredits any potential for influence that mythic traditions could have had on the 
shape of the text of Beowulf.  Given his predilection for monolithic purpose, 
"confused or faulty memories," "decay," and "conventional trappings of poetry" 
could only be dead material awaiting the authorial breath of life.   
In a somewhat tautological argument, he describes Snorri Sturlusson as an 
antiquarian rather than an author.  Snorri did exactly what redaction criticism 
claims that the Beowulf poet(s) did—he compiled a unified work in a Christian age 
from disparate pre-existing myths of gods and heroes.   Though he was a Christian 
author writing in a Christian age, he was able to tell the stories of pre-Christian gods 
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as stories within the frame of mild euhemerism in "The Deluding of Gylfi.”  However, 
Tolkien has already delegitimated this activity as "dead" and "muddleheaded."  
Therefore, for Tolkien, Snorri must be nothing more than an antiquarian.  Whatever 
Snorri's artistic contributions (and these are significant) the fact that we have 
parallel texts with similar stories that did not originate with him undermines the 
mystique of authorial authority within the work. 
Christine Fell seizes upon the complicated nature of Icelandic Edda and saga 
production to illustrate the problems of interpretation by authorial intent. 
It is true that it is easier in the world of late Middle English or of Icelandic 
saga, where there are multiple and widely different manuscripts of individual 
texts, to remember that we are in an age where the concept of authorial 
responsibility is different from our own. But even within the Anglo-Saxon 
world, where mostly we have only one manuscript of any extant poem and it 
is therefore particularly easy to slip into the fallacy of author intent, such 
matters of common knowledge as the variant texts, variant in period, in 
dialect, and in medium of preservation, of The Dream of the Rood ought to 
keep us on our guard. Even where a manuscript is from the Anglo-Saxon 
period there are few poems we can assign confidently to a named author. (17, 
my emphasis) 
Fell's caution comes not in reference to Beowulf but as an attack aimed at John D. 
Niles, whose essay "Pagan Survivals and Popular Belief" in the Cambridge 
Companion to Old English Literature refers to the author of the Old English Rune 
Poem "with as much confidence as if we knew of the existence of such a person" 
(Fell 17).  The passage in question comes as Niles attempts to describe the Rune 
Poem as a more or less redacted work:  "The Rune Poem may take its starting point 
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from ancient Germanic tradition, but as it stands, it shows how deftly the author 
rehabilitated barbaric culture so as to render it innocent within the context of 
Christian faith"(Niles, 135-6).  Fell defends the position that the poem could have 
been the result of "natural semantic development within a Christian environment" 
(17).  Their two positions are not as far apart as Fell's reaction would suggest.  In 
Niles' terms, the authorship involved in the Rune Poem was primarily an "act of 
appropriation" (135, a process he describes more fully in his essay "Appropriations: 
A Concept of Culture"), not quite the work of Tolkien's "great man."   
Fell does not apply the same caution to discussions of the intent of the 
Beowulf poet.  She gives the presumed author total authority over subsequent 
interpretations, even over the inclusion of names with documented pre-Christian 
cognates.  
The list of folk-tale creatures, the eotenas, ylfe and orcneas are so clearly 
labelled progeny of Cain as Grendel is so clearly labelled 'heathen' that this 
shows, not lurking paganism, but an author determined  to detach himself 
from any suspicions. The mentality is like that of King Alfred when he 
carefully explains that 'what we call Wyrd that is God's providence' or 
defends his description of the goldsmith Weland as 'wise' on the grounds that 
Weland was a skilled craftsman — just in case anyone foolishly thought he 
might be responding to supernatural implications of pre-Christian Germanic 
legend. (25) 
In accordance with her preferred methodology of interpreting words strictly "as 
meaning what people use them to mean" (9), Fell blocks the structural or 
philological comparison of Alfred's reference to Weland (a semi-divine smith) and 
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Wyrd (Fate) to the Old Norse and Old High German texts which bear more elaborate 
descriptions of each.  The author has priority of interpretation—to "carefully 
explain," "clearly label," and "detach himself" and his text as he determines.  Critics 
who employ any hermeneutics of suspicion do so "foolishly."   
In Tolkien's terms, whatever the origins of the names and their stories, they 
"are transmuted: they belong to a special time, with a special temper, and also to a 
special man"(38).  Hence they become disconnected from origin and context, a 
singularity governed by modern laws of proprietorship.  This underlying legality, 
the barely-perceptible system of social mores which constrains not what can be 
proven but what may be broached, allows Tolkien to say "We have no right to speak 
in general either of confusion in one poet's mind or of a whole period's thought, or 
of patch-work revision" (70, my emphasis). And again, "We have no right to assume 
that he was ordinary and negligible or that his authorship was of no concern to him" 
(38, my emphasis).  In an argument approaching tautology, Tolkien grounds the 
singular author's existence as author (as opposed to a simple "antiquarian" like 
Snorri) on the suggestion that he would be concerned with his status as author, or at 
least that we cannot assume "that his authorship was of no concern to him."  
Authorial authority is thus validated by authorial authority.  Whether or not there is 
an author, there is a space of authority into which we may not "trespass" (Tolkien, 
41).  If we cannot trespass into such a space, and if we cannot ask such questions 
and make such interpretations which the author would not approve, we may not, 
then, ask if there ever existed such an author to grant such approval. 
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Two concentric boundaries have been written around the poet by the 
scholarship.  The outer boundary separates the affirmative "consensus" from the 
"dissectors" and others who are "lost in speculation as to what is the nature and 
ultimate origin of that material in itself" (Tolkien, 45).  This is the boundary which 
unites and defines what Kiernan called "Beowulfians as a group" from the "generally 
repudiated" theories of distributed origins.  This is the consensus into which Wilcox 
must bring his naive student, who must trade for admission his excitement and 
"wishful thought that such Old English literature as is not obviously Christian in 
subject-matter is pre-Christian and therefore early”(40).   Within this circle lies an 
inner circle wherein lies "Beowulf as it is, and was made . . . as a thing itself, as a 
poem, as a work of art, showing structure and motive" (Tolkien, 32).  The consensus 
of scholarship has allocated itself to this middle band encircling the authorial center 
and protecting it from disintegration by circumscribing it—writing around it what is 
to be found within it and condemning to the periphery those who find anything else.  
As Wilcox points out, the poem, in the text we have of it, is already 
"circumscribed by Christian royal polity"(96).   Someone, poet or scribe, 
circumscribed “that man's [Beowulf's] courage/mind/heart” (ðæs mannes mōd) 
with didactic reminders that “The Measurer ruled all mankind then as he does now,” 
(Metod eallum wēold / gumena cynnes, swā hē nū ġīt dêð 1057-8).  The interpretation 
of the story begins in the text, itself.  Whether or not this interpretation is integral or 
interpolated, whether it is part of the story or only part of the poem, and thus 
whether or not there could be a Beowulf unintended by the author of this 
interpretation, is another matter. 
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Klaeber's Foundation 
As Arthur K. Moore noted above, the affirmation that few scholars disagree 
about the unity of the poem’s religious worldview is not an argument in itself.  
Consensus is not evidence.  In place of an argument for the poem’s unified 
worldview, most scholars appeal to arguments of Frederick Klaeber as “the 
authoritative work governing Beowulfian scholarship” (Damico, forward to 
Klaeber’s Beowulf).  In his edition of the poem and in subsequent publications, 
collectively titled “Christian Elements in Beowulf,” Klaeber argued at length that the 
poem as we have it is a theologically unified product of a Christian worldview.  
Stanley comments in the absolute terms characteristic of such references: 
1911 saw the first three of F. Klaeber's four fundamental articles on the 
Christian elements in Beowulf. They contained the evidence in sufficient 
profusion for the correctness of the view that the poem as we have it is 
Christian in every part. . . . After Klaeber the essential unity of the poem could 
no longer be denied. (46-8) 
In the fourth edition, retitled Klaeber’s Beowulf, which currently serves as the 
academic standard, editors R. D. Fulk, Robert Bjork, and John Niles say of Klaeber’s 
interpretive authority: 
Much of the subsequent scholarly commentary builds on the solid base of 
Klaeber's demonstration of the organic nature of the poem's Christian 
elements.  Since the publication of persuasive studies by Tolkien, Hamilton, 
Whitelock, and Brodeur, building upon (or reinforced by) the work of other 
scholars whose views are of considerable weight . . . few specialists in Beowulf 
studies now dispute the essentially Christian character of either the poem or 
the milieu in which it arose. (lxvii) 
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The key factors Fulk, Bjork, and Niles invoke are “persuasive studies,” by scholars 
whose “views” rather than textual evidence are cited as “of considerable weight.”  
The substance of these arguments or of what precisely constitutes an “essentially 
Christian character” receives little or no review.  The conflict of metaphors in the 
first sentence illustrates an underlying conflict in the consensus argument.  Klaeber 
is said to have demonstrated the “organic nature of the poem’s Christian elements.”  
This, along with similar metaphors of the text as fabric into which the poem’s 
Christianity is interwoven (Battles, v), allow that the composition comes from 
various elements but that their integration followed a singular design.  However, the 
reference to Klaeber as “the solid base” on which “subsequent scholarly 
commentary builds” precedes “organic nature” invoking the image of a stone 
foundation which covers over the fertile soil.  Rather than creating a guide to the 
poem—a way in—Klaeber is described as limiting our approach to it. 
 In his survey, “Christian and Pagan Elements,” in the 1997 A Beowulf 
Handbook, Edward B. Irving assures us that "Friedrich Klaeber demonstrates in 
detail that the Christian elements are integral to the poem and cannot be detached 
from it" (175).  In anthropomorphic terms similar to those used by Tolkien and 
Stanley, Irving notes that Klaeber:  
. . . studied and documented the Christian elements in the poem responsibly 
and in great detail.  He made the indisputable claim that the so-called 
Christian coloring was not laid late and lightly on the surface but was worked 
deeply into the very tissue of the poem at every point and could not be 
surgically removed without the death of the patient, and his majestic and 
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universally admired edition of the poem stressed that same point. (Irving, 
181, my emphasis)   
Here again, rather than specify exactly what Klaeber wrote or what makes it 
“indisputable,”  Irving uses the rhetorical tactic of equating redaction criticism with 
murder.  Further, Irving’s three tenets, that 1) there is a single essential 
interpretation that is 2) indisputable and 3) evidenced by universal admiration, 
borrows a frequent rhetorical pattern employed by Bede and other medieval 
Christian apologists.  For example, in his frequent derogation of the native British 
church’s doctrinal autonomy, Bede cites “Catholic unity” (“unitate catholica,” 
Historia Ecclesiastica 4.2) as the only necessary proof of his own correctness.  He 
warns native churches “not to imagine that their little community, isolated at the 
uttermost ends of the earth, had a wisdom exceeding that of all churches ancient 
and modern throughout the world,” (ne paucitatem suam in extremis terrae finibus 
constitutam, sapientiorem antiquis siue modernis, quae per orbem erant, Christi 
ecclesiis aestimarent 2.19).  Bede never mentions how, for example, the British 
church calculated the calendric placement of Easter, nor does he bother to compare 
it to the Roman method of calculation.  It is enough to mention that they deviate 
from “the custom of the universal church” (morem uniuersalis ecclesiae, 2.4).   
 As the solid foundation for the similarly catholic consensus of 20th century 
Beowulfian scholars, the specifics of Klaeber’s argument deserve a critical 
reevaluation.  Klaeber’s essay, “Christian Elements in Beowulf” and his introduction 
to the poem both depend on an equation of correlation with causation.  He 
documents an impressive number of words, phrases, and motifs that appear in 
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Beowulf, and compares them to parallels in texts whose categorization as Christian 
has rarely if ever been questioned.   While this aspect of his methodology is certainly 
commendable, his use of these data depends on essentialist and value-laden 
assumptions of Christianity and its alternatives.   Klaeber begins “The Christian 
Coloring” section of his introduction with the frank admission that “We hear nothing 
of angels, saints, relics, of Christ and the cross, of divine worship, church 
observances, or any particular dogmatic points” (xlix).  Undeterred, he continues, 
“Still, the general impression we obtain from the reading of the poem is certainly the 
opposite of pagan barbarism” (xlix).  Proof by “general impression” is tenuous 
enough, but the value judgment implicit in “pagan barbarism” underscores Klaeber’s 
bias.   In a response to John Niles’ use of the term “barbaric” (of the Rune Poem’s 
“Christian mediation of barbaric lore” 135), Christine Fell argues: 
That disservice is done to our studies by the use of such fossilised terms as 
'barbaric' and 'barbarian' ought to be obvious to one who professes to be a 
literary critic however much such terminology is still apparently acceptable 
to historians.  The classical meaning of the term barbarus was of course 
'foreigner' in the sense of non-Roman, as a Gentile was originally a non-Jew 
or a Welshman a non-Anglo-Saxon. But the merest glance at a Modern 
English dictionary, or newspaper editorial, shows this sense to have long 
been overtaken by the emotive overtones. What Niles intends us to 
understand by his term 'barbaric' is of course what he singles out as 
surviving pre-Christian (and so of course 'pagan') elements in the poem. (16-
17) 
While Fell acknowledges that Niles is not intentionally adding a negative value 
judgment to the word, she insists that “disservice is done to our studies” by its use.  
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She is not reacting to the use of barbaric to describe paganism, but to the association 
of either of these terms with Anglo-Saxon poetry.  This embarrassment at pre-
Christian vestiges is consistent with Stanley’s bias against “whatever in the 
Germanic literature of the Dark Ages is primitive (that is, pagan),” and preference 
for “whatever in it is civilized, learned, and cosmopolitan (that is, inspired by 
Christianity)” (3, Stanley’s parentheses).  Klaeber’s argument lays the groundwork 
for these by creating a value-laden dichotomy which depended on the association of 
paganism with barbarism, with all of the contempt Fell points to in that term.  “We 
are no longer in a genuine pagan atmosphere. . . . The virtues of moderation, 
unselfishness, consideration for others are practiced and appreciated . . . and the 
poet’s sympathy with weak and unfortunate beings . . . are typical of the new note” 
(xlix-l).  Privileging Christianity as the source of all morality, Klaeber necessarily 
construes its absence to be characterized by amoral brutality.  Finding little such 
brutality, Klaeber presumes, vindicates the poem’s Christianity.  Again, in “Christian 
Elements”:  
On the whole, the poem's tone and values are predominantly Christian—in 
sharp contrast with, for example, the Nibelungenlied. The atmosphere is no 
longer pagan.  The virtues of benevolence, moderation, self-control, 
consideration for others, and selflessness stand in sharp relief against the 
backdrop of the old Scandinavian setting.  The main characters, Beowulf and 
Hrothgar, have undergone an astonishing spiritualization and moral 
refinement. (56-7) 
To say that the characters have “undergone spiritualization and moral refinement” 
assumes that they were unspiritual and amoral before this undergoing.  Klaeber’s 
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use of the Nibelungenlied , which dates to late 12th or early 13th century Austria, at 
least a century further into the Christian era than the Beowulf manuscript (Hatto 
365), illustrates Klaeber’s search for selective evidence.  He seems not to grasp that 
non-Christians may also demonstrate self-control, moderation, unselfishness, or 
sympathy.  Presuming that such elements originate in Christianity, he imagines they 
could only exist elsewhere only by transmission from a Christian source.  Fulk, Bjork, 
and Niles perpetuate this assumption with only slight emendation which only begs 
the question: 
Predominantly religious in nature are the general tone of the poem and its 
ethical viewpoint. . . . The virtues of moderation, unselfishness, and 
consideration for others — virtues restricted to no particular religion, but 
associated with Christian precepts — are both practiced and appreciated. 
Particularly striking is the moral refinement of the two principal characters, 
Beowulf and Hroðgar. (lxxv) 
The editors are less restrained in affirming the Christian God’s monopoly on 
benevolence.  Fulk, Bjork, & Niles point out with confidence, "Certainly, the poet 
portrays the main characters of the story, Beowulf and Hroðgar, as persons who are 
aware of the existence of a deity who is the creator, sustainer, and judge of human 
beings"(lxix).  The abstract terms taken to describe God and the absence of uniquely 
Christian characters and concepts, most conspicuously Christ himself, leave only 
these three roles—creator, sustainer, and judge—to connect Beowulf to Christianity.  
This presumes that no other religious worldview could conceive of gods fulfilling 
these three roles. 
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The bulk of Klaeber’s argument is constituted by a survey of phrases from the 
poem and their correlation to Christian texts, most requiring lengthy explanation 
despite the susceptibility to more general interpretation.  For example, “The 
description of the sun as candel (1572 rodores candel, 1965 woruldcandel), which 
was perhaps inspired by a corresponding use of lampas or lucema, recalls the 
ceremonious use of candles during the service”(8).  Klaeber overlooks the 
possibility that non-Christians might make a similar association between two 
sources of light and heat.  He takes darkness to represent the Christian Devil and 
light to represent the Christian god (34).   
The peculiar phrase deorc deaþscua 160, which recurs as an epithet for Satan 
in Christ I 257 (ms. deorc dredscua), could perhaps denote "dark, murdering 
spirit," but also bears a striking resemblance to the biblical umbra mortis: Mt 
4.16 (Is 9.2) in tenebris ... in regione et umbra mortis, Lc 1.79 in tenebris et in 
umbra mortis, ler 13.16 in umbram mortis et in caliginem, Ps 22.4 in medio 
umbrae mortis, 43.20,87.7,106.10,14, lob 3.5 (compare Greg.Moralia 4.4), and 
elsewhere, as for instance Descensus Christi ad inferos 5.399.3. Vesp.Hymn 
9.12, York.Miss 1.71, Lat.Hymn.MA 101.34 tenebra! et umbra! mortis 
patefactus inferus (which at several points refersto the darkness of hell). If it 
is indeed a reference to the umbra mortis, the phrase would mean "darkness" 
and could therefore be read as a name for the devil as well. (22) 
The implication is that without Christianity, people would not fear the dark.  
Likewise, he takes wolf imagery to represent the Devil. 
Sarrazin (1910: 21) argues that the description of Grendel's mother as 
brimwylf (1599, 1506, ms. brimwyl) derives from Scandinavian folklore, 
where the hero battles a man-eating she-wolf (see Bjarkarimur 4.58 ff. and 
54 
 
compare Panzer 1910: 365, also 104). However, it is also quite possible that 
the common image of the devil as a wolf could have been of some influence. 
(20) 
If the image of the devil as a wolf is common in Christian texts, the image of wolf as 
enemy of the gods is ubiquitous in Germanic myth (Pluskowski).  Icelandic texts 
frequently use “the wolf” without further qualification to refer to Fenris, the lupine 
son of Loki prophesied to kill Odin in the Eddas (explicated in Snorri’s Hattatal). 
Likewise, Klaeber ignores Norse and other Germanic parallels to the poem’s 
giants, finding them, rather, “derived from the Old Testament,”(xlix).  Compared to 
nearly every other mythic system, the giants of the Hebrew Bible (such as the 
Nephilim of Genesis 6.4 or the Anakites of Numbers 13.28-33) are far less significant 
to that text compared to the giants who war with the Norse gods from the beginning 
of the world to its end in the Eddas.  Klaeber (61), however, goes so far as to say that 
a draft of the poem originating before Christianity could not have included 
references to giants or their destruction in a great flood, despite the fact that Snorri 
(Gylfaginning 6) attributes just such a flood to Odin’s slaying of Ymir.   Upon 
observing the remaining hilt of the ruined giant sword with which Beowulf had slain 
Grendel’s mother, Hrothgar refers to a flood that wiped out the race of giants (1687-
93): 
 
Hrōðgār maðelode;      hylt scēawode  
ealde lāfe.       On ðæm wæs ōr written 
fyrnġewinnes;        syðþan flōd ofslōh 
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ġifen ġēotende          ġíganta cyn, 
frēcne ġefērdon;         þæt wæs fremde þēod 
ēcean dryhtne.        Him þæs endelēan 
þurh wæteres wylm       waldend sealed. (1687-93) 
 
Hrothgar spoke. He studied the hilt of the ancient treasure, on which was 
written the description of that ancient battle, when the flood, the rushing 
seas,  wiped out the race of giants. They suffered severely.  That was a tribe 
foreign to the eternal lord; the ruler paid them a final reward with that tide.  
 
This reference is obviously not incompatible with the Genesis story of the flood, but 
neither is it incompatible with the story of Manu in the Matsya Purana, Utnapishtim 
in the Epic of Gilgamesh, or, most conspicuously, the slaying of Ymir in Snorri’s 
Gylfaginning.  Snorri relates: 
Synir Bors drápu Ymi jǫtun.  En er hann fell, þá hljóp svá mikit blóð ór sárum 
hans at með því drektu þeir allri ætt hrímþursa, nema einn komsk undan 
með sínu hýski.  (Sturluson, Edda: Prologue and Gylfaginning, ed. Faulkes)  
 
Bor’s sons [Odin and his brothers] killed the giant Ymir.  And when he fell, so 
much blood flowed from his wounds that with it they drowned all the race of 
frost-giants, except that one escaped with his household. (Sturluson, Edda, 
trans. Faulkes)  
 
The kenning “Ymir’s blood” for the sea occurs independently as early as the 10th 
century skald Ormr Barreyjarskáld.  Though de Vries suggests that Snorri’s flood 
story is derivative of the Genesis flood, Rudolf Simek contests this.  Vafþrúðnismál 
corroborates the polytheistic context of Snorri’s version of this particular flood 
story.  The fact that Snorri’s version differs slightly from Vafþrúðnismál, according to 
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Simek, indicates that Vafþrúðnismál was not Snorri’s source, but that both accounts 
drew from an even older tradition native to Norse polytheism rather than Biblical 
flood stories (Simek 377). 
Christine Fell cautions against "the artificiality of singling out bits and pieces 
and using them to demonstrate 'paganism' "(33).  The point of her argument, 
ironically, serves as a caution against the same tactics used to argue for the poem’s 
Christianity.   
We are still unwary of the dangers and glamorised by the enchantment of 
pressing pictorial and literary scraps into identifiable 'legend-cycles'.  It is 
naturally tempting to reduce our evidence to the controllable, similarly 
tempting to use any fragment of that evidence as a piece in a jigsaw, even if 
we have to manipulate or massage the piece to ensure a fit.  If we have a 
mythology that includes a god Woden / Wotan / Oðinn it is more satisfying 
to establish links and patterns than reject the links and leave ourselves with 
unpatterned unrelated bric-a-brac.  Some art-historians are happier with a 
picture of a man with a spear if it can be asserted that men with spears are 
depictions of an identifiable spear-God. (Fell 10) 
The same argument could be made regarding Klaeber’s association of monsters with 
demons, wolves with Satan, and the sun with Christ.  If Germanic legend provides a 
tempting body of surviving literature to which we may connect odd fragments, how 
many more connections could we make to the incomparably larger body of Christian 
literature?  With all of the literature generated in Christian contexts in the thousand 
years before the creation of the Beowulf manuscript, we might continue finding 
parallels for even the most banal elements of the poem.  In Fell’s statement, “We 
need to be more aware of the dangers of argument by analogy, less delighted by the 
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riches of possible anthropological parallels” (24), we might replace “anthropological” 
with “theological.”  The similarities, however numerous, lead us ultimately to the 
irreconcilable differences.  
Beowulf as Christ Figure 
Klaeber finds it “odd” that the poem focuses on a hero’s fight with monsters 
rather than historical battles. 
These difficulties are resolved, however, if we assume that the poet saw a 
profound significance in these fantastic, fairy-tale adventures, since they 
came to symbolize for him the greatest of all heroic struggles (Christ's fight 
against the devil), which fascinated Christians of Germanic descent.  Or, to 
put it differently, the poet would never have chosen such a curious tale if it 
had not lent itself particularly well to Christianization. (69) 
The argument that Beowulf is a Christian poem because Beowulf acts as a Christ 
figure has been echoed by several scholars (Cabaniss, McNamee, Donahue).  
However, in such a reading, Beowulf would replace Christ and shrug off the 
demands of Christian soteriology—he is the one who saves rather than the one who 
is saved.  Beowulf never seeks God’s aid in advance.  God’s agency is described as 
necessary in didactic asides, but it is portrayed in the narrative, if at all, as a minor 
act of assistance such as the light emanating from the giant’s sword in the fight with 
Grendel’s mother.  Such an act might exemplify God’s assistance, but it hardly proves 
the level of control assumed in Christian beliefs in Providence.  These acts of subtle 
divine assistance have many more parallels in epic literature from polytheistic 
cultures, such as the invisible hand of Athena which guides Diomedes’ spear in his 
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dual with Ares depicted in the Iliad.  The appearances of Odin in Norse narratives 
also parallels a subtler form of divine provocation and assistance to heroes.  If this 
sort of intervention is decisive, both Odin or Athena would be as worthy of the 
designation “sigora waldend” (“wielder of victories,” line 2875) or “sige-hreþig” 
(“victory-creative,” 94) usually taken as a reference to the Christian God in Beowulf 
(cf. sigfoþr, “father of victories” for Odin in Voluspa 55, Grimnismal 48, Lokasenna 58, 
etc., catalogued in Whallon).  This term, and nearly all others used for God in 
Beowulf, has no shortage of polytheistic analogues (Whallon).  
Even in the cases of divine intervention, it is the agency of the hero that 
accomplishes the outcome.  The power of the polytheistic gods in such cases is 
neither providential nor omnipotent.  In the poly-agential cosmology, they don’t 
need to be.  However, in Christianity, especially Christianity of the Pauline and 
Augustinian variety, human agency is entirely dependent upon God, and God’s will is 
entirely unconstrained by human agency.  As I will argue in the following chapters, 
in the omni-agent schema of orthodox Christianity, human agency is inversely 
proportional to God’s.  To say that Beowulf is a Christ figure is to say that rather 
than being saved through Christ, he, rather than Christ, does the saving.  If this “lent 
itself particularly well to Christianity,” as Klaeber argues, it resembles a Pelagian 
Christianity which assumes the power of the individual to save himself—a belief 
condemned as heresy by Augustine.   Orthodox soteriology demands the sort of 
dependence on divine intervention exhibited in Orms þáttr Stórólfsonnar, cited in 
Klaeber’s introduction to the poem (xvi).  In his subterranean battle with a 
monstrous mother, Orm must call on God and St. Peter before he is able to overcome 
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his attacker and her murderous progeny.  Beowulf calls on no one.  When he gives 
credit in his recounting the event, he has more diplomatic and secular motives for 
doing so (discussed in Ch. 3, below). 
  Terms such as dryhten “lord” apply both to humans and to God, much as the 
modern cognate lord could denote a member of the nobility or the substitute term 
for Yahweh in the King James Bible.  The use of one word to denote humans in one 
context and God in another does not justify an equivocation of the two roles.  
However, Klaeber goes so far as to indicate that the concept of human leadership is 
built upon the Christian conception of God rather than the other way around. 
The phrasing of the passage in which Beowulf's men praise their lord 
suggests the praise of God: eahtodan eorlscipe, ond his ellenweorc / duguðum 
demdon, -swa hit gede[fe] bið, þæt mon his winedryhten wordum herge, / 
ferhðum freoge . . . 3173. This is an unmistakeable echo of the well-known 
liturgical Praefatio. See Gregory, Liber sacramentorum, Easter mass Praefatio, 
91. (11) 
The passage Klaeber cites translates as “they praised his nobility and his brave 
action, spoke highly of his prowess, as it is fitting that one speak in high terms of his 
friend-lord,  love him in his heart.”  This description of praise may well resemble 
those used in a particular Easter mass.  One may praise God and one may praise man, 
but the object of praise, here, is man, not God.  Just six lines after these, the poem 
ends with the description of Beowulf as lofgeornost, “eager for praise.”  Rather than 
offering praise to God, Beowulf’s men offer it to a human savior.  They pay him the 
only eternal reward guaranteed in the Hávamál, a collection of sayings attributed to 
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Odin:  ‘Deyr fé, deyja frændr, deyr sjalfr et sama, en orþstírr deyr aldrigi / hveims sér 
góþan getr’ “Cattle die, kinsmen die, / you yourself will eventually die, / but one 
thing I think will never die, / the good fame of one who earns it” (Hávamál 75, Bray, 
ed. and trans.). 
In the summary of his argument, Klaeber admits that his conclusion depends 
on the quantity of references that could be attributable to a Christian worldview 
rather than on the quality of any individual reference.   
The overall character of the Christian elements is not particularly 
ecclesiastial or dogmatic. . . . They express the pronounced dualism in 
accordance with which all individuals should shape their lives.  Allusions are 
usually brief, but quite numerous, and demonstrate by their very frequency 
the extent to which Christian ideas are considered to control life as a whole.  
Among these are a number of general expressions, whose equivalents in 
colorless, everyday language would be "thank God" (A III 1), "God knows" 
(2650), "God be with you" ("adieu, " 316 ff.). (51) 
However, repetition is not weaving.  Klaeber’s stated goal, which later scholars 
proclaim him to have accomplished, was to disprove the redaction theorists such as 
Ettmüller, Müllenhoff, Möller, and ten Brink, specifically insofar as these had argued 
that the poem’s Christianity came late in the redaction process.  For this argument to 
be conclusive, the examples would need to be not only evident in Christian sources 
but absent from non-Christian ones.  Very few of Klaeber’s examples fit this 
qualification.  These few specifically Christian passages are the very ones described 
as interpolations by Klaeber’s rivals, as well as by a handful of 20th century 
philologists such as Francis Magoun, Charles Moorman, Michael Cherniss, and Karl 
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Schneider.  For all of Klaeber’s diligent collection and comparison of epithets and 
similes, he does little to show narrative parallels with Christian sources, Biblical or 
otherwise.  If the assertions of God’s Providence occur in the text only as assertions, 
they remain superficial addenda—ad hoc additions which circumscribe the action 
rather than create it.  If Beowulf slays Grendel, he occupies the role assigned to God 
by these disputed passages.  As such, God’s pagan rival is not absent from the poem.  
It is Beowulf, himself.   
Regardless of the presence or absence of other gods in the poem, the agency of 
the hero in effecting the salvation of his community, especially when compared to 
the limited agency reserved for God, bears at least as much in common with 
polytheistic myth as it does with Biblical monotheism.  Klaeber is correct that the 
poem has many parallels in orthodox Christianity.  However, these same elements 
also have parallels in polytheism.  If we assess the poem’s connection to either 
Christian or polytheistic tradition according to the number of extant parallels in the 
literature of those two traditions, we will of course find many more parallels in 
Christian texts.  That is not because these elements are more characteristic of 
Christianity but because no literature remains of Germanic polytheism that was not 
selected and reinterpreted after conversion and under stringent theological 
constraints.  Rather, we may compare what in the poem is irreconcilable with 
Christianity (and therefore likely to have originated from polytheistic tradition) 
against what in the poem is irreconcilable with polytheism (and therefore likely to 
have originated in Christian tradition).  This approach has been avoided by previous 
scholars due to an assumed dependence on textual evidence.  However, there are 
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ways of reconstructing a polytheistic world-view which are not entirely dependent 
on surviving literature. 
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CHAPTER III 
TWO MODELS OF GOD CONCEPTS 
 
The approach to religious themes in Beowulf, particularly assumptions about 
human and divine agency, has been troubled by misleading definitions.  Readers of 
the poem continually perceive some form of vestigial paganism, despite certain 
didactic passages in the poem which make explicit overtures to Christian beliefs in 
divine providence and creation.  As Jonathan Wilcox indicated in his story of the 
eager undergraduate (above), the reader’s expectations of a polytheistic epic are 
quite resilient, despite the didactic asides scattered throughout the poem which 
explicitly affirm Christian Providentialism.  Explanations by scholars such as Wilcox, 
Fell, and Klaeber, that the poem is “circumscribed by Christian polity,” and that 
explicit paganism is absent, does little to dissuade what Fell calls “persistent 
mythologies” because what they discount is not what readers pick up on in the text.  
The problem originates from the fact that expectations of what paganism would 
have been originate from Christian definitions of belief which are inadequate for 
isolating the source of the perceived discordance.  This discordance, I argue, results 
from two modes of religious cognition.  Christianity, in its core beliefs in divine 
providence and the need for divine salvation (soteriology), resembles the 
“attachment” behavior observed in the earliest stages of a child’s social development.  
Propositional affirmations of creedal belief seize upon this predisposition and 
promote it by fostering belief in an omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient 
attachment figure that survives falsification long after children realize the human 
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limitations of their original attachment figures (i.e. parents).  This institutionally-
cultivated attachment disposition, the omni-agent schema, translates poorly into a 
narrative structure of cause and effect.  The alternative, the poly-agent schema, 
resembles a more developed social psychology, corresponds strongly with the 
anthropomorphized gods of polytheistic myth, and is crucial for understanding 
narrative cause and effect as well as the drives and limitations of human agents.  
Both schemas originate in evolved human cognition.  Both are differently cultivated 
by social context.  Beowulf is dominated by the second form of religious cognition 
but bears clear attempts by an author or redactor to assert a monotheistic belief in 
God’s agency where none is causally necessary, and limit the agency of the mythic 
protagonist. 
Beowulf is the product of a society in the midst of a changing religious 
worldview.  The sole manuscript on which the poem is recorded originated in or 
around the first decade of the eleventh century.  Many scholars have argued that due 
to this date, it is unlikely that vestiges of Anglo-Saxon paganism could survive in the 
poem, much less govern its structure.   This argument depends on several tenuous 
assumptions: 1) That conversion is an instantaneous event, 2) which is determined 
by the conscious self-identification of the individual, with 3) a coherent and stable 
set of beliefs, which 4) supplant beliefs from alternative systems similarly 
structured.  These assumed characteristics of religion, though widely taken for 
granted today, originate in Judeo-Christian apologetics and function as poor criteria 
for describing systems of myth and ritual in non-monotheistic societies.   
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The very nature of the “pagan question” seems to require essentialist notions 
of what it means for a text to be either Christian or pagan.  The latter term, whether 
used by scholars seeking to prove its survival or those dismissing it, becomes 
immediately problematic due to its irrelevance to the people it is supposed to 
describe.  Whereas the term Christian names its founder and, by extension, a body of 
qualifiers to apply to those falling under the name, the term pagan is a Christian 
coinage that does not describe what something is, but what it is not (namely 
Christian).  Alternatively, the subjective categorization of one’s self as a Christian is a 
social rather than analytical categorization.  Studies in religious cognition have 
frequently demonstrated professed believers contradicting their own core beliefs 
when translating propositional beliefs into narrative representation.  This unstable 
division is directly relevant to the study of Beowulf, not because the poem is either 
Christian or pagan, but because it tries to be both.  
To be sure, it bears many deliberate marks of Christianity: monotheism, 
individual sin, divine providence, and approaching judgment.  It also perpetuates 
beliefs that characterize most non-monotheistic religious views. These include 
anthropomorphic explanations of non-human phenomena, reciprocal relations with 
non-human agents, syncretism, and the assumption that one’s actions are the results 
of one’s own intent and effort.  This is not to say that such characteristics never 
occur in works more widely regarded as Christian or that they would be recognized 
as non-Christian by the poem’s earliest audience.  Rather, we may observe that a 
definitive element of Christian narratives, namely the causal agency of an 
omnipotent god in the realm of human action, conflicts with a definitive 
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characteristic of myth, namely the distributed agency of many gods, mortals, and 
other sentient beings.  Further, the narrative structure of Beowulf depends on a 
secular heroism that much more closely resembles the epics of polytheistic cultures 
than it does more theologically-consistent Christian saint’s lives or stories of passive 
protagonists, such as Dante’s Comedia.   From this perspective, scholars who claim 
that Beowulf is not pagan but heroic or secular may not be justified in presuming a 
separation between the two.   
Inherited Definitions  
Philosopher Gianni Vattimo, a self-described “Catholic atheist”, observes: "We 
cannot even speak but from a Christian point of view.  That is because we are 
fundamentally incapable of formulating ourselves, fundamentally incapable of 
articulating a discourse, except by accepting certain culturally conditioned 
premises" (After the Death of God, 36).  A fundamental tenet of the present argument 
is that the core of human thought emerges, not from local historical social norms, 
but intuitive assumptions originating in evolved cognitive predispositions.  This 
perspective is compatible with Vattimo’s observation.  What Vattimo describes is 
not the formation but the formulation of ourselves—the reflective descriptions 
which must choose from a society-specific vocabulary to describe their objects.  It is 
not thought, but the articulation of thought that is limited by available culturally 
conditioned premises.  Among these culturally conditioned premises are the terms 
by which we categorize our culturally conditioned premises—at the present, terms 
like culture, religion, and Christianity.  If we are limited in our ability to formulate 
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ourselves, we are still more limited in our abilities to categorize the unfamiliar.   In 
his book, Orientalism, Edward Said observes: 
Something patently foreign and distant acquires, for one reason or another, a 
status more rather than less familiar. One tends to stop judging things either 
as completely novel or as completely well known; a new median category 
emerges, a category that allows one to see new things, things seen for the 
first time, as versions of a previously known thing.  In essence such a 
category is not so much a way of receiving new information as it is a method 
of controlling what seems to be a threat to some established view of things. If 
the mind must suddenly deal with what it takes to be a radically new form of 
life—as Islam appeared to Europe in the early Middle Ages—the response on 
the whole is conservative and defensive. Islam is judged to be a fraudulent 
new version of some previous experience, in this case Christianity. (58-9) 
In particular, Christian definitions of religion tend to assume that all religions 
consist of devotion to particular gods, are irreconcilable with other religions and 
other gods (ontologically exclusive), serve as the basis of group cohesion (imagined 
community), and are identifiable by the unchanging reflective beliefs of its members 
(creedal belief).  However, religious beliefs outside of the influence of Abrahamic 
monotheism tend to be heterogeneous, contingent, and syncretistic.  One of the few 
attestations of pre-conversion belief among the Anglo-Saxons makes such religious 
openness explicit.  In the story of the conversion of King Edwin (c. 627 CE) the 
Christian historian, Bede, hardly an unbiased source, relates the response of one of 
the king’s advisers to a Christian missionary: 
Talis mihi videtur, rex, vita hominum praesens in terris, ad comparationem eius 
quod nobis incertum est temporis, quale cum te residente ad coenam cum 
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dueibus ac ministris tuis tempore brumali, accenso quidem foco in medio et 
calido effecto coenaculo, furentibus autem foris per omnia turbinibus 
hiemalium pluviarum vel nivium, adveniensque unus passerum domum 
citissime pervolaverit qui cum per unum ostium ingrediens, mox per aliud 
exierit. Ipso quidem tempore quo intus est, hiemis tempestate non tangitur, sed 
tamen parvissimo spatio serenitatis ad momentum excurso, mox de hieme in 
hiemem regrediens, tuis oculis elabitur. Ita haec vita hominum ad modicum 
apparet; quid autem sequatur, quidve praecesserit, prorsus ignoramus.  
Such seemeth to me, my Lord, the present life of men here in earth (for the 
comparison of our uncertain time to live), as if a sparrow should come to the 
house and very swiftly flit through ; which entereth in at one window and 
straightway passeth out through another, while you sit at dinner with your 
captains and servants in winter-time; the parlour being then made warm 
with the fire kindled in the midst thereof, but all places abroad being 
troubled with raging tempests of winter rain and snow. Right for the time it 
be within the house, it feeleth no smart of the winter storm, but after a very 
short space of fair weather that lasteth but for a moment, it soon passeth 
again from winter to winter and escapeth your sight. So the life of man here 
appeareth for a little season, but what followeth or what hath gone before, 
that surely know we not. (HE 2.13, King ed. & trans., pp. 282-5) 
The tendency to see unfamiliar belief through the lens of the familiar is not limited 
to Christianity.  In his descriptions of the Gallic Wars (de Bello Gallico), Julius Caesar 
projects his own Latin pantheon into the German religious practices he observes.   
The god they reverence most is Mercury.  They have very many images of 
him, and regard him as the inventor of all arts, the god who directs men upon 
their journeys, and the most powerful helper in trading and getting money.  
Next to him they reverence Apollo, Mars, Jupiter, and Minerva, about whom 
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they have much the same ideas as other nations. (ch. 6.17, Handford trans., p. 
142) 
The Roman historian Tacitus likewise records that the Germans elevate Mercury 
above the other gods, and after him Hercules and Mars (Germania ch. 9).  It is highly 
unlikely that the Germans used Roman names for their gods.  Neither author 
includes myths associated with these gods.  Instead, the association of German with 
Roman gods is based on similarity of attribute.  The Germans have a god of art, 
travel, and trade.  The Romans have a god of art, travel, and trade.  Therefore, in a 
process Georg Simek calls interpretatio romana, the German god is taken to be a 
version of the Roman god Mercury.  It is likely that the German god which Caesar 
and Tacitus identify as Mercury is actually a variant of the proto-Germanic god 
Woðanaz, forerunner of the Norse god Odin, (Simek, North, Turville-Petre).    
Mercury and Odin are both revered as travelers, keepers of occult knowledge, and 
guarantors of honest trade.  Both possess iconic staves (Odin’s spear, Gungnir, and 
Mercury’s caduceus) and winged helmets.  Tacitus’ addition of Hercules and Mars 
indicates a similar translation of Thor/Donar into Hercules (both known for their 
strength and represented wielding blunt weapons) and Tyr/Tiwaz into Mars (as 
gods of war).  However, all of these parallels are static attributes.  The myths of 
these three pairs of gods have no precise parallels.   
Still, the interpretatio romana survived since, unlike the Germans, the 
Romans had the advantage of writing.  A millennium after Caesar’s contact with the 
Germans, English archbishop Wulfstan, in his sermon De Falsis Diis (“On the False 
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Gods”), borrowing from a similar homily attributed to Aelfric, describes the current 
view of heathen gods: 
Sum man eac wæs gehaten Mercurius on life, se wæs swyðe facenfull and ðeah 
full snotorwyrde, swicol on dædum and on leasbregdum; ðone macedon þa 
hæðenan be heora getæle eac heom to mæran gode and æt wega gelætum him 
lac offrodon oft and gelome þurh deofles lare and to heagum beorgum him 
brohton oft mistlice loflac.  Ðes gedwolgod wæs arwurðe eac betwux eallum 
hæðenum on þam dagum, and he is Oðon gehaten oðrun naman on denisce 
wisan. (Sedgefield, ed.) 
There was a man called Mercury in his lifetime who was very deceitful and, 
though quite clever, deceitful in his actions and schemes. The heathens also 
made him one of their most celebrated gods and often left gifts for him at 
crossroads, following the Devil's teaching, often bringing offerings to him on 
hilltops. This false god was worshiped by all pagans in those days; he was 
called Odin in the Danish tradition. 
Wulfstan also perpetuates the association of Jupiter with Thor.  However, he is 
aware of the incompatibility of the Germanic and Roman gods in their narrative 
contexts. 
Nu secgað sume þa denisce men on heora gedwylde, þæt se Iouis wære, þe hy 
þor hatað, Mercuries sunu, þe hi Oðon namjað.  Ac hi nabbað na riht, forðan þe 
we rædað on bocum, ge on hæþenum, ge on cristenum, þæt se hetula Iouis to 
soðan is Saturnes sunu.  
Now some of those Danish men say in their heresy that this Jove, that they 
call Thor, was the son of Mercury, who they call Odin; but they do not have 
that right, for as we read in books, in the pagan as in the Christian, this 
wicked Jove is actually the son of Saturn.  
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Wulfstan, like Caesar and Tacitus, participates in a form of cosmological assimilation.  
Christian cosmology allows no sort of supernatural being other than God, angels, 
and demons.  Wulfstan opts for euhemerism, the belief advanced by the Greek 
historian Euhemerus, that the gods were originally prominent mortals who came to 
be worshipped as they passed into legend.  Wulfstan also, unsurprisingly, inserts the 
Christian devil into the religious mix. 
However, Wulfstan goes a step further than the interpretatio romana.  
Neither Ceasar nor Tacitus explicitly derogates the Germanic beliefs.  Even though 
the differences would have been obvious, they merely state the similarities as if to 
allow that the Germans might know something about these common gods that the 
Romans did not.  This was in keeping with the syncretism that had merged many 
Roman gods with Greek cognates.  Wulfstan’s description is an appropriation of the 
beliefs of others into a worldview that is inflexible and closed to speculation.  We 
would not expect a Christian bishop to do otherwise than condemn religious beliefs 
that conflict with Christian doctrine.  But Christianity is not the only religion that 
Wulfstan assumes rests on a doctrinal foundation.  His use of the word gewylde 
(heresy) refers not to the Danes’ deviation from Christian orthodoxy but to their 
violation of a supposed pagan orthodoxy.  He assumes not only that Odin was 
Mercury and Thor was Jupiter, and hence that Roman paganism was the same as 
Norse paganism, but also that the Danes committed a religious violation by believing 
anything other than what was recorded in the literature.  While gewylde could 
merely mean “error,” it occurs most often in Aelfric’s writings (Wulfstan’s 
predecessor and source) in descriptions of Christian heresies (Bosworth-Toller 
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supplement, p. 316).  This implies that Wulfstan is not merely assuming that 
Mercury and Jupiter were historical people, but that one really was the father of the 
other, and that the Danes were obligated by a supposed pagan orthodoxy to profess 
belief in this tenet.   
Wulfstan’s characterization of paganism resembles what anthropologist 
Pascal Boyer (Naturalness of Religious Ideas) calls “the trap of theologism.”   
Theologism is the combination of two essential mistakes. One is to take the 
connections between religious assumptions for granted, as a self-evident or 
necessary aspect of religious representations.  The other is to think that they 
can be best described by postulating some abstract intellectual entities 
("symbol systems,'' "webs of meaning," "cultural theories," etc.) that 
supposedly underpin the connections.  Theologism, in its various guises, begs 
the question of systematicity by positing that religious representations 
necessarily constitute shared, integrated, consistent sets of assumptions, 
often in the face of less-than-perfect empirical confirmation.  Moreover, it 
leads to models with cognitive implications that are always difficult to 
estimate. The religious assumptions are treated as the realization or 
implementation of abstract objects, the precise properties of which are not 
clearly described. (229) 
Boyer observes a connected misconception in which this categorization by 
orthodoxy leads to the assumption that people with other beliefs fall into 
homogenous units that can be treated as single entities. 
You represent the various groups as ‘big agents.’ For instance, you think what 
is happening in the political arena is that ‘Labour is trying to do this . . .’ or 
‘the Tory party is doing that . . .’ although parties cannot literally be trying to 
do anything, as they are not persons . . .  To think that a village, a company or 
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a committee is a big agent spares us the difficult work of describing the 
extraordinarily complicated interaction that occurs when you get more than 
two people together. (Religion Explained, 127, 251) 
Wulfstan not only lumps all Danes into just such a big agent but insists that they 
alter their own belief to accord with the pagan writings on the subject, “bocum . . . on 
hæþenum,” with which he is familiar as if these writings constituted a doctrine akin 
to the Christianity.  The fact that the bishop regards the pagan literature as false 
does not seem to distract his insistence on a pan-ethnic pagan homogeneity.  
Just as we lack of any sort of canon or regularized doctrine for pre-Christian 
European religious beliefs, so too we lack any native term cognate with the 
Christians term pagan.  Pagan, like its English translation heathen (hæþen) 
originally referred to people who lived in rural areas (pāgānus, “of the country, 
rustic,” hæþen, “of the heath, untilled land”) at the time that Christianity come to 
dominate the urban areas of the Roman Empire.  As such, it resembles the 
designation of goyim (Greek ἔθνη) in the Hebrew Bible, or gentes in the Vulgate 
(from which “Gentile”), both of which indicate “the nations,” or every culture other 
than the Biblical authors’ own.  It is a negative definition, implying that all out-group 
members share some essential likeness.  Judith Jesch observes, “While ‘pagan’ is 
derived from Latin, and ‘heathen’ from the vernacular, neither term is neutral, both 
implying Christian disdain. There is no non-judgmental equivalent, except for the 
strictly chronological (and therefore inaccurate) ‘pre-Christian’”(55n).   
Like Wulfstan, we have many Greek and Latin sources representing gods and 
goddesses, and we may be just as likely to assume these to be definitive, even 
74 
 
dogmatic.  But as Hilda Davidson points out in her 1988 Myths and Symbols of Pagan 
Europe,  
Gods and goddesses appear in popular mythologies in fossilized and static 
form.  From the way in which they behave in various tales, often simplified in 
their turn, they are assumed to be deities of certain fixed types. . . However, 
we are dealing here with many different levels of belief, and also with 
confused traditions, which may have been worked on by earlier antiquarians 
long before modern scholars began their reconstructions (196-7). 
Even in Greek and Roman myth, for which we have ample literature 
originating before conversion to Christianity, we cannot point to anything 
resembling fixed orthodoxy.  If we view the works of Homer or Ovid from a post-
Christian standpoint, we may assume that their works would have held a normative 
authority over their audiences and future poets who represented the same subject 
matter.  If this had been the case, Book 2 of Herodotus’ Histories would have been 
considered heresy for its claim that Helen had never been taken to Troy by Paris as 
in the Iliad, but held captive in Egypt while an apparition took her place in Troy.  Not 
only was Herodotus not condemned for disputing the accepted convention and 
implying that the whole Trojan War had been fought unnecessarily, but his account 
became the basis for Euripides’ popular play, Helen.  The Greek audience’s 
acceptance of such deliberate variation on traditional accounts resembles the 
relatively open-minded approach Tacitus and Caesar took to the Germanic 
“Mercury.”  Rather than saying, as does Wulfstan, that there is one true version 
which all must accept, the audience of Helen seems to have acknowledged that 
Homer says Helen was taken to Troy; Euripides says she wasn’t.  Tacitus seems 
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content to relate that the Germans think Mercury is the highest god without the sort 
of correction Wulfstan inserts.   
Reflective and Intuitive Beliefs 
The assumptions of what would constitute “authentic paganism” (Fell, Irving) 
are often based on individual self-identification—i.e. Would the Beowulf poet and 
audience have identified themselves and the poem as Christian, or pagan?  This is an 
improvement over the stance of Wulfstan, who defines a social group by his own 
assumptions about their religion and then blames the individuals rather than the 
category for inevitable deviations.  But the notion that there is a kind of pagan belief 
that is more than an operational heuristic, contingent upon changing circumstances 
and new information, may be another cultural inheritance of the Judeo-Christian 
legacy.  The question “What do you believe about (x)?” locates religious essence not 
in what a person believes about x but in what he professes to believe about x.  
Philosopher Daniel Dennett has dubbed this extra conceptual step, appropriately 
enough, belief-in-belief.   
This is not to imply that a believer may be deliberately deceptive, but that 
profession of belief requires the believer to stop and think, and invariably invoke 
social convention.  Cognitive psychologist Justin Barrett cautions, “Sometimes 
reports of one’s own beliefs may be deceptive, but more frequently, people do not 
have a reflective belief until asked for one” (Why Would, 8).  A Catholic reciting the 
Nicene Creed publicly and (we assume) privately affirms that Jesus was “begotten 
not made, consubstantial to the Father, by whom all things were made” without 
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anything like a clear concept of the Athanasian reaction against Arius which led to 
the creed’s instantiation.  This creedal belief operates less as a means of 
understanding the real world than it does as a social identification.  Indeed the word 
“creed” originates in the first word of the Nicene Creed—“Credo in unum Deum” 
(I/We believe in one God)—a verb rather than a noun.  Translated into a noun, creed 
indicates the act of enunciating a belief, especially as a public act of affiliation, rather 
than the belief itself.  This is fundamentally different than the contingent, 
operational beliefs which govern our actions in the world, such as the belief in 
gravity, the recurrence of the seasons, or our assumptions about the behavior 
patterns of our fellow humans. 
Creedal beliefs constitute a form of what Barrett calls reflective belief.  
Reflective beliefs, such as those most easily identified as religious, require deliberate 
contemplation or explicit instruction.  By contrast, non-reflective or intuitive beliefs, 
such as that animals are born from other animals or that solid objects can’t pass 
through each other, mostly come hardwired in the human brain and are subtly 
molded through actual interaction with the environment.  They rarely require 
verbalization and are more accurately observed through behavior than dialogue.  
Barrett interviewed people from Ithaca, New York (Barrett & Keil) to Delhi, India 
(Barrett, “Hindu Concepts”) to test the compatibility of reflective beliefs, such as the 
omnipresence and omniscience of God, with nonreflective beliefs such as that a 
single agent, mortal or divine, can do and think only one thing at a time.  Subjects 
were first given a questionnaire asking:  
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Whether or not (a) God can read minds; (b) God knows everything; (c) God 
can do multiple mental activities simultaneously; (d) God needs to be near 
something to see, hear, smell, taste, or feel it; (e) God is spatial (in a 
particular place or places) or nonspatial (no where at all); and (f ) God can 
occupy space with another object without in any way distorting it. (225) 
Subjects were then asked to listen to a story about God’s intervention in 
multiple scenarios and answer questions testing their recall of that story.  The 
narrative scenarios allowed for God’s agency to be either anthropomorphic or 
transcendent.  In scenarios testing omnipresence, God was represented helping two 
people in different parts of the world without implying that he had to do them in 
sequence.  In scenarios testing omniscience, God was represented assisting a 
praying supplicant;  it was left to the subject to interpret him as either hearing the 
prayer and acting in response, thus learning what he did not already know, or acting 
on foreknowledge.  Despite carefully removing any indication of anthropomorphic 
limitations, Barrett and Keil found that subjects consistently interjected human 
limitations even after they stated their own beliefs in God’s transcendence. 
In striking contrast to the results of the questionnaire, the results of the story 
recall items suggest an anthropomorphic everyday God concept. For the God 
items, subjects incorrectly reported that the information was included in the 
story 61.2% of the time on the average, for a mean accuracy of 38.8%.  This 
compares to an average accuracy of 86.2% on the base items. . . Specifically, 
subjects seemed to characterize God as having to be near something to 
receive sensory information from it, not being able to attend differentially to 
competing sensory stimuli, performing tasks sequentially and not in parallel, 
having a single or limited focus of attention, moving from place to place, and 
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sometimes standing or walking. God was not conceptualized as completely 
free of constraints. (228-30) 
Barrett and Keil chose the indirect method of a recall test to avoid what 
Barrett calls theological correction.  As Barrett explains, “People seem to have 
difficulty maintaining the integrity of their reflective theological concepts in rapid, 
real-time problem solving because of [cognitive] processing demands”(Why Would).   
As a result, the beliefs that make intuitive sense prevail over assertions of slower, 
culturally mandated, creedal beliefs.  Variations of the test went so far as to remind 
subjects of their own reflective beliefs in God’s transcendence and provide them the 
transcript of the story while they answered the recall questions.  The results 
remained largely the same.  Though people affirm beliefs in an unlimited God, they 
usually represent him with human limitations in space, time, and awareness.   
Beowulf contains a vacillation between narrative and didactic asides 
remarkably similar to the intuitive anthropomorphism and reflective theological 
correction offered by Barrett’s test subjects.  The propositional interjections—the 
“monkish interpolations” as Müllenhoff and 19th century scholars called them—are 
the exceptions, the theological corrections.  They occasionally profess creedal 
references to God’s agency, but this agency is not depicted in the action of the poem.  
To recall Wilcox’s term, they circumscribe the story—write around it—but they do 
not constitute or structure it.  
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Allzumenschliches  
Descriptions of religion, whether one’s own or that of another, tend to take the 
form of propositional statements, hence reflective beliefs.  As Barrett’s studies 
demonstrate, these reflective beliefs are not necessarily translated into operational 
beliefs—the sort necessary to easily conceive and remember a narrative.  
Specifically, reflective beliefs that do not conform to anthropomorphic conceptual 
predispositions are quickly forgotten in the reconstruction of a story.  Barrett’s 
studies indicate the prevalence of anthropomorphism as the default, occurring even 
when it conflicts with reflective tenets.   
These findings accord with the anthropomorphism hypothesis of religion 
collected and explicated by Stuart Guthrie (Faces; “Why Gods”).  The basic idea is 
familiar enough.  Xenophanes observed in the 5th century BCE that “If oxen (horses) 
and lions . . . could draw with hands and create works of art like those made by men, 
horses would draw pictures of gods like horses, and oxen of gods like oxen” (Guthrie, 
Faces, 178).   
The degree of anthropomorphism exhibited by the god of Abrahamic 
religions is as difficult to isolate in historical representation as it is in the responses 
of Barrett’s test subjects.  Clearly the amorphous omni-god (omniscient, omnipotent, 
omnipresent god) of monotheism has an embarrassingly anthropomorphic past.  
Harold Bloom opens his reading of the Yahwist (J) source of Genesis, The Book of J, 
by noting the disparity between theological assumption and narrative embodiment. 
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Yahweh, in transmorgrified forms, remains the God of the Children of 
Abraham, of believing Jews, Christians, and Muslims.  But Yahweh, in the 
Book of J, is a literary character, just as Hamlet is . . . Why does Yahweh 
attempt to murder Moses?  How can God sit under the terebinth trees at 
Mamre and devour roast calf and curds?  What can we do with a Supreme 
Being who goes nearly berserk at Sinai and warns us he may break forth 
against the crowds, who clearly fill him with great distaste?  (2) 
The point at which Yahweh graduates from merely superhuman to Supreme Being is 
not only historically ambiguous, it seems to happen in the midst of the story.  In his 
discussion of the same dinner at Mamre mentioned by Bloom, James Kugel observes 
the vagaries of  Yahweh’s narrative representation: 
While the ‘angel’ is unrecognized at first—mistaken for an ordinary human 
being—after the recognition takes place, something equally striking occurs: 
usually, it is no longer an ‘angel’ at all that is speaking, but God Himself. 
Thus, in the passage above about Abraham and the three men, these three 
effortlessly slide into being God at some point. (Kugel, 115) 
This ambiguous shift from man to god resembles the vacillations between intuitive 
and reflective belief in theological correction on a historical scale.  Even the oldest 
books of the Bible are the result of centuries of redaction and interpretation, 
resulting in an evolving god that, unlike Bloom’s Hamlet analogue, cannot be 
exclusively attributed to any particular person, culture, doctrine, or precedent.  
There are, however, a handful of characteristics which God has maintained in 
monotheistic religions despite their incoherence with intuitive beliefs and the 
vestigial remains of an all-too-human Yahweh still evident in scripture. 
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The oddity of this anthropomorphism highlights the fact that Yahweh in the J 
source is not just another name for the capital-G God.  It is a fundamentally different 
god concept.  As Biblical scholar Yehezkel Kaufmann illustrates in his 
comprehensive 1960 work, The Religion of Israel, Judeo-Christian monotheism, at 
least as it is conceived by the time of the Second Temple, shows fundamental 
differences in the way its adherents conceive of the nature of the god Yahweh and 
the way pagans (his term) conceive of the gods, the world, and human agency.  “It is 
not the plurality of gods per se, then, that expresses the essence of polytheism, but 
rather the notion of many independent power-entities, all on a par with one another, 
and all rooted in the primordial realm” (23).  In paganism, Kaufmann argues, the 
gods have origins and limitations by which they have more in common with mortals 
than with a universal god.  There is no correlate in paganism to the monotheistic 
idea of a god beyond limitation or necessity who precedes and rules over all of 
creation. 
The “primordial realm” or “metadivine [ˁal ˀelōhī] realm,” Kaufmann argues, 
is the physical substance out of which the gods were born, as well as the rules of fate 
or necessity to which they are bound.  “Although the will of the gods plays a 
significant part in the cosmogonies, there is something that transcends it: the power 
of matter, the innate nature of the primordial order. The gods are conceived in the 
world-stuff, emerge out of it, and are subject to its nature”(31). This primordial 
order consists not only of matter but also of rules of causation and necessity 
exemplified by the Hindu rita (world order) and Greek moira (fate)—forces to 
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which the gods are bound and over which they have no ultimate control.   Likewise, 
morality was not the creation of the gods but something external to them.   
The ethical moment was equally incapable of giving the gods ultimate 
sovereignty. For morality is viewed by the pagan not as an expression 
of the sovereign will of the gods, but as part of the supernal order that 
governs the gods themselves. Morality, too, is, so to speak, part of 
nature, and its laws "laws of nature" (38). 
In Kaufmann’s view, a Judeo-Christian monotheist should not be as perplexed as 
Euthyphro by Socrates’ question, “Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it 
is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?” (Euthyphro, 10a).  To a 
monotheist, God determines holiness. 
In polytheism, as in monotheism, a god’s worshippers may supplicate him in 
order to influence the physical or social world.  But in polytheism, a magician may 
act directly with the matter (mana, Kaufmann 31ff) through which the gods initially 
obtained their power, effectively bypassing the gods in asserting his own 
autonomous agency.  Likewise, if fate or dharma function according to their own 
rules, human diviners might forecast their destinies without the intercession of a 
god.  The reason that magic and divination are condemned in the Bible is that they 
constitute a means of human agency independent of Yahweh.  In polytheism, 
however, these constitute options not only for humans, but for the gods themselves.    
The distinctive mark of all pagan rituals is that they are not directed 
toward the will of the gods alone. They call upon self-operating forces 
that are independent of the gods, and that the gods themselves need 
and utilize for their own benefit. The ultimate symbol of divine 
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subjection to transcendent powers is the god as magician or as diviner. 
(40-1) 
The gods act not only through immanent power but through interaction with other 
autonomous forces beyond them.  Likewise, divination is, for them, not merely the 
discovery of divine will but the discovery of their own fates.   
The basic idea appears to be that the system of signs and portents 
functions autonomously, as a part of nature through which one learns 
about both the will of gods and the cosmic order which transcends 
them. Because the system is self-operating, the gods also divine and 
prophesy to gain knowledge of the unknown. Divination can, 
therefore, not have been originated by the gods for the purpose of 
disclosing their will; it is prior to them; it is science of cosmic secrets 
by which even the gods can serve themselves. (43) 
The fact that the gods must act to empower, protect, and enrich themselves, that 
they must acquire magical tools and weapons, fight and slay each other, and often 
resort to ignoble methods to deceive each other and humanity, fundamentally 
separates them from the Biblical God.   These facts are also the substance of all 
mythology.  Myths, narratives about the gods, function only with gods of limited 
scope and influence.    
In myth, the gods appear not only as actors, but as acted upon.  At the 
heart of myth is the tension between the gods and other forces that 
shape their destinies. Myth describes the unfolding destiny of the gods, 
giving expression to the idea that besides the will of the gods there are 
other, independent forces that wholly or in part determine their 
destinies. (22) 
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Kaufmann gives copious, if brief, examples primarily from Greek and Near 
Eastern myths to demonstrate the physical and mental limitations of pagan gods 
illustrated in, if not wholly constituting, their signature stories.  Pagan gods, in short, 
are distinctly human.  The Bible retains scattered vestiges of Israel’s monolatrous 
past—Yaweh’s surprise at Adam’s transgression, his battle with Leviathan, and his 
near loss in a wrestling match with Jacob, among others—but these have been 
heavily subsumed under centuries of motivated interpretation (theological 
correction) to protect the conception of Yaweh’s pre-existence, omniscience, and 
omnipotence.   
The prominent Germanic god Wotan/Odin, as recorded in Scandinavian 
sources (the fornaldursögur, Poetic Edda, Prose Edda, Heimskringla), not only 
demonstrates human limitations but is obsessed with them.  Nearly all of his 
appearances involve his quests for knowledge, prophecy, skill, and material 
possessions.  Though he is frequently characterized as a god of war and monarchy, 
he may just as accurately be described in modern parlance as a god of self-
improvement.  He hangs himself from the holy tree Yggdrasil to learn the art of runic 
inscription.  He sacrifices his eye to the giant Mimir in order to drink from his well of 
knowledge.  Continuing the theme of imbibing mental skill, he uses shape-shifting 
and deception to steal the mead of poetry from the giant Suttung.  He uses 
necromancy to resurrect a prophetess in the quest to learn the fate of his son 
Balder—a fate which he cannot alter.  He depends on his ravens, Hugin (“Thought”) 
and Munin (“Memory”), and his high seat, Hlidskjalf, to give him insight into the 
world beyond his limited sensory perception.   
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Portrayals of Odin’s intercession into the affairs of mortals largely resemble 
the interloping of gods of culturally distant pantheons in epic literature.   The 
Vǫlsunga saga introduces him simultaneously as the father of the Volsung line of 
kings and as an immortal worker of magic.  He sires Sigi, who is in turn the father of 
Rerir.  When Rerir and his wife prove unable to conceive children, they pray to the 
gods, and Odin intercedes in the manner of a magician.  Odin does not hear their 
prayers directly, but is informed by his wife, Frigg.  Unlike Yahweh in his response 
to Abraham and Sarah, Odin does not seem to have the option of enabling his 
supplicants’ fertility by divine will or command alone; but the god is, according to 
the saga, “not without resources” (eigi aurþrifrada).  He sends a magic apple in the 
care of a shape-shifting wish maiden (oskmey; óskmær according to Byock).  The 
maiden, Hljod, the daughter of the giant Hrimnir, takes the form of a raven and 
drops the apple in Rerir’s lap while he is seated on a mound.  Rerir suspects the 
purpose of the auspicious event and eats the apple, after which his wife becomes 
pregnant with Volsung.   Soon afterwards, Rerir becomes fatally sick, and, according 
to the saga, he “intended to go to Odin; in those days that seemed desirable to many” 
(ętlaði at sekia heim oðinn ok þotti þat moigum fysilikt i þann timæ).   
Rerir’s interaction with Odin seems virtually indistinguishable from that of a 
monotheistic supplicant.  He prays to his god for the alleviation of a state of affairs 
beyond normal human control, and he looks forward to an afterlife in that god’s 
presence.  It is in Odin’s actions which are unobservable to Rerir that he differs 
significantly from later monotheistic portrayals of divine agency.  He cannot hear 
Rerir’s prayers directly; he must exploit substances possessing power beyond his 
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own (the apple and possibly the mound) and the agency of supernatural envoys 
(Frigg and Hljod).  But we only know this because the narrative incorporates him as 
a character who requires a means for his agency.  Conversely, according to 
Kaufmann, Biblical monotheism conceives Yahweh as: 
[A] supernal God, above every cosmic law, fate, and compulsion; unborn, 
unbegetting, knowing no desire, independent of matter and its forces; a God 
who does not fight other divinities or powers of impurity; who does not 
sacrifice, divine, prophesy, or practice sorcery; who does not sin and needs 
no expiation; a God who does not celebrate festivals of his life. An unfettered 
divine will transcending all being. (Religion of Israel, 121) 
In the Biblical account of the birth of Abraham’s son Isaac, a story of divine 
intervention in human fertility which parallels that of Odin and Sigi, Yahweh’s actual 
means of enabling Sarah’s post-menopausal fertility is affirmed but never portrayed.  
How he enables Sarah to become pregnant seems immaterial to the author(s) of the 
text.  Yahweh is uncharacteristically anthropomorphized in these passages in 
Genesis, appearing as one of three men who visit Abraham at Mamre (Genesis 18).  
Yaweh not only assumes human form, but he eats calf and curds prepared for him 
by Abraham (Kugel, 113-5; Bloom, 12).  Standing before Abraham, he admits his 
own lack of omniscience when he says, “How great is the outcry against Sodom and 
Gomorrah and how very grave their sin! I must go down and see whether they have 
done altogether according to the outcry that has come to me; and if not, I will know” 
(18:20-21).  The story clearly carries vestiges of proto-Biblical monolatry, if not full-
blown polytheism, which was monotheism’s historical, if not philosophical, forebear.  
Yet, even at his most anthropomorphic, Yahweh’s means of enabling Sarah’s 
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pregnancy remain without description.  After Abimelech attempts to take Sarah as 
his own wife, Genesis 20:17-18 says, “Then Abraham prayed to God; and God healed 
Abimelech, and also healed his wife and female slaves so that they bore children.  
For the LORD had closed fast all the wombs of the house of Abimelech because of 
Sarah, Abraham's wife.”  Genesis 21 does little to elaborate: “The LORD dealt with 
Sarah as he had said, and the LORD did for Sarah as he had promised.  Sarah 
conceived and bore Abraham a son in his old age, at the time of which God had 
spoken to him” (21:1-2).  
The surviving anthropomorphism of these episodes indicates their antiquity 
and somewhat troubles the distinction Kaufmann assumes between paganism and 
monotheism (assuming this account was originally monotheistic rather than 
monolatrous).  However, the fact that Yahweh’s agency is not accompanied by 
explanation, even when his physical form and limited knowledge are explicit, 
confirms a fundamental difference between the two modes of theology.  As in the 
creation narrative of Genesis 1 (if not Genesis 2), Yahweh speaks, and what he 
describes comes to pass.   
The act of explaining Yahweh’s agency is implicitly condemned in the story of 
Abraham and Sarah.  When Sarah, while eavesdropping, overhears Yahweh say that 
she will become pregnant, she laughs, and Yahweh reacts defensively. “The LORD 
said to Abraham, ‘Why did Sarah laugh, and say, 'Shall I indeed bear a child, now that 
I am old?' Is anything too wonderful for the LORD?” (18:13-14). Sarah denies her 
laughter for fear of retribution and is confronted directly by Yahweh.  This 
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interaction may simply exemplify a perceived taunt of a superior by an inferior.  
However, in Kaufmann’s dichotomy, it may also indicate the greatest challenge to 
monotheism: the assertion of autonomous reason over the assumption of unfettered 
teleological agency.    
The basic idea of Israelite religion is that God is supreme over all. There is no 
realm above or beside him to limit his absolute sovereignty. He is utterly 
distinct from, and other than, the world; he is subject to no laws, no 
compulsions, or powers that transcend him. He is, in short, non-mythological 
(Religion of Israel, 60, emphasis added). 
For Yahweh to have his own mythology, that a story of his action against an 
oppositional agent or nature might require a means external to himself for its 
completion, undermines the “supernal God” concept of later Judaism and its 
offshoots.  A story requires conflict.  Conflict requires a division of agency (e.g. a 
poly-agent schema).  If conflict is impossible for Yahweh, he cannot have his own 
story.   
Along with the theogonic idea, the Bible rejected the thought that YHWH 
draws upon any external source of power. . . . The Bible has no concept of 
overriding fate and unalterable destiny. Its God is not subject to sexual needs, 
cycles of growth, life and death, or any cosmic order. The Bible knows only 
one supreme law: the will of God. Destiny is determined only by God; from 
him emanate the decrees that bind all. God alone has fixed the laws of heaven 
and earth, the world and all that is therein (Jer. 31:35; Ps. 148:6; Job 38:33, 
and elsewhere). Typical is the notion that the order of the cosmos is a 
covenant which God has imposed upon it (Jer. 33:20, 25). The blessings of 
fertility, the regularity of nature, the order of the times and seasons have all 
been ordained by God. He is first and last (Isa. 41:4; 44:6; 48:12); before him 
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there was no god nor will there be after him (43:10). No decree or fate binds 
him. . . .The biblical God . . . is outside of the flux of becoming and change; he 
controls times and sets seasons (72-3) 
In the parallel stories of Abraham and Sigi, the actions of the human supplicants are 
remarkably similar.  The roles of the two gods parallel each other but for the fact 
that Yahweh’s means are not described.  To reveal means would trap the concept of 
Yahweh inside “the flux of becoming and change.”   
Monotheism and Early Agent Concepts  
Kaufmann’s illustration of Yahweh as capital “G” God is familiar enough.  This 
is the notion of God inherited by Christianity and Islam, and seems to have been a 
defining characteristic of Judaism at least since the reign of Josiah and the 
consolidation of Yahwist cults at Jerusalem (Wright 2009, Kugel 2007).  However, as 
illustrated in the above examples of Yahweh’s all-too-human embodiment in Genesis, 
this abstract God has not always stood apart from pagan god concepts.  Something 
elevated Yahweh from a god into God, and did so in spite of the fact that 1) his own 
sacred scriptures evidence his anthropomorphic limitations, 2) none of the 
neighboring cultures maintained lasting monotheistic cults, and 3) political and 
economic forces discouraged this development (Babylonian captivity, Roman 
occupation, etc.) for intervals often extending over several generations.  Cultural 
context alone is insufficient to explain the shift. 
Justin Barrett argues that: 
a superknowing, superperceiving, superpowerful, immortal, and (perhaps) 
supergood god possesses a strong selective advantages, such that once it is 
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introduced, belief in such a god should spread quite well.  This supergod 
concept matches well (but not perfectly) with the God of Christianity, Islam, 
and Judaism, and other religious traditions as well. (Why Would, 89, my 
italics, Barrett’s parentheticals) 
Jean Piaget (Child’s Conception of the World; Physical Causality) observed a 
tendency in children to attribute purposeful design to objects and characteristics of 
objects whether they were natural or the products of human design.   Piaget termed 
this tendency childhood artificialism.  Mountains, his child subjects told him, were 
made for climbing.  Wind was made by someone, a god or human, blowing air from 
his mouth or nostrils.  Rocks were pointed to keep people from sitting on them.  
Everything, in the children’s minds, was created by a human-like will for a human-
like purpose, very often, not by gods but by humans.  Piaget hypothesized that 
artificialism begins when children observe human creation of artifacts and apply 
this generalized knowledge to all objects.  Research by developmental psychologist 
Deborah Kelemen confirms this bias, which she terms promiscuous teleology. 
But teleology does not necessarily imply full-blown anthropomorphism.  
Research has found that infants’ expectations of intentional agency are not bound to 
phenotypically human images.  Infants can follow goal-oriented behavior in images 
of faceless blobs (Johnson, Booth, & O'Hearn) and computer dots (Csibra & Gergely) 
devoid of any anthropomorphic characteristics beyond that of apparent self-
propulsion.  Kelemen observes that “rather than being anthropomorphic, children's 
earliest concept of agency is abstract and is invoked by a range of nonhuman 
entities from the time when overt signs of children's sensitivity to mental states are 
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becoming increasingly robust” (“Intuitive Theists”).  This would indicate that 
childhood artificialism is not the product of observation, much less of cultural 
learning, but an evolved psychological mechanism only later refined through 
observation (Biro & Leslie, 2007).  Kelemen’s studies have found that children from 
different religious and cultural backgrounds consistently prefer a form of 
creationism even when told that their parents prefer a scientific view with no 
creator (“Children’s Preferences”). It is only around the age of ten that children from 
non-religious households begin to adopt scientific explanations for the origin of the 
natural world (Evans).  For this reason, Kelemen suggests that children are born 
“intuitive theists,” only coming to non-creationist beliefs through education if at all.  
Besides being born creationists, we are also born predisposed to belief in 
omniscience.  Developmental psychologists Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan Leslie, and 
Uta Frith developed a false belief task to test children’s understanding of what other 
people know and what they do not.  Children were told a story with accompanying 
illustrations describing two girls, Sally and Ann, in a room with a with a basket and a 
box.  In the story, Sally puts a marble in the basket and leaves the room.  Ann then 
moves the marble from the basket to the box, shortly after which Sally returns.  The 
children are asked which container, the basket or the box, Sally will look inside for 
her marble.  Most children over the age of four (excepting those with autism) realize 
that Sally is unaware that in her absence the marble has been moved.  Younger 
children, on the other hand, say that Sally will look in the box despite the fact that 
she was absent when Ann put it there.  Through interaction with others, children 
eventually learn the limits of human knowledge; only God’s knowledge escapes 
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falsification.  As Barrett interprets these findings, children “begin with a default 
assumption that beliefs are infallible and must then learn that beliefs can be 
wrong. . . . Through development, they had to mature to the point of answering 
correctly for a person but needed only to maintain their naïve default assumption to 
answer correctly for God” (79).  Thus, individual humans and possibly the 
anthropomorphic schema fails a key test of godhood, “For one who is not prescient 
of all future things is not God” (Augustine, City of God, 5.9, p. 194).  Whereas in early 
development, children believe that all humans are omniscient and omnipotent, after 
learning of human limitations, the only agent unrestricted in power and knowledge 
is God. 
In those same earliest days of life when young children intuitively accept 
disembodied agents with power and knowledge unlimited by physics, they exhibit 
another likewise unlearned set of social behavior patterns.   The discovery of 
attachment behavior by Harry Harlow and theorized by John Bowlby confronted the 
contemporary behaviorist paradigm with its first disconfirming evidence.  The 
conventional psychological wisdom of the time dictated that infants learned 
behavior through operant conditioning, coming to love their mothers only as a 
means of nutrition.  Harlow (in Haidt) discovered that the young rhesus macaques 
in his laboratory derived comfort from stimuli to which they had never been 
conditioned.  Testing a hunch, Harlow created two artificial mothers: one made of 
wire which held a bottle of milk, and another made of foam covered with cloth with 
no milk dispenser.  Contrary to the Freudian and behaviorist assumption that the 
monkeys would be conditioned to find comfort where they found nourishment, 
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none of the babies clung to the wire mother any longer than they had to for feeding.  
Once satiated, they exhibited an unambiguous and unconditioned preference for the 
soft, cloth mother.  The discovery of these unconditioned behaviors or fixed action 
patterns laid the groundwork for evolutionary psychology.   
John Bowlby explored the implications of Harlow’s findings for human 
development.  The resulting theory of attachment explained the behavior of children 
in relation to their care-givers (attachment figures) as sources of emotional security 
and models for learned behavior.   The child’s mental attachment system monitors 
his/her relative proximity to the attachment figure, creates a sense of distress when 
the attachment figure is out of sight for too long, and creates a sense of comfort and 
security when proximity is reestablished.  The care-giver functions as a mobile 
secure base from which the child may explore, checking back at regular intervals for 
comfort and information (social referencing, Campos and Stenberg).  This pattern of 
exploration, anxiety, return, and reference was reliably demonstrated by Mary 
Ainsworth and colleagues in a test they dubbed the strange situation (in Kirkpatrick).   
Lee Kirkpatrick has argued that attachment behaviors in children have precise 
parallels in religious behaviors of people throughout life: 
It seems clear that beliefs about a personal God who watches over one 
functions psychologically as a secure base, just as do human attachments. It is 
easy to see why: An attachment figure who is simultaneously omnipresent, 
omniscient, and omnipotent would provide the most secure of secure bases. . . 
In monotheistic religions in particular, there is the potential for God (by 
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whatever name he or she is identified) to serve as an attachment figure. (87, 
92) 
Kirkpatrick’s book, Attachment, Evolution, and the Psychology of Religion, draws 
evidence from religious literature as well as modern studies of religious believers 
(mostly American Christian) that monotheistic religious adherence exhibits all of 
the primary elements of attachment psychology.   
Faith 
The Hebrew Bible is replete with descriptions of Yahweh as an attachment 
figure and his followers as wholly dependent children at the mercy of his protection 
and provision (Genesis 15:1: “the word of the LORD came to Abram in a vision, ‘Do 
not be afraid, Abram, I am your shield [protection]; your reward [provision] shall be 
very great”).  In addition, metaphors originating in the pastoral economy of the early 
Levant merge with attachment psychology.  Psalm 23 (“The Lord is my shepherd, I 
shall not want.  He makes me lie down in green pastures. He leads me by the still 
waters,”) fails to continue the believer-as-sheep metaphor to the extent of depicting 
Yahweh sheering and eating his followers.  It only borrows those elements of the 
pastoral schema that parallel the child-parent schema. 
This is not to say that, as an attachment figure, God can never fail to provide 
sustenance and protection.  Kirkpatrick notes: 
Perceptions of God as a nurturant caregiver and as a punitive, frightening 
being are not necessarily opposites, nor mutually exclusive. In some cases, 
the latter may actually serve to reinforce the former. Bowlby noted that 
lambs and puppies develop and maintain attachments despite receipt of 
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unpredictable punishments from their caregivers and, moreover, that 
attachment behaviors actually increase as a result of such treatment. 
Similarly, human infants are attached to parents who mistreat them (Egeland 
& Sroufe, 1981). The basis for this seemingly paradoxical behavior is that the 
punishments, like other sources of fear and distress, activate the attachment 
system and hence the seeking of proximity to the primary attachment figure. 
The same individual is, in a sense, both the source of the problem and the 
solution. (83) 
This is precisely the sort of reasoning that came to define Judaism in exile.  In the 
period before the Babylonian conquest, Yahweh was a henotheistic patron god 
rather than a monotheistic universal God (Mark S. Smith, p. 165).  However, it was in 
the time of Israel’s greatest national crisis, a collective “strange situation” in 
attachment terms, that Yahweh received an ironic promotion to omnipotence.  Mark 
S. Smith observes: 
First in the face of the great empires and then in exile, Israel stands at the 
bottom of its political power, and it exalts its deity inversely as ruler of the 
whole universe, with little regard for the status of the older deities known 
from the preexilic literary record. . . The events leading to the Judean exile of 
587 extended Israel’s understanding of its deity’s mastery of the world even 
as the nation was being reduced. (165) 
The loss of national sovereignty threatened more than the lives and livelihoods of 
Israel’s people.  It also threw Yahweh’s potency, if not existence, into doubt.  Robert 
Wright observes: 
The momentousness of Israel’s geopolitical defeat, and the depth of the 
psychological trauma, left two basic theological options on the table and 
rendered one of them unpalatable. First, the Israelites could just conclude 
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that their god had lost a battle; Yahweh had done his best, only to lose to the 
mighty Marduk, imperial god of the Babylonians.  But the thought of your 
national god losing has never been appealing (to Israelites, to Moabites, to 
people in general), and in this case it was just about unbearable. For if 
Yahweh had lost this battle, he had lost in an utterly humiliating way. His 
temple—his home—had been destroyed, and his people had been stolen…. 
That left option two: concluding that the outcome had been Yahweh’s will. 
But if the outcome was Yahweh’s will, then he was even stronger than had 
been previously evident. (170-1)  
Seeing the attachment figure as cruel seems to be psychologically less unnerving 
than seeing him as wholly absent or impotent in the face of a threat (Kirkpatrick, 
83).  This may be due to the fact that a child already realizes his/her own impotence 
and thus loses nothing by being reminded of it.  Realizing the absence or impotence 
of the attachment figure leaves the child with no resources other than his/her own 
at the very moment he/she is confronted with the futility of those resources.  In an 
actual childhood threat situation, the child is far more likely to survive by continuing 
to seek out and seek to appease an attachment figure than going it alone.  As a result, 
the intuitive plan of action is to supplicate, regardless of how inconsistent or 
vindictive the attachment figure has proven to be. 
The fact that the attachment system is a fixed action pattern, that it functions 
(although in different forms) whether or not the child has reason to trust the 
attachment figure to handle a given situation, connects it to the Biblical concept of 
faith (Hebrew ’ēmûn, Greek pistis, πίστις) more reliably than with the conditional 
beliefs of polytheism.  It correlates especially well with the Pauline idea of faith.  
Paul emphasizes faith as a relationship with God rather than a conditional belief:  
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“Against all hope, Abraham in hope believed and so became the father of many 
nations, just as it had been said to him, ‘So shall your offspring be.’” (Romans 4:18).  
The Pauline school that came to dominate Christian orthodoxy focused specifically 
on faith over the law, ritual, or understanding.  “Now faith is being sure of what we 
hope for and certain of what we do not see” (Hebrews 11:1).  The term became 
definitive of early Christians to the point that it sufficed as a social marker 
separating Christian from Jew and polytheist long before the term “Christian” 
emerged:  “All the believers were together and had everything in common” (Acts 
2:44).  
Theory-of-Mind and Limited Gods 
Evidence of the infant’s predisposition to goal-directed action, unlimited by 
perceptual and physical constraints or phenotypically human embodiment, has led 
Barrett and Richert to dispute Guthrie’s anthropomorphism hypothesis of religion 
(described above).  Holding anthropomorphism as the root of religious beliefs 
implies that the individual’s beliefs are based on observation of humans and 
subsequently applied to God or gods.  They should therefore be altered as the child’s 
concept of specifically human agency changes.  Barrett and Richert suggest that the 
disembodied and unconstrained agent concepts that precede more limited 
anthropomorphic schemas are evidence that the god concept familiar in Abrahamic 
monotheism precedes the more limited gods of polytheistic mythology.  In this 
model, which the authors dub the preparedness hypothesis, ontogeny completely 
inverts phylogeny.  The familiar historical chronology, popularized by Herbert 
Spencer and other 19th century forerunners of anthropology, assumes that religion 
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evolves along a continuum beginning in animism, proceeding to anthropomorphism, 
and culminating in monotheism as a result of progressive civilization.  In disputing 
this progressivist model, Barrett and Richert’s preparedness hypothesis agrees with 
Kaufmann’s observation that monotheism grew in spite of anthropomorphic 
polytheism rather than out of it.  While I dispute their characterization of Guthrie’s 
hypothesis (which uses the term anthropomorphic more broadly to include 
disembodied intentional agency), I agree that the transcendent God of monotheism 
is grounded in a very different cognitive system than that which gives rise to 
anthropomorphic polytheism.  The preparedness hypothesis’ theoretical base in 
evolutionary psychology explains how the two models of gods could coexist 
throughout history despite their mutual exclusivity.  I doubt that the developmental 
priority of transcendent agency concepts would suffice to bolster this mode of 
thought through the disconfirmation of social experience.  Barrett’s experiments 
with anthropomorphic intrusion errors into transcendent god concepts pose an 
explanatory challenge.  However, the addition of Kirkpatrick’s link between 
attachment psychology and monotheistic faith suggests a grounding of transcendent 
agency in a separate cognitive network than that which processes fully 
anthropomorphic schemas.  
I suggest that the anthropomorphism hypothesis, in opposition to which 
Barrett and Richert define their preparedness hypothesis, not be defined by 
Guthrie’s anthropomorphism, due to the fact that Guthrie’s hypothesis incorporates 
early abstract agency concepts as well as embodied ones.  Instead, I suggest the 
anthropomorphic god concept be defined by the sort of full-blown 
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anthropomorphism which emerges subsequently as children refine their social 
schemas in order to comprehend the increasing complexity of their extended social 
world.  It is this development which marks the emergeance of metarepresentation 
and the transition of the individual from the omni-agent schema of attachment to the 
poly-agent schema necessary to expand one’s social relations and refine one’s 
comprehension of the thoughts of others. 
In the false belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith) above, we noted that 
around the age of four children begin to realize that other people’s knowledge is 
limited by things like sense perception and access to information.  While this is 
familiar enough to escape notice, it is connected to a uniquely human evolutionary 
development in cognition dubbed theory-of-mind (ToM) by primatologists Premack 
& Woodruff.  Awareness of the presence of an intentional agent accomplishes little 
on its own.  To successfully integrate into a social milieu, protect ourselves against 
cheaters, convince others to share their resources, discourage violence, etc. we must 
be able to see things from the point of view of others.  Developmental psychologist 
Alan Leslie terms this sort of perspective-taking metarepresentation (Leslie, 
“Pretense and Representation”; “Selective Attention”).  An individual needs to be 
able not only to represent a given situation as it is, but to represent the 
representation as another person would, who had different access to information, 
different preconceptions, and different goals.   
Between the ages of eight and fourteen, the child’s number of attachment 
figures grows to include peers and relatives (Haidt 119).  At the same time, children 
100 
 
learn to integrate a new awareness of the limitations of others.  While their new 
attachment figures can provide emotional support, they do not necessarily offer the 
same level of perceived security that was attributed to the attachment figure at an 
earlier stage of development.  As attachment security decreases, the need for 
coalition-building increases.  Creating support networks, alliances, exchange 
relationships, etc. requires progressively advanced levels of metarepresentation 
which, in turn, requires progressively subtler understandings of the conceptual and 
perceptual limitations of individual others. 
Polytheistic gods rarely exhibit omniscience.  The Nasadiya (Creation Hymn) 
of the Rig Veda gives the gods room for wonder: 
Who really knows? Who will here proclaim it? Whence was it produced? 
Whence is this creation?  The gods came afterwards, with the creation of this 
universe.  Who then knows whence it has arisen?  Whence this creation has 
arisen—perhaps it formed itself, or perhaps it did not—the one who looks 
down on it, in the highest heaven, only he knows—or perhaps he does not 
know. (10.129.6-7, Doniger trans. 25-6) 
Of course, the Christian spirit world is also populated by less-than-omnipotent 
supernatural agents.  The difference lies in the subordination of these weaker spirits.  
In Christianity, angels with autonomy are demons.  The word “angel” means 
messenger.  They do not initiate action of their own will.  They merely act as vessels 
of God’s will.  As such, they do not compare with the pagan gods.  Pagan gods, as 
Christian apologists since Justin Martyr have been happy to point out, have more in 
common with demons of the Christian cosmology.  However, even demons are 
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subordinate agents, at least since Origin’s assertion that they carry out God’s will 
unwittingly (felix culpa), creating opportunities for God to show his mercy.  As such, 
even their comparative autonomy falls short of that possessed by pagan gods.  
Though the agency of pagan gods is limited by the means available, their wills are 
not the effect of prior causal agency any more than are those of humans in normal 
social cognition.  In other words, a god may be manipulated to react in anger, lust, 
ignorance, etc., but this is a feat possessed by mere mortals by virtue of 
metarepresentation.  Through normal theory-of-mind, we may trace causal agency 
back to an initial causal agent, whose motives are just as open to us as those of any 
other human or god.  In Christianity, however, metarepresenting God’s thought 
process is forbidden, for “no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit 
of God” (1 Corinthians, 2:11). 
The anthropomorphism that characterizes pagan gods lends them to 
inclusion in social cognition.  The transcendent god as attachment figure, on the 
other hand, does not require a well-developed ToM.  Attachment behavior does not 
require the child to read the attachment figure’s mind.  A child responds with fixed 
action patterns such as crying even when a parent explicitly discourages crying.  
This is not to say that people do not attempt to read an attachment figure’s mind; 
only that the mindreading originates separately from the attachment seeking, 
connected by subsequent reflective effort. 
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Kirkpatrick admits that attachment theory is less informative in the study of 
polytheism than more anthropomorphic cognition in which gods are regarded much 
the same as human exchange partners: 
In polytheistic belief systems . . . I suspect people’s perceived relationships 
with deities are not attachment relationships. For example, one such 
mechanism to which I have alluded already is that of perceived relationships 
with gods predicated on principles of social exchange rather than attachment. 
The typical pattern in polytheistic systems is for gods to be specialized, in the 
sense that different gods are seen to be responsible for different kinds of 
effects in the world: the weather, the bounty of the harvest, success or luck in 
the hunt or on the battlefield; disease and good health; and so forth. To the 
extent that these effects are important to the human condition, people enter 
into implicit or explicit social contracts with these deities to influence their 
behavior, with different gods presumed to expect or demand different kinds 
of sacrifices or investments. In most cases, then, supernatural beings are seen 
to offer a particular provision or set of provisions in exchange for a particular 
obligation—the sine qua non of social exchange. (92) 
The most identifiably religious aspect of most non-monotheistic cultures, the ritual 
of sacrifice, rarely takes the form of a show of submission or the rendering of a thing 
owed.  Rather, it takes the form of a contractual exchange between two equally 
responsible parties (Wade 41-2).  The Latin prayer “do ut des,” (I give so that you 
will give) finds its cognate in the Vedic “Dãdãmi se, dehi me” (Mauss 17).   
This is the orientation of one pagan priest described by Bede in his Historia 
Ecclesia.  When the missionary Paulinus preaches to the English King Edwin (c. 627), 
Edwin’s chief priest, Coifi, seems eager to convert, but not for virtues inherent in 
Christianity.  The priest advises the king: 
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Tu vide, rex, quale sit hoc quod nobis modo praedieatur: ego autem tibi 
verissime quod certum didici, profiteor, quia nihil omnino virtutis habet, nihil 
utilitatis religio ilia quam hucusque tenuimus nullus enim tuorum studiosius 
quam ego culturae deorum nostrorum se subdidit ; et nihilominus multi sunt 
qui ampliora a te beneficia quam ego, et maiores accipiunt dignitates, 
magisque prosperantur in omnibus quae agenda vel adquirenda disponunt. Si 
autem dii aliquid valerent, me potius iuvare vellent, qui illis impensius servire 
curavi.  Unde restat, si ut ea quae nunc nobis nova praedicantur, meliora esse et 
fortiora, habita examinatione perspexeris, absque ullo cunctamine suscipere 
ilia festinemus. 
May it like your highness to prove what manner of doctrine this is which is 
now preached unto us; but thus much I surely avouch unto you, which I have 
certainly learned, that the religion which unto this day we have observed 
hath no virtue nor advantage in it at all: for none of your subjects hath set 
himself more earnestly to the worship of our gods than I; and yet, 
notwithstanding, there are many of them which receive from you more 
ample benefits than I, and higher dignities than I, and better prosper in all 
they take in hand to do or seek to get than I.  If now the gods could aught 
have done, they would rather have helped me, who have been careful to 
serve them more zealously.  Wherefore it remaineth that, if you shall find 
after good examination that these things which be now newly preached to us 
be better and of more power, then without longer delay we hasten to receive 
them. (HE 2.13, King ed. & trans. pp. 282-3) 
In other words, Coifi’s allegiance to the gods is conditional, based on expectation of 
reward from them, particularly in the form of recognition from the king.   
Caesar’s description of Celtic druids describes an office entrusted with 
officiating ritual and settling cosmological debate, but just as heavily occupied with 
judicial and educational duties.  Likewise, the goði (usually translated “priests”) of 
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Icelandic sagas function more as landholders, war chiefs, and Mafioso-style dons 
who have the added responsibility of maintaining ritual and courting the patronage 
of particular gods.  These examples suggest that the division between the social and 
supernatural worlds was not fixed.  The gods in these societies were the objects of 
the same sorts of metarepresentation required to manage relationships with fellow 
humans.  This may include devotion, but it would just as likely include conditional 
alliance, reprimand, grudges, unrequited love, imitation, and even strategic human 
opposition to the gods through magic or alliance with competing gods. 
Human and Divine Agency in Narrative Representation 
The polytheistic supplicant, like Coifi and Sigi, seeks aid, reward, and 
protection from the gods the way he would seek them from other mortals.  This 
interaction may be metarepresented in narrative on both sides—we see the desires, 
powers, suspicions, limitations, etc. of both the human supplicant and the god whom 
he supplicates.  Such is not the case with the abstracted omni-potentate.  As 
Kaufmann notes, a god with a story is a god with needs, limits, competitors, and the 
potential for failure.  Pagan gods fit easily into narratives, differing from human 
protagonists only in the magnitude of their actions and, usually, their challenges.  
Theologically correct monotheistic narratives, as in most Biblical examples, can only 
have protagonists who are psychologically human—who have desires, limitations, 
emotions, etc.  Neither the Gospels nor Milton’s Paradise Lost manages to escape this 
limitation.  The synoptic Gospels maintain Jesus’ human limitations and separation 
from the Father, which they maintain he accepted as necessary to the incarnation.  
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Both Johns (Milton and the gospel author) vacillate between anthropomorphic 
characterizations and theologically correct didacticism.   
The only sort of narrative which is logically permitted by monotheism is one 
which is also compatible with the attachment schema.  In order to attribute all 
agency to an omnipotent and omniscient God, the story must limit the agency of the 
protagonist to the decision of obeying and acting as conduit of God’s agency or 
disobeying and awaiting inevitable judgment.  This is precisely the template of the 
hagiography genre.  In the prose Life of Saint Cuthbert, which Bede expanded from 
an earlier anonymous source, the eponymous hero acts as a vessel of God’s will 
rather than through his own ability or from his own agenda.  In introducing his 
subject, Bede himself defers credit for the work’s authorship to Domino juvante 
(with the Lord’s help).   
The feats which Cuthbert performs through God’s power might not impress 
the modern reader as the sort of thing requiring divine intervention.  Two events 
Bede describes as miracles (miraculis, ch. 19 & 20) requires Cuthbert to do nothing 
more than scare away birds with raised hands and shouts.  In both cases, the birds 
are treated as interlocutors rather than animals.  A group of ravens who had been 
pulling thatch out of a roof at the monastery were reproved by Cuthbert and flew 
away “ashamed” (Uix uerba compleuerat, et confestim tristes abiere 224).  When a 
flock of birds is eating grain from the monks’ harvest, Cuthbert chastises them, 
asking “Why are you eating crops you yourselves did not grow?” (‘Quid tangitis,’ 
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inquit, ‘sata, quæ non seruistis? 222).  However, when Cuthbert takes an eagle’s meal, 
he attributes the act as the acceptance of divine providence. 
Cui uir Domini, Disce inquit filiole fidem semper et spem habere in Domino, 
quia nunquam fame perit, qui Deo fideliter seruit. Et sursum aspectans 
uidensque aquilam in alto uolantem, Cernis inquit aquilam illam porro 
uolantem?  Etiam per huius ministerium possibile est Domino nos hodie reficere.  
Talia confabulantes, agebant iter iuxta fluuium quendam, et ecce subito uident 
aquilam in ripa residentem, dixitque uir Dei, Uides ubi nostra quam praedixi 
ministra residet?  Curre rogo, et quid nobis epularum Domino mittente attulerit 
inspice, et citius affer.  Qui accurrens attulit piscem non modicum, quem ilia 
nuper de fluuio prendiderat. 
 ‘Learn to have constant faith and hope in the Lord,’ said Cuthbert. ‘He who 
serves God shall never die of hunger.’ He looked up and saw an eagle flying 
high overhead. ‘Do you see that eagle up there? God is quite capable of 
sending us food by it.’  They were making their way along a river, talking 
much about such things, when they suddenly saw the eagle settling down on 
the bank. ‘There,’ said the saint, ‘is the servant I was telling you about.  Run 
and see what God has sent and bring it back quickly.’  The boy brought back a 
big fish which the bird had just caught. (Ch. 12, 196-7, my emphasis) 
Cuthbert’s reliance on external agency blurs the boundary between providence and 
theft when he stops at an empty shepherd’s hut while traveling.  After feeding his 
horse straw from the roof (the very thing he chastises the ravens for in Ch. 19), 
Cuthbert begins his evening prayers.  As he does so, his horse, now chewing directly 
on the roof, dislodges a cloth-wrapped bundle containing bread and meat.  Cuthbert, 
as well as Bede, disregards the human agency and intent behind both the hut and 
the food stash. 
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Laudemque decantans benefidis coelestibus, Deo inquit gratias qui et mihi pro 
eius amore ieiunanti et meo comiti coenam prouidere dignatus est. Diuisit ergo 
fragmen panis quod inuenit, partemque eius dimidiam equo dedit, reliquum suo 
esui reseruauit, atque ex illo iam die promptior factus est ad ieiunandum, quia 
nimirum intellexit eius dono sibi refectionem procuratam in solitudine, qui 
quondam Heliam solitarium, quia nullus hominum aderat qui ministraret, 
eiusdem modi cibo per uolucres | non pauco tempore pauit. Cuius oculi super 
timentes eum, sperantes autem in misericordia eius, ut eripiat a morte animas 
eorum, et alat eos in fame. 
 ‘O God,’ he said.  ‘I was fasting for the love of Thee and in return thou hast 
fed both me and my animal, blessed be Thy Name.’  He broke the bread and 
gave half to the horse. From that day on he was much more ready to fast, now 
that he knew he had been fed in his solitude by Him who, when there was no 
one else to provide, had sent the very birds, day after day, with food for Elijah 
in the wilderness.  His eyes are ever on them that fear Him and hope in His 
mercy, so that He may, in the words of the Psalmist, ‘snatch their souls from 
death and feed them in time of famine.’ (Ch. 5, pp. 170-1) 
The attribution of divine agency by both the protagonist and the author clearly 
enough bypass mundane causal explanations (i.e. shouting and hand waving scare 
birds away; eagles fish, must land to eat, and tend to fly away leaving their catch 
when approached by large mammals).  But a second significant omission is required 
for the last story.  Bede tells us that Cuthbert was traveling in an area far from any 
human habitation.  The fact that he discovers a shepherd’s hut with a food stash 
should not be surprising if we, unlike the author or protagonist, extend our theory-
of-mind to the shepherd.  A shepherd who traveled with his flock to a remote area 
would need food and shelter just as much as Cuthbert, hence the construction of the 
hut and the placement of the bundle of food.  That same shepherd is likely to return 
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and, as anyone who can pass the false belief task above will know, is likely to expect 
his roof to be intact and his food to be waiting.   
This lack of any significant metarepresentation is not limited to these 
incidents, nor to Bede’s Life of Cuthbert.  Throughout the hagiography, Cuthbert is 
the conduit for miraculous healing (though frequently accompanied by material 
remedies).  However, these are always described as means to the end of promoting 
conversion to Christianity and enabling the work of the church.   
When the Abbess Aelfflaed is afflicted with pain in her legs, Cuthbert sends, 
in his absence, a cincture to her.  Wrapping the cincture around her legs relieves the 
pain in her legs.  Afterwards, a nun under the abbess’ care is afflicted with 
headaches which are also cured by being wrapped in the cincture.  The nun then 
closed the cincture in her locker, but when asked for its return by the abbess, the 
nun could not find it.  Bede interprets the event as follows: 
Quod diuina dispensatione factum intelligitur, uidelicet ut et per duo sanitatis 
miracula Deo dilecti patris sanctitas appareret credentibus, et deinceps 
dubitandi de sanctitate illius occasio tolleretur incredulis.  Si enim eadem zona 
semper adesset, semper ad hanc concurrere uoluissent egrot, et dum forte 
aliquis ex his non mereretur a sua infirmitate curari, derogaret impotentiae 
non saluantis, cum ipse potius esset salutis indignus. Unde prouida ut dictum 
est dispensatione supernae pietatis, postquam fides credentium confirmata est, 
mox inuidie perfidorum materia detrahendi est prorsus ablata.  
It is clear that this was done by divine dispensation, so that the holiness of 
the father beloved of God might be made apparent to believers through these 
two miracles of healing, and that henceforth all occasion for doubting his 
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sanctity might be removed from the incredulous. For if that girdle had always 
been there, sick people would always have wished to flock to it; and when 
perhaps one of them did not deserve to be healed of his infirmity, he would 
disparage its power, because it did not heal him, when really he was not 
worthy of being healed.  Hence as has been said, by the providential 
dispensation of heavenly grace, after the faith of believers had been 
strengthened, forthwith the opportunity for the envious and unbelievers to 
disparage was entirely taken away. (Ch. 23, 232-5) 
“The sick” in question do not seem to have mattered quite so much as the 
recognition that Cuthbert was the chosen instrument of God.  Similarly, when a boy 
thought to be a demoniac is brought to the monastery for divine healing, Bede tells 
us that “the martyrs refused to grant the cure in order to show just how high a place 
Cuthbert held amongst them” (sed noluere sancti Dei martyres ei petitam reddere 
sanitatem, ut quam celsum inter se locum Cuthbertus haberet, ostenderent).  Though 
Cuthbert had already died, a monk gathered earth from the spot where water used 
to wash Cuthbert’s corpse had been dumped.  The refusal of the martyrs to cure the 
boy before Cuthbert could be associated with the miracle echoes the lack of 
importance of the boy in question.  This focus on Cuthbert’s holiness, however, is 
not an estimation of him as an individual.  The use of relics, both the cincture and 
the earth touched by the water which had cleansed the saint’s corpse, attest to the 
fact that Cuthbert’s relevance had nothing to do with his own existence as a person 
or causal agent.  He needed to be neither present nor alive for the divine residue to 
do its—or rather God’s—work. 
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Beowulf in the Strange Situation 
 
As a warrior with the strength of thirty men and several victories against 
superhuman monsters already under his belt, Beowulf obviously approaches the 
strange situation of Grendel’s incursion into Heorot without the need for reference 
to an attachment figure.  Instead he displays a refined understanding of the social 
milieu he enters before he seeks it out.  He knows of Grendel’s abilities compared to 
the ability of Hrothgar and the Danes to oppose him.  Despite the fact that Grendel 
has killed scores of warriors, Beowulf insists on meeting him unarmed as a matter of 
honor. 
Hæbbe iċ ēac geāhsod        þæt se ǣġlæċa 
for his wonhȳdum        wǣpna ne reċċeð; 
iċ þæt þonne forhicge        swā mē Hiġelāc sīe,  
mīn mondrihten,       mōdes blīðe, 
þæt iċ sweord bere        oþðe sīdne scyld, 
ġeolorand tō gūþe,       ac iċ mid grāpe sceal 
fōn wið fēonde        ond ymb feorh sacan, 
lað wið lāþum.  
I have also heard that this rogue, in his savagery, does not use weapons, so I 
will also go unarmed so that Hygelac, my kinsman-lord, will be of good mood 
for me to bear a sword or a broad shield, a yellow battle-board, but I will 
wrestle that fiend with my strength in the fight for life, one man to another. 
(433-40) 
 
Beowulf’s decision to deliberately handicap himself may seem as reckless (wonhýd) 
as he claims Grendel to be.  However, his thought process incorporates two 
metarepresentations.  He is mindful of Grendel’s thought process for strategic 
purposes, and he recognizes that this indicates a courage on Grendel’s part that he 
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would fail to match even if he defeated the unarmed monster while armed.  He 
further recognizes that meeting Grendel on equal terms will result in his own fame, 
particularly in the eyes of his uncle and king, Hygelac.  “I will also go unarmed so 
that Hygelac, my kinsman-lord, will be of good mood” (435-7b). 
Immediately following the above pledge, Beowulf adds: “Let him put his faith 
in the Lord's judgment, whom death takes! (“ðǣr ġelȳfan sceal/ dryhtnes dōme sē þe 
hine dēað nimeð” 440b-441). This is clearly the sort of thing one would expect in 
Christian providentialism.  It is also a reflective profession of a belief mandated by 
the social context of the poem’s transcription.  The terms dryhtnes dome (lord’s 
judgment) refer unambiguously to God.  However, this is immediately followed by 
the ascription of agency to death (déað).  The Lord judges, but Death takes.  
Fourteen lines later, a third non-anthropomorphic agent is introduced:  “Wyrd goes 
as she will” (Gāð ā wyrd swā hīo scel 455).  The Lord, Death, and Fate (wyrd) all 
compete with the protagonist as potential causal agents of the outcome of the 
impending contest.  But rather than originating in the sort of attachment language 
found in Cuthbert’s story, these other agents are limitations of Beowulf’s agency that 
are motivated by the social norms (“The Lord” in Christian parlance; Death and 
Wyrd in the cosmology of pre-Christian Germanic belief).  Wyrd, like Kaufmann’s 
example of Fate in classical paganism, co-exists with anthropomorphic gods and 
gives evidence to their anthropomorphism by remaining beyond their control.  As 
socially mandated reflective qualifiers, the insertion of these three agents resembles 
Beowulf’s insertion of Hrothgar’s authority in the lines that precede them.  The 
hero’s diplomatic deference to Hrothgar, which serves to lessen the status threat 
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Beowulf poses, matches his deference to the Lord, Death, and Fate.  Moreover, we 
should not overlook the suggestive repetition of the word for Lord, first as 
mondrihten referencing Hrothgar, then as dryhtnes referencing God. 
The question of Beowulf’s religious orientation turns on the source of his 
sense of confidence.  Is he venturing out from a secure base (God as attachment 
figure), or is he placing his trust in his own understanding of the dangerous social 
milieu before him and his estimation of his own abilities relative to his human (and 
humanoid) challengers?  Many reflective assertions assert the agency of non-
anthropomorphic agents.  Others, equally reflective, affirm the intuitive causal 
agency of the hero alone: “He trusted his strength, the power in his grip, as a man 
should do if he intends to win long-lasting praise through battle: he cares nothing 
for his life” (strenġe ġetruwode,/ mundgripe mægenes. Swā sceal man dôn,/ þonnē he 
æt gūðe ġegān þenċeð/ longsumne lof, nā ymb his līf cearað 1533b-6). 
While the two competing agency concepts occur in such didactic asides, the 
intuitive story, the sequence of cause and effect, prefers the anthropomorphic 
agency.  In the fight with Grendel’s monstrous mother, after throwing his opponent 
to the ground, Beowulf loses the upper hand and nearly suffers a fatal blow. 
Hēo him eft hraþe        andlēan forġeald 
grimman grāpum        ond him tōġēanes fēng; 
oferwearp þā weriġmod        wigena strenġest, 
fēþecempa,       þæt hē on fylle wearð. 
Ofsæt þā þone seleġyst        ond hyre seax ġetēah, 
brād [ond] brūnecg;       wolde hire bearn wrecan, 
āngan eaferan.         Him on eaxle læġ 
brēostnet brōden;        þæt ġebearh fēore, 
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wið ord ond wið ecge        ingang forstōd. 
Hæfde ðā forsīðod        sunu Ecgþeowes 
under ġynne grund,       Ġeata cempa, 
nemne him heaðobyrne        helpe ġefremede, 
herenet hearde,       ond hāliġ God. 
Geweold wiġsigor       wītiġ drihten, 
 
rodera rǣdend,       hit on ryht ġescēd 
ȳðelīċe,       syþðan hē eft āstōd.  
She quickly paid him back with a powerful strike and seized him again tightly 
with an aweful crush.  That strongest of soldiers stumbled and fell.  She sat 
atop her hall-guest and drew her broad, bright-edged dagger. She meant to 
avenge her son, her only family. Across his shoulders lay a mail hauberk; it 
protected his life, withstood a pierce from the blade point.  There the son of 
Ecgtheow, the Geat’s champion, would have finished his life under the broad 
surface of the earth, if his armor had not saved him, the hard battle-net, and 
also holy God.  The wise lord, ruler of heaven, brought about war-victory, 
easily decided it right, once he stood up again.  (1541-55) 
The poem gives two distinct causes for the failure of the ogress’ stab—Beowulf’s 
mail armor and God’s ambiguous agency (geweold)—and two distinct causes for the 
battle’s outcome—Beowulf’s rise to his feet and God’s right decision.  God’s decision 
is easy (ȳðelīce) as well as right (ryht), but only after (syþðan) Beowulf stands up (hē 
eft āstōd).    Was God waiting for Beowulf to stand up before deciding rightly?  If so, 
what was the efficacy of such a decision?  The stab at Beowulf’s chest was deflected 
by his mail.  The mail’s efficacy is small wonder given that, in line 455, we learn that 
it was made by Weland, a legendary smith of semi-divine character occurring 
elsewhere in Germanic myth as a maker of magical weapons.   
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A poem about a man with the strength of thirty men, who has a history of 
slaying monsters, and whose life is saved by exquisite armor, and who slays three 
monsters, hardly constitutes a David-and-Goliath story.  It differs in its assignment 
of causal initiative.  The hero is too strong and the role of God too supplemental for 
the sort of strong belief in Providence that characterized the omni-agent schema of 
medieval Christianity.  The text juxtaposes actions and reactions that are intuitively 
complete, but adds to these an abstract profession of faith—a theological 
correction—that can only be didactic in purpose.  This interjection of culturally-
mandated, reflective beliefs into an intuitive narrative structure resembles the 
anthropomorphic intrusion errors observed in Barrett’s cross-cultural studies of 
god concepts.  This interjection of reflective belief, however inconsistent or 
unnecessary to the event structure, occurs in both Bede’s Life of Cuthbert and 
Beowulf.  Though unnecessary in the Life of Cuthbert, these theological corrections 
do not conflict with the portrayal of Cuthbert’s agency.  Cuthbert’s pattern of action 
extends no further than that of a child acting upon fixed action attachment patterns.  
He explores the world with the certainty that he can rely on the intervention of an 
omnipotent attachment figure.  He does not effect change in the world himself.  
Beowulf, on the other hand, occasionally professes an attachment relationship, but 
his ability to affect change in the world originates in his superhuman strength, 
quasi-magical accoutrements, and nuanced abilities of metarepresentation.  The 
assertions of attachment-style religious belief seem to satisfy creedal requirements 
both in the social milieu within the poem and the religious context of the 
manuscript’s creation.  It seems clear that Bede was searching for stories of 
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auspicious events in Cuthbert’s story which could be interpreted as proof of divine 
agency.  He was motivated by the desire to promote Cuthbert’s spiritual legacy.  In 
doing so, he selected stories which would not be noteworth but for the possibility of 
demonstrating Providence.  In Beowulf, a Christian audience is confronted with a 
story which triggers the audience’s fancy by its own characters and actions.  Its 
protagonist, unlike Cuthbert, is proactive.  In Bede, Cuthbert waits upon the Lord, 
goes where he is led, and passively observes the operation of the divine.  In Beowulf, 
the hero goes where he will and does what only he can do.  God’s role in Beowulf is, 
at most, to award a rubber stamp after the feat has been accomplished.  Given the 
strict theological mandates of the society in which the poem was committed to 
parchment, that rubber stamp may have saved the story that doesn’t otherwise 
require it.   
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CHAPTER IV 
TWO MODELS OF THE SOCIAL SELF 
 
Emerging Hierarchy and the Limits of Social Cognition 
To say that god concepts originate in evolved cognitive predispositions is not 
to say that the historical and cultural location of their manifestation is unimportant.  
If, as I argue in the previous chapter, monotheism is rooted in a stage of cognitive 
development that loses its dominance in early childhood, it is a testament the power 
of culture that this mode of cognition is maintained throughout life in spite of the 
emergence of critical theory-of-mind.  In this usage, it helps to recall the origin of the 
word culture as the process of cultivation as opposed to fabrication.  A given social 
context may trigger predispositions such as the attachment system which would 
otherwise dissipate through disuse.   
This would explain the correlation of the adoption of monotheism and the 
centralization of previously small-scale societies.   The translation of Yahweh from 
anthropomorphic to transcendent god was not the only such occurrence.  
Fourteenth century BCE Egypt had seen the rise to omnipotence of the god Amun 
coincide with the spread of its empire.  Robert Wright observes: 
The theology had one hallmark of an emerging monotheism: the dominance of 
the divine firmament by a single god, Amun.  Amun had grown in power after 
championing a series of Egyptian military campaigns and getting credit for the 
ensuing victories. Vast wealth and landholdings had flowed into Amun’s 
temples—which meant, in practical terms, that the priests of Amun, who 
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presumably had themselves favored these wars, were now powerful, 
overseeing a commercial empire involving mining, manufacturing, and trade. 
To check the power of these priests, pharaoh Amenhotep IV (later Akhenaten) 
outlawed the worship of Amun, declared that Aten (formerly the sun disk symbol of 
Re) was the only god, and declared himself Aten’s sole representative on Earth.   
Akhenaten’s motivation was demonstrably political.  As the perception of Amun’s 
power rose, the power of his priests rose to the point that they became a threat to 
the pharaoh.   In order to maintain his political power, the pharaoh had to 
manufacture a monotheism of his own.  While such a process need not involve the 
conscious action of those in power, the effect is the same.  The consolidation of 
religious authority effects the consolidation of political authority.   
Similarly, the elevation of Yahweh was preceded by the elevation of rivals 
from the emerging empires of Babylon and Assyria.  Mark S. Smith points out: 
The rise of supranational empires suggested the model of the super-national 
god.  As a result, the figures of Assur and Marduk assumed such proportions, 
the super-gods whose patronage of empires matches their manifestation as 
the sum-total of all the other deities. . . Mesopotamian authors are exploring 
the nature of all divinity in relation to a single major god (165). 
The emergence of super-national political allegiance requires more than the 
addition of a supranational authority.  It requires the weakening of local and familial 
social bonds.  As Smith notes, the paring of social ties coincides with the paring of 
theological pluralism:  
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 By the seventh century the lineage system of the family had perhaps eroded, 
thanks to a variety of factors, including the deleterious effects of royal power 
on traditional patriarchal authority. . . A culture with a diminished lineage 
system, one less embedded in traditional family patrimonies due to societal 
changes in the eighth through sixth centuries, might be more predisposed both 
to hold to individual human accountability for behavior and to see an 
individual deity accountable for the cosmos. (I view this individual 
accountability at the human and divine levels as concomitant developments.) 
Accordingly, later Israelite monotheism was denuded of the divine family, 
perhaps reflecting Israel’s weakening family lineages and patrimonies (164). 
This is the same social phenomenon Craig Davis has argued lies at the core of 
Beowulf, especially the “institutional resonance of the monster-fights in Beowulf, the 
‘political’ or ‘ideological work’ the poem is attempting to perform” (x).  Davis argues: 
Grendel and his mother are primarily political monsters and the meaning of 
their destruction by the hero is peculiar to the poem's political context, an 
institutional nexus which I take to be a troubled and transitional one between 
tribal forms of social organization and those of an incipient national kingship. 
The monsters are manipulated by the poet to isolate and demonize an aspect 
of the venerable Germanic social value of kindred solidarity (cf. Berger and 
Leicester, "Social Structure as Doom: The Limits of Heroism in Beowulf 54).  
They are used to dramatize the resistance of entrenched kindred 
chauvinism—of regressive tribal institutions like the blood-feud—to late 
pagan and early Christian attempts at intertribal monarchy. 
While I do not share Davis’ belief that the tribal social structure is unique to the 
monsters or that it is a necessarily deliberate addition of the author, the poem and 
its story certainly originate from a time when small-society modes of interaction 
were becoming replaced by hierarchical authoritarianism.   
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The deliberate promotion of the intertribal system by the author is not a 
necessary tenet for the present argument.  What is more important is the paradigm 
shift in implicit concepts of social relations this movement entails.   In the sort of 
small-scale societies in which the social cognition of modern humans evolved, it was 
possible for individuals to know the vast majority of the people with whom they 
interacted throughout their lives.  If they did not know every person in their 
extended social world directly, they could at least recognize another individual by 
reputation or social relation (that individual’s father, mother, grandparent).  In the 
more populous and cosmopolitan social world of intertribal kingdoms, individuals 
would have to constantly deal with people whom they could recognize neither by 
reputation nor by affiliation with other individuals.  Moreover, they would be 
required to consider anonymous strangers as part of their in-group, depend on 
them for fair trade, trust them as comrades on the battlefield, etc.  These intertribal 
kingdoms became nations in Benedict Anderson’s definition of that term as “an 
imagined political community.”  Though Anderson’s book, Imagined Communities, 
seeks to describe the modern democratic nation state, his definition of nation fits 
Roman, Carolingian, and Anglo-Saxon political units equally well in this respect.  
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never 
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in 
the minds of each lives the image of their communion. . . In fact, all 
communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and 
perhaps even these) are imagined.  Communities are to be distinguished, not 
by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined (6). 
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To the human brain, which evolved to maintain relationships with approximately 
150 individuals (Dunbar), the anonymity afforded to individuals in large in-group 
populations poses a challenge to the individual trying not to be cheated by her 
fellow group member. 
In his 1962 Primitive Social Organization: An Evolutionary Perspective, 
anthropologist Elman Service distinguished four types of social organization which 
occur cross-culturally in correspondence with population size: bands, tribes, 
chiefdoms, and states.  For the majority of homo sapiens’ evolutionary history, we 
have primarily been organized in hunter-gatherer bands of between 20 and 60 
individuals typically genetically related but with the capacity for fission and 
recombination.  Leadership of such bands is nearly always situational—a 
particularly good hunter might lead a hunting foray but exercise no authority in 
other social activities and maintain his status as a hunt leader only so long as he is 
able to maintain success.  These bands may occasionally combine with 
geographically and genetically adjacent bands for temporary social and economic 
exchange or to form strategic alliances against more distant bands.  As these 
alliances became permanent, the bands merged into tribes.  “Head men” (often 
having endogenous terms that translate as “Big Man”) emerge at the tribal level and 
achieve higher status, though this status must be constantly proven.  Though a head 
man may serve to resolve disputes and serve as the tribe’s central voice, he rarely 
enjoys unconditional authority and retains what he has only so long as it remains 
beneficial to all (Boehm).  As tribes merge into chiefdoms, usually accompanied by 
the development of a settled agricultural or pastoral economy, the emergent chiefs 
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grow to enjoy permanent status and hereditary succession.  The authority of the 
chief is exhibited (and dependent on) redistribution of wealth.  He receives tribute 
from the people of his chiefdom, but he is expected to redistribute that wealth 
generously to those in need and as a reward for pro-social action.   
 Though we may note a correspondence between the progression of group 
size and social order with the progression of history (particularly European history), 
we should not assume, despite Service’s choice of title, that bands, tribes, or 
chiefdoms are primitive in the sense of being inferior to modern nation states, 
democratic or otherwise.  Because the cognitive mechanisms that underlie these 
various organizations are the product of human and pre-human evolution, we find 
evidence of all of these stages in every place and time, including within post-
industrial Western democracies.  The progressions that concern the present 
argument are primarily the increase of group size and the centralization of coercive 
authority. 
The Dunbar Number  
The benefits of increasing group size are not hard to imagine.  Larger 
communities have a larger labor force, more fighting men able to defend community 
resources and seize those of other groups, and a larger knowledge and technology 
base.  However, the increase in group size awakens a very old problem that has been 
extremely influential in the evolution of human intelligence.  All social animals must 
deal with the problem of individual cheaters—those who benefit from the labor or 
sacrifice of others but give nothing in return.  Friedrich Nietzsche, in 1873, 
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speculated that the intelligence that defines homo sapiens lay not in the advantage 
of discerning truth from falsehood, but from the ability to deceive our rivals: 
As a means for the preserving of the individual, the intellect unfolds its 
principle powers in dissimulation, which is the means by which weaker, less 
robust individuals preserve themselves—since they have been denied the 
chance to wage the battle for existence with horns or with the sharp teeth of 
beasts of prey.  This art of dissimulation reaches its peak in man.  Deception, 
flattering, lying, deluding, talking behind the back, putting up a false front, 
living in borrowed splendor, wearing a mask, hiding behind convention, 
playing a role for others and for oneself. . . . Insofar as the individual wants to 
maintain himself against other individuals, he will under natural 
circumstances employ the intellect mainly for dissimulation.  But at the same 
time, from boredom and necessity, man wishes to exist socially and with the 
herd; therefore, he needs to make peace and strives accordingly to banish 
from his world at least the most flagrant bellum omni contra omnes (Truth 
and Lies, 452) 
Nietzsche’s suspicions have been to a large extent confirmed by the last three 
decades of evolutionary psychology, to the extent that the mechanisms underlying 
human social cognition have occasionally been dubbed Machiavellian intelligence 
(Byrne & Whiten).  Byrne and Whiten’s Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis along 
with Robin Dunbar’s Social Brain hypothesis assert human intelligence evolved less 
as a means of understanding the world as it is than as a means to understand our 
fellow humans and navigate the social world on which the individual’s survival and 
reproduction depended.  Noting a correlation of brain size and social structure in 
non-human primates, both hypotheses agree: 
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Primate intelligence evolved primarily to deal with complex social problems, 
rather than nonsocial ecological or technological problems such as locating 
food, extractive foraging or using tools. Support for the hypothesis comes 
from correlational analyses of a number of primate species showing a link 
between a proxy of intelligence, the ratio of neocortex to the rest of the brain 
and various measures of social complexity, such as group size (Barton & 
Dunbar, 1997), frequency of tactical deception (Byrne & Corp, 2004) and 
frequency of social play (Lewis, 2001). Measures of non-social complexity, 
such as range size or foraging style, show no such correlation with neocortex 
ratio. (Mesoudi, Whiten, & Dunbar, 2006) 
In particular, the threat of becoming the sucker of such dissemblers has led to the 
refinement of cognitive mechanisms of cheater detection which precede individual 
experience in actual interpersonal interaction. 
Two pioneers of the field of evolutionary psychology, John Tooby and Leda 
Cosmides, have, over the last three decades, simultaneously illustrated the role of 
the problem of cheater-detection in social cognition and the priority of evolved 
cognition to experiential learning.  In their most famous example, the Wason 
Selection Task, Cosmides (“Social Exchange”) illustrates the human ability to solve a 
problem dealing with rule violation far quicker than a problem exhibiting the same 
logical equation which had no such social relevance.  Test subjects are presented 
with two problems taking the form of an “If P then Q.”  In one scenario, test subjects 
were given the following problem: 
Part of your new job for the City of Cambridge is to study the demographics 
of transportation. You read a previously done report on the habits of 
Cambridge residents that says: "If a person goes into Boston, then that 
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person takes the subway."  The cards below have information about four 
Cambridge residents. Each card represents one person. One side of a card 
tells where a person went, and the other side of the card tells how that 
person got there. Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over 
to see if any of these people violate this rule. (96) 
Each card showed one of the following: Boston, Arlington, subway, cab.  Logically, 
only the cards reading Boston and cab need to be checked.   However, less that 25% 
of the subjects answered correctly, including subjects with formal training in logic.  
By contrast, between 65 and 80% of subjects answer correctly when the question 
involves contractual obligation, such as “If you are to eat those cookies, then you 
must first make your bed” or “If a man eats cassava root, then he must have a tattoo 
on his chest.”  This maintains the “If P, then Q form,” but adds the social contract 
element: “If you take benefit B, then you must satisfy requirement R.”  Tooby and 
Cosmides explain: 
People who ordinarily cannot detect violations of if-then rules can do so 
easily and accurately when that violation represents cheating in a situation of 
social exchange. . . . When asked to look for violations of social contracts of 
this kind, the adaptively correct answer is immediately obvious to almost all 
subjects, who commonly experience a "pop out" effect. No formal training is 
needed . . . even when the situation described is culturally unfamiliar and 
even bizarre—subjects experience the problem as simple to solve, and their 
performance jumps dramatically. (Cosmides and Tooby 96)  
Tests like these confirm an evolved domain specificity in human cognition.  While 
individual experience and cultural interaction contribute to an individual’s ability to 
interact in a social environment, some problems are easier to solve than others 
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because the brain comes equipped with more resources devoted to problems that 
fostered survival and reproduction in our ancestors.   
The human mind must include inferential procedures that make one very 
good at detecting cheating on social contracts.  The game-theoretic 
complexities governing conditions of reciprocation in social exchange 
indicate that the capacity to engage in social exchange cannot evolve in a 
species unless one is able to detect individuals who cheat (fail to reciprocate) 
on social contracts (Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971).  
An individual who engaged in exchange, but who lacked the ability to detect 
cheaters, would experience fitness costs with no compensating benefits, and 
would be selected out. (Cosmides 196)   
While the cognitive resources devoted to social interaction are comparatively vast, 
they are not limitless.  Anthropologist Robin Dunbar has observed a limit to the 
number of social connections individuals are able to maintain. 
The problem of maintaining group coherence and stability through time 
obviously increases (probably exponentially) with group size. The more 
individuals there are, each trying to maximize his or her genetic interests, the 
less likely it is that common purpose will prevail. Divergent interests will 
become harder to reconcile and the risks of exploitation by those willing to 
cheat on the implicit contracts that underpin sociality rise dramatically. 
Evidence from the fossil record and modern primates suggests that average 
group sizes rose progressively through time from around 60-80 (values not 
untypical of living chimpanzees) to around 150 in modern humans. (Dunbar, 
“Culture” 194)  
Beginning in 1993 (Aiello & Dunbar), anthropologist Robin Dunbar has illustrated 
the spontaneous and cross-cultural tendency for communities to limit the number of 
126 
 
regularly interacting individuals to approximately 150 persons.  Neolithic villages, 
modern hunter-gatherer communities, 18th century English villages, Doomsday 
Book villages, business units (such as Gore-Tex, which limits its branches to 150 
employees), and a host of other social units repeatedly attest that the optimum 
number of associates in an individual’s social network remains very close to 150.  
Beyond 150, it becomes difficult for a single individual to keep track of enough 
personal information, either learned directly or second-hand, to safely interact with 
other potential dissemblers.  Groups exceeding the 150 limit move toward 
Anderson’s imagined communities and toward types of centralized social order that 
can deal decisively with the anonymity that results.   
Cheaters, Bullies, and Rulers 
It is not hard to see the need fulfilled in increasingly anonymous populations 
by the rise of central authorities.  A strong chief would have the power to punish 
cheaters, enforce the pooling of resources (taxes) and participation in social 
ventures (military and labor service), and serve as decisive voice among squabbling 
subgroups.  The book of 1 Samuel records the shift from incipient chiefdom to strong 
chiefdom when Samuel reluctantly anoints Saul king of Israel.  The immediate 
rationale is voiced by the people: “we are determined to have a king over us, so that 
we also may be like other nations, and that our king may govern us and go out 
before us and fight our battles" (8:20).  However, Samuel voices a perennial concern 
in such a shift:  
These will be the ways of the king who will reign over you: he will take your 
sons and appoint them to his chariots and to be his horsemen, and to run 
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before his chariots; and he will appoint for himself commanders of thousands 
and commanders of fifties, and some to plow his ground and to reap his 
harvest, and to make his implements of war and the equipment of his 
chariots. He will take your daughters to be perfumers and cooks and bakers. 
He will take the best of your fields and vineyards and olive orchards and give 
them to his courtiers. He will take one-tenth of your grain and of your 
vineyards and give it to his officers and his courtiers. He will take your male 
and female slaves, and the best of your cattle and donkeys, and put them to 
his work. He will take one-tenth of your flocks, and you shall be his slaves. 
And in that day you will cry out because of your king, whom you have chosen 
for yourselves (1 Samuel 8:10-18). 
While a central authority may embolden the social group as a whole, he (and it is 
nearly always a he) poses a significant threat to the individual’s status, resources, 
and reproductive fitness.  The evolutionary dilemma is not significantly different in 
humans than in other social animals.  A submissive male who allows an alpha male 
to dominate all of the fertile females is extremely unlikely to pass his genetic 
inheritance forward.   Males who work to subvert or directly oppose such 
dominance, either through multi-male coalitions or through conspiracy with females, 
are far more likely to have offspring.   
In fact, anthropologist Christopher Boehm points out that authoritarian 
hierarchies have more in common with our fellow apes than they do with the small-
scale societies of early humans.  Boehm has documented the cross-cultural 
occurrence of a particular ambivalence toward prominent individuals, especially 
when they become coercive and threaten to subjugate their peers.  Overbearing 
individuals are regularly checked by social leveling mechanisms that serve to create 
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what Boehm designates a reverse dominance hierarchy.  Whereas great apes and 
monarchic states are ruled by dominant individuals, individuals in the sort of small-
scale bands in which our species evolved vigorously protect their autonomy through 
collective censure of individuals who threaten it.   
Individual dislike of being dominated, reflected in the ethos and reinformed 
by it, is transformed by small communities into what amounts to social policy. 
I think it is accurate to call the result a "reverse dominance hierarchy" 
(Boehm I984, I99I) because, rather than being dominated, the rank and file 
itself manages to dominate. So-called acephalous societies and even incipient 
chiefdoms have reverse dominance hierarchies. By contrast, authoritative 
chiefdoms, kingdoms, and primitive states are not committed to such 
egalitarian ideals (even though they recognize and deal with power abuse), 
and therefore they have dominance hierarchies that are "orthodox" in that 
they follow a pattern shared with our closest phylogenetic "cousins," the 
African great apes. Compared with both African great apes and other humans 
at the strong-chiefdom level or higher, human groups committed to 
egalitarian behavior have gone in an opposite direction. They have done so 
because followers discovered that by forming a single political coalition they 
could decisively control the domination proclivities of highly assertive 
individuals, even their chosen leaders. This political direction was somehow 
reversed after the invention of agriculture, and an "orthodox" version of 
social dominance hierarchy reappeared. (“Egalitarian” 236) 
This is not to say that egalitarianism evolved for its own sake.  Rather, shared 
ambivalence toward domination by another outweighed the inclination toward 
dominance by any individual in the band-level societies in which humans lived for 
the majority of our species’ evolution. 
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Boehm notes that a group’s egalitarianism is inversely proportional to its size.   
A "material" factor that seems to correlate universally with absence of such 
leadership is smallness of social scale. . . . Locally autonomous groups in 
which authoritative leadership is suppressed are well known to subdivide at 
a certain basic size, often just a few hundred persons. This takes place not 
just where resources are sparse but even where they are relatively abundant 
and where sedentary life gives everyone a local subsistence investment. 
(“Egalitarian” 236) 
Though Boehm implies that it is egalitarianism that causes the group size to remain 
small, the Dunbar number may provide an underlying explanation.  In a society that 
is small enough for every individual to know every other (or at least every other he 
or she would need to depend on), coercive authority is unnecessary, and those who 
grasp at it are more cheaters than leaders.  However, as the population rises above 
the number individuals can know by experience or reputation, cheaters might take 
advantage of anonymity unless a strong leader enforces pro-social behavior.  
Whether egalitarianism causes small group size or vice versa, it is significant that 
the two function well together in ways that egalitarianism and large populations do 
not, nor do authoritarianism and small groups.  This may be due to the fact that the 
more intimately a cheater or leader is known, the less power he has to elevate 
himself at the expense of others. 
The display of above average size, strength, or ability, which implies an 
individual’s greater importance to the group in defense or acquisition of resources, 
naturally empowers that individual disproportionately to his peers.  Thus it 
behooves the uniquely endowed individual to make his importance known to the 
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rest.  However, we are wary of braggarts who may undervalue the importance of 
their fellows and subsequently undervalue their autonomy.  With this in mind, 
Boehm suggests:    
[O]f equal interest are others with exceptional physical or supernatural 
strength, special abilities in gaining subsistence, or an unusual propensity to 
compete assertively or take other people's lives. This is a study of behaviors 
that control any main political actor whose assertiveness would otherwise 
result in an unusual degree of control over others. (“Egalitarian” 229). 
Boehm describes the methods of the Dobe Ju/’hoansi (also known as !Kung) hunters 
of the Kalahari for keeping even the most able hunters from using their abilities for 
social status.  !Kung custom gives credit for a kill to the owner of the arrow used in 
felling the animal rather than to the one who shot the arrow or tracked the animal.  
Many hunters will return from solo expeditions and describe the prey they provide 
to the community as if they found it lying on the ground (Boehm, Hierarchy in the 
Forest).  In the case of the !Kung, it is not an act of piety (no one actually believes 
that the animal was simply found by the hunter) but an act of modesty.  When 
modesty is absent, the reverse dominance hierarchy brings forth its leveling 
mechanisms: 
There is great variability among men as to who is responsible for the kills. 
They use two principal mechanisms to keep the best hunters from 
dominating the politics of the camp and monopolizing the women. We have 
seen that they preemptively cut down those who might become arrogantly 
boastful. They also share all large-game meat, helping those who are 
incapacitated or down on their luck, and these customs are enhanced by 
some very practical cultural rules. . . . The fact that the best hunters speak so 
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modestly, and frequently swap arrows to avoid envy, is a monument to the 
efficacy of ridicule as an instrument of social control. . . . If they are faced with 
serious upstartism people like the !Kung will go far beyond ridicule. 
(Hierarchy, 48) 
 Richard Lee, cited as a source by Boehm, encountered the !Kung reverse 
dominance hierarchy first-hand (183-188).  During his fieldwork, Lee had earned a 
reputation as a miser for not sharing the provisions he brought with him.  At 
Christmas, he hoped to improve his reputation by purchasing the healthiest ox he 
could find to slaughter for a Christmas feast.  Finding an ox which he calculated 
would provide four pounds of meat for every member of the local !Kung social 
network (which Lee estimated at 150, publishing before Dunbar’s initial studies), 
Lee reserved the massive animal for the feast.  When the !Kung learned of his plans, 
they referred to the animal as “a bag of bones” though it was larger than any 
livestock Lee had seen in his time with the !Kung.  Others commented that “it was 
going to be a grim Christmas because there won’t be enough meat to go around,” 
and told Lee that he “has lived here for three years and still hasn’t learned anything 
about cattle;” “You’ll have to kill it and serve it, I suppose, but don’t expect much of a 
dance to follow”(184).  When the custom is finally revealed to Lee, one of the !Kung 
tells him: 
It is our way. . . . Say there is a Ju/’hoan who has been hunting.  He must not 
come home and announce like a braggart, ‘I have killed a big one in the bush!’  
He must first sit down in silence until I or someone else comes up to his fire 
and asks, “What did you see today?”  He replies quietly, “Ah, I’m no good for 
hunting.  I saw nothing at all, just a little tiny one.”  Then I smile to myself 
because I know he has killed something big (187). 
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When a party of !Kung men follow the successful hunter to the site of the kill to 
carve it up, they complain that they have wasted their day coming to such a scrawny 
kill.  The hunter is expected to agree with such derision.   
The art for understatement has clear parallels in Germanic literature with 
likely roots preceding the rise of strong chiefdoms or monarchial states.  In Grettis 
saga, a much-cited Icelandic analogue of Beowulf, Grettir enters a grave mound and 
fights for his life against an undead draugr which has been terrorizing area farms.  
After defeating his opponent, Grettir staggers back to the farmhouse where he is a 
guest, carrying with him the treasure that the draugr had been guarding.  As he lays 
the treasure out on his host’s table, his host asks him why he can’t keep the same 
hours as everyone else.  Grettir replies only, “Many little things happen at night.”  
The only part of the treasure Grettir seems to want for himself is a short sword.  His 
host agrees to give it to him on the condition that “you must prove your prowess 
before I give you the sword,” as if the victory against the draugr and the claiming of 
the sword were not quite enough (Saga of Grettir the Strong 40-1).   
When Lee asked his !Kung hosts why it was a custom to insult someone who 
had provided such a vital resource to the community, his interlocutor replied, 
“Arrogance.” 
When a young man kills much meat he comes to think of himself as a chief or 
a big man, and he thinks of the rest of us as his servants or inferiors.  We can’t 
accept this.  We refuse one who boasts, for someday his pride will make him 
kill somebody.  So we always speak of his meat as worthless.  This way we 
cool his heart and make him gentle (188). 
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These sorts of leveling mechanisms do not seem to be limited to small bands 
or absolutely egalitarian societies.  Even in incipient chiefdoms, if not beyond, the 
dominant authority figure must demonstrate personal humility as well as 
competence relevant to his position.  In the Icelandic saga of Hrolf Kraki (Hrólfs saga 
kraka), one of the fornaldarsögur or “sagas of ancient times,” as well as an analogue 
of Beowulf which shares many of its characters, the eponymous king comes much 
closer to the incipient chieftain than a strong chieftain or feudal king.  Though a 
hereditary king, Hrolf clearly depends on his retinue of champions in order to 
maintain his rank and kingdom.  Early in his reign, Hrolf depends on a band of 
twelve berserks, warriors characterized by their ferocity and unpredictability.  The 
alliance between Hrolf and the berserks does not resemble the ritual shows of fealty 
that might be expected in a Carolingian court.  Rather, after spending the raiding 
season pursuing their own designs, the berserks return to Hrolf at midwinter with a 
display that is less than submissive. 
Upon returning to the king’s guard, it was their custom to challenge each and 
every man.  They begin with the king, asking him if he considers himself their 
equal.  The king answers, “That is difficult to say with men who are as valiant 
as you are.  You have distinguished yourselves in battles and bloodlettings 
with many peoples in the southern regions of the world as well as here in the 
North.”  The king answers in this way, more from courage than from fear, 
because he knows their minds, and they have won great victories for him. 
(Saga of Hrolf Kraki, ch. 24, p. 53) 
The autonomy of the berserks is guaranteed as much by their coalition as by their 
strength.  As Boehm observed, anti-authoritarian tendencies are only relevant if 
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they are shared and acted upon.  The berserks’ custom bears all the marks of a ritual 
of status demarcation in an egalitarian society.  The king demonstrates modesty and 
foresight, and the berserks display the collective militant strength on which their 
social status depends as well as the autonomy that strength ensures. 
Parallel rituals are common in anthropological literature.  In 1968, 
anthropologist Napoleon Chagnan documented a ritual feast by which two warring 
bands of Yanomamo, natives of southern Venezuela and northern Brazil, came 
together to resolve hostilities and unite against common enemies.  The visiting band 
is welcomed into the camp of their erstwhile enemies who perform a war dance 
simulating actual attack.  “The visitors remain motionless in the hammocks while 
Krihisiwa’s dancers try to intimidate them. Everyone knows that this is the point 
when treacherous hosts could murder their guests.  But the guests must not show 
any emotion or fear for true men, Yanomamo, are fierce” (Chagnon & Asch).  Though 
acted between rival bands, the ceremonial show of force has the same message as 
the berserks show before Hrolf: “We could kill you, but we won’t.”   This is the exact 
opposite of the displays expected by an authoritarian monarch: bowing the head 
and thus bearing the neck as if to say “You could kill me, but please don’t.”   
Hrolf’s court is far from egalitarian.  The king’s retinue jockey for seats 
nearest to the king to indicate their elevated status in comparison with those who 
must sit further away.  However, submission to the king cannot be taken for granted.  
Rather, the whole court acts as a coalition which is able to advance the interests of 
each of its members.  Like the “head man” of a tribe in Service’s scheme, Hrolf’s 
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status is dependent on his own demonstration of ability, and the power of his 
command is relative.  When the king learns that the berserks continue in their 
practice of throwing leftover bones at a scrawny farm boy named Hott, he reminds 
them, “It is a bad habit that you have adopted, throwing bones at innocent men.  It 
brings dishonor to me and shame to you.  I have repeatedly spoken to you about this 
matter, but you have paid no attention” (Hrolf, ch. 23, p. 49).  Though the king’s 
honor is tarnished by the act, he seems to have no power to stop the matter and is 
limited to reasoning with his subjects.  The king is only able to maintain his position 
through his application of theory-of-mind.  He knows that he needs the berserks to 
protect him and advance his own influence over others, but he knows that he cannot 
be seen to esteem himself over them.  In this, we see the early stages of more 
centralized authority, but we see it confronted by reverse dominance.  The berserks, 
as with any king’s retinue, serve as the barrier between the ascendant authority and 
the leveling mechanisms which always threaten to reemerge.   
Deferred Authoritarianism: the Unapproachable Superior 
If the majority of individuals in a society possess an ambivalence toward the 
emergeance of centralized leadership, the optimum model would be a society with a 
genuinely benevolent chief.  In reality, unfortunately, as Winston Churchill famously 
noted, power corrupts.  However, the establishment of an authority beyond 
reproach—literally too distant for his faults to be observed or for his subordinates 
to censure him—would serve as the next best thing to the untenable model of a 
benevolent dictatorship. 
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It is worth emphasizing that people who exhibit egalitarian behavior are not 
opposed to leadership per se; indeed, they value it so long as the benefits 
outweigh the penalties. In discussing the Baruya's execution of a man whose 
high status went to his head, Godelier (I986:109-10) says that "differences 
between individuals are only permitted . . . insofar as they work for the 
common good." This statement may well provide the key to how egalitarian 
political behavior can coexist with a big-man type of society, since with 
respect to rivalry between groups a big man's prestige rubs off on those 
associated with him. Such coexistence, also identifiable in incipient 
chiefdoms, provides a likely basis for conflict, but it also contains the seeds of 
a nonegalitarian political arrangement, one in which the benefits of further 
domination may seem worthwhile to the main political actors (Boehm, 
“Egalitarian,” 237). 
Both Caesar and Tacitus record a similar egalitarianism in their Germanic 
contemporaries—an egalitarianism which the Romans sought to undermine as a 
means of cultural assimilation.   
The Romans themselves encouraged kingship. They supported whatever 
nascent royal authority they found among their barbarian allies, perhaps 
sometimes even creating kingship where it did not exist before. . . The 
Romans wanted a reliable and efficient system for managing the independent, 
loosely organized tribes. They thus supplied the wealth and weapons which 
made possible not only the control of one allied tribe over its neighbors but 
also, as important, the firm rule of a friendly chief over the clans of his fellow-
tribesmen (Davis 19). 
Caesar relates several stories in which Romans were invited to conquest by status-
seeking locals who hoped to become their colonial legates.  He says of the Gallic 
Treveri, “Two rivals were struggling there for supremacy – Indutiomarus and 
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Cingetorix.  As soon as news came of Caesar’s approach with the legions, Cingetorix 
presented himself, assured Caesar that he and all his followers would remain loyal 
to the Roman alliance”(5.3, p. 106).  After Caesar accepted the offer, other Treveri, 
which Caesar refers to as “other leaders of the tribe,” and eventually Indutiomarus, 
himself, sought a similar alliance.  The presence of “other leaders,” indicates that, 
though Indutiomarus and Cingetorix were two powerful leaders of the Treveri with 
undeniable personal ambition, they did not occupy anything like a kingship.  
Cingetorix was willing to submit to a foreign hierarchy in order to secure a position 
for himself in his own community which would have been untenable without Roman 
military alliance.  Similarly, Dumnorix, a leader of the Aedui and voluntary ally of the 
Romans, “had said in the Aeduan council that Caesar had offered to make him king 
of the tribe—a statement that was much resented by the Aedui, although they dared 
not protest to Caesar” (5.6, p. 107).  Ironically, when this same Dumnorix defied 
Caesar’s orders and fled, he defied the cavalry detachment sent to capture him by 
“shouting over and over again that he was a free man and a citizen of a free state” 
(5.7, p. 108).  It seems that Dumnorix, though quite aware of how he could use the 
foreign alliance to secure his own power over his council-governed society, did not 
yet grasp the fact that he, himself, was expected to submit without question. 
Early medieval Germanic courts, like that of Hrolf, increasingly took the form 
of a strong chiefdom.  Craig Davis, drawing from work by Wallace-Hadrill, 
documents the emergence of small, chief-dominated war bands under Roman 
colonial organization: 
138 
 
Within these new confederations developed a special military clique or 
comitatus, a band of professional warriors personally attached to the 
emergent war-chief and directly dependent upon his bounty for their 
livelihood. The comitatus replaced the old hastily assembled and readily 
dispersed war-party of earlier times. In effect, it functioned as a standing 
strike force ideally capable, as the Beowulf-poet would later emphasize, of 
deployment against external enemies on an instant's notice (lines 1246-50).  
Internally, the comitatus was a "cross-cutting institution" (Miller, Kings and 
Kinsmen 266—67) and worked against kinship structures in several ways. 
The old assemblies of tribal elders had enjoyed no executive power. Their 
judgments on clan-feuds and other intratribal matters had the same force as 
decisions by the International Court at the Hague: compliance was voluntary, 
enforcement the responsibility of the plaintiff and his kinsmen (cf. Lewis, 
Social Anthropology 343—44). A successful war-chief, however, in the 
company of his armed retinue, could impose his will on an assembly whether 
he had obtained general consensus or not; and he could enforce or ignore 
any judgment he wished (19-20).  
The kinship structures Davis describes resemble the incipient chiefdoms described 
by Boehm, characterized by inherited status but limited in their influence over the 
constituent clans.  The emergence of a singular head of the comitatus matches the 
strong chieftainship described by Boehm, in that it was “based upon war-service 
and the accumulation of moveable wealth—treasure, cattle, slaves. It was 
democratically open to parvenus, soldiers of fortune who fought simply for gain, at 
the same time that it rendered the society as a whole more hierarchical by 
separating full-time warriors from ordinary tribesmen”(20).  However, in its 
mobility, openness to outsiders, and small size, the comitatus resembled the band 
level of social organization described by Service except that, rather than hunting and 
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gathering, it was primarily occupied with militarism.  This is significant because the 
egalitarianism of the band depended on the fact that every member was largely self-
reliant—he could hunt on his own, gather food, thatch arrows, craft baskets and 
clothes, etc.  Without the ability to provide for themselves, individual members of 
the comitatus depended on their leader to secure resources, either through political 
alliance or strategic raiding.  This does not mean that they would simply submit to 
whoever offered to step into this role, as it is likely any one of them could fancy 
himself equally capable of it.  In a small group, each is likely to know the weaknesses 
of his leader and use that knowledge as a check on status, as do Hrolf’s berserks.   
As Dumnorix recognized, an individual could exploit his alliance with a 
higher and more remote authority, such as Julius Caesar, to counteract his local 
society’s leveling mechanisms. The thing hunter-gatherer bands use to keep bullies 
in check—insult, awareness of their own limitations, and, ultimately, group 
retaliation—is removed as populations grow and caste barriers are erected.  The 
more removed the king, the more removed from criticism.  If his personal weakness 
is hidden from his subjects, his vulnerability to the antiauthoritarian sentiment is 
reduced.  Hence, the local authoritarian ruler is protected by the unfalsified power 
of a deferred authority who may retaliate if his legate is not obeyed.  This appeal to a 
higher power functions clearly enough in the borderlands of an empire such as the 
Roman or Carolingian.   
When a group is removed from the threat of imperial enforcement of 
hierarchy, it is likely to “devolve” into a more egalitarian collection of cognitively 
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manageable social networks.  Such was the case when Iceland was settled by those 
who opposed Harald Fairhair’s subjugation of Norway.  Harald’s rise to intertribal 
rule was an innovation in Scandinavia, and it provoked Boehm’s reverse dominance 
hierarchy into action.  However, Harald was able to maintain enough self-seeking 
retainers to defeat this opposition by force, at which point the incipient chiefs 
resorted to fission by fleeing to Iceland, the British isles, and elsewhere.  Realizing 
that this, too, threatened his rule, Harald sought to prevent this fission by 
subjugating or killing these men abroad (Byock, Viking Age Iceland 82-3).      
Jesse Byock argues that during Iceland’s first century, “the evolutionary 
machinery was in many ways running in reverse.” 
Icelandic institutions eliminated a significant number of the roles played by 
elites and overlords.  By avoiding the formation of self-perpetuating 
executive structures, the farmers collectively retained control over coercive 
power.  In doing so they denied would-be elites the crucial state function of 
monopolizing force.  Leadership was limited to local chieftains who often 
operated like ‘big men,’ individuals whose authority often was temporary 
(Iceland, 65). 
As with the reaction against Harald, fission of retainers rather than exile of upstart 
despots became the primary leveling mechanism.   
The legal goði-thingman bond was created by a voluntary public contract 
which did not depend upon a geographical base. . . .  This relationship 
provided little sense of either permanency or protection to either leader or 
follower . . . The goði was answerable only to minimal guidelines set by law 
and to the pressure of public opinion.  Possession of all or part of a goðorð 
(the political office of chieftaincy) granted a leader little formal authority 
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over his followers . . . It appears that a chieftain, in accordance with the 
Grágás, had little power to command a thingman to act against his will.  
Instead, a chieftain’s power rested, to a large degree, on the consent of his 
followers (Iceland 119-20). 
Tenth century Iceland was not 11th century England or 6th century Denmark.  
However, the consistent competition between individual quests for power and 
reverse dominance hierarchies in Northern Europe attested from Caesar’s conquest 
of Gaul to the settlement of Iceland confirms the cognitive predisposition theorized 
by Boehm.  The only strategy an authoritarian can depend on for long-term 
guarantee of individual status remains the appeal to a higher authority removed 
from social leveling mechanisms and capable of violent retaliation against those 
who show insubordination.  In addition to deferring the origin of individual 
commands beyond the usual modes of censure, this deference to a higher power 
would likely avoid the signs of self-aggrandizement and the leveling mechanisms 
that they would trigger by forcing the leader to show modesty—a strategy which 
would have extended Dumnorix’s career had he been willing to submit to Caesar’s 
command.  Beowulf depicts a time of transition from diffuse to more centralized 
authority, and it seems to have been composed during a similar transition (Davis). 
The Social Function of the Self  
If the human brain has evolved to specialize in tracking social relationships, 
it should not be surprising that it has also evolved to appease the predispositions of 
those on whom we depend for sustenance, alliance, and procreation.  If we can use 
theory-of-mind to figure out what other people want in an ally or sexual partner, we 
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can manifest just such an appealing individual in ourselves.  Neuroscientist Antonio 
Damasio divides the conscious self into two parts.  The first, the core self operates on 
instinct and learned behavior as opposed to reflective thought (Damasio 131-67).  
We are conscious of what the core self is doing while it is doing it, but we may not 
know why.  The whys of our actions are represented in what Damasio calls the 
autobiographical self, the story by which we represent ourselves to ourselves and to 
others (195-233).  It is not, however, all that you are.  It is only the story.  We do not 
recall everything that happens to us, much less everything that happens around us.  
Instead, we selectively cull information from our experiences that conforms to our 
preconceived notions of ourselves and our relations to our particular social 
environments.     
In his book, The Feeling of What Happens (43-7, 113-21), Damasio tells the 
story of a patient named David who suffered from severe amnesia caused by 
widespread neurological damage from a case of encephalitis.  David is unable to 
learn or recall specific names or facts for more than two minutes.  When asked for 
specific information, such as a name or a date, David manufactures an answer 
through a process known as confabulation—a sort of lie that the conscious mind 
believes.  When asked to name the month, he would reply confidently that it was 
February or March, and that it had been quite cold.  After walking to the window 
and opening the curtains to feel the heat from the bright sunlight, he would 
immediately change his story, accurately estimating that it was June.  Similarly, 
when Damasio entered the room, the two would greet each other warmly and begin 
a happily non-specific conversation.  When Damasio asked David to identify him, 
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David would reply only “you’re my friend.”  When pressed for a name, he would 
elaborate, “George; you’re my cousin, George McKenzie.”  Damasio had worked with 
David for nearly twenty years, and the two had developed considerable rapport, 
though the rapport was not based on conscious recall, much less coded social 
relations.  David interpreted the rapport as a family relation—that they were 
cousins.  Due to his loss of long-term memory, David had also lost the ability to 
maintain his autobiographical self in a fashion we could call accurate.  He is relying 
on an intuitive inference, a belief that is felt, but not explained.  In order to provide 
reflective explanation for the intuited situation, David fabricates (confabulates) a 
narrative, though he does not recognize that he is doing so.  He is not lying.  The 
explanations, “You’re my friend—You’re my cousin, George McKenzie,” are ad hoc 
confabulations which David believes because they are both familiar types that are 
compatible with his intuitive inference.  Significantly, he only resorts to the 
confabulation when pressed by Damasio for an explanation.  That is to say that his 
confabulation has a social function which would not be served by admitting “I don’t 
know.”   
David is not alone in his tendency to confabulate.  Neuroscientist Michael 
Gazzaniga has documented numerous cases of patients who, due to a surgical 
procedure dividing left and right hemispheres of the brain, were unable to use the 
brain mechanisms dedicated to verbal communication (located in the left 
hemisphere) to explain information presented only to the right hemisphere.  When 
asked to explain with the left hemisphere visual information that the left 
hemisphere had not processed, patients either stated that they did not see anything, 
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or they confabulated situations that made sense but were inaccurate.  “When the 
command ‘walk’ was flashed to the right hemisphere, the patient stood up from his 
chair and began to leave the testing van.  When asked where he was going, his left 
brain said, ‘I’m going into the house to get a Coke’” (Gazzaniga 13).   
The phenomenon of confabulation is not limited to patients with brain 
lesions, though these allow a more precise study of it.  Because Gazzaniga’s patients 
and David had different sorts of brain lesions, they did not know why they behaved 
the way they did.  But these lesions do not explain the confabulation they exhibited.  
Confabulation does not seem to be the product of brain damage, but a consistent 
feature of human consciousness designed to create a narrative identity that explains 
the individual’s action in terms acceptable to the immediate social milieu (Hirstein, 
2005; Fotopoulou, et al, 2008).  That is to say that narrative identity—how we came 
to be who we are, and what we will become—serves a primarily social function.  The 
function of autobiographical memory is not “Know thyself,” but “explain thyself.”   
Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber have presented a strong case that uniquely 
human capacity to reason evolved, not as a means of discerning the truth about the 
world (animals seem to get by decently enough without it), but as a means of 
convincing our fellow humans to act a certain way relative to ourselves or our 
strategic aims.  “Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It 
is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived 
is adaptive given human exceptional dependence on communication and 
vulnerability to misinformation” (Mercier & Sperber, 2010).  Our brains have 
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evolved to instantly process signs of intelligent life, group affiliation, reciprocity 
tallies, vendettas, and the like, milliseconds before the language centers of the brain 
begin the search for the appropriate socially-constructed signifiers and justifications.  
Language is a function of second-order consciousness, reflective consciousness, 
consciousness of consciousness, our own and that of others.  It adopts, refines, and 
applies social conventions after the fact.  As David’s case illustrates, our reflective 
consciousness interprets; it does not control.  In other words, the way we think is 
not culturally constructed, but the way we tell ourselves we think is.  The self is a 
narrative—ad hoc, redacted, and subject to multiple authors.   
Social Intelligence in Heorot 
In a small-scale society, a hunter can be totally modest yet still be highly 
regarded as a worthy member of his community, as indicated by Lee’s account of 
the !Kung custom of belittling one’s own contribution.  However, as the size of the 
social network expands beyond the Dunbar number and anonymity increasingly 
blurs the line between fellow and foreigner, one cannot take for granted that his 
efforts have been recognized or reciprocated.  In this event, a certain amount of self-
promotion may become necessary to avoid unrequited altruism.  Earning a 
reputation is earning access to alliance and sustenance, not to mention (as Beowulf 
rarely does) mating opportunities.  Though it may have become increasingly 
necessary in the evolutionarily novel situation of large-scale societies, bragging 
would nevertheless trigger the evolved predisposition that maintained the 
egalitarianism of small scale societies for most of our evolutionary history.  As a 
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result, individuals in an incipient chiefdom would have had to walk a fine line 
between self-promotion and bragging.   
The Hávamál, the Old Norse collection of proverbs attributed to Odin, provides 
the medieval Norseman a wealth of advice on how to walk that line.  In it, fame is 
more prized than wealth, family, or life itself.  “Cattle die and kinsmen die, thyself 
too soon must die, but one thing never, I ween will die, — fair fame of one who has 
earned” (Deyr fé, deyja frændr,/ deyr sjalfr it sama,/ ek veit einn, at aldrei deyr:/ dómr 
um dauðan hvern, Hávamál 75, Bray ed. and trans.).  However, many of the poem’s 
proverbs emphasize the importance of modesty and silence, reminding the cautious 
to “say what is needed or be silent” (mæli þarft eða þegi, Hávamál 19).    
The import of such sayings resembles the leveling mechanisms of small-scale 
societies, though a new dimension of censure emerges in increasingly anonymous 
social milieus.  In small-scale societies like the !Kung, group members know the 
upstart’s individual faults and can therefore remind him of them.  In an unfamiliar 
group, the normative potential of ridicule is replaced by that of the potential perils 
posed by unknown interlocutors.  “A wise counseled man will be mild in bearing and 
use his might in measure, lest when he come his fierce foes among he find others 
fiercer than he” (Ríki sitt skyli ráðsnotra hverr/ í hófi hafa;/ þá hann þat fiþr, es með 
frœknum kömr,/ at engi’s einna hvatastr” Hávamál 64).  This advice is paralleled in 
the Völsung Saga.  After the shape-shifting dragon, Fafnir, has been mortally 
wounded by Sigurd, he recounts to the hero the strategy which he had employed 
effectively until that day:  
147 
 
Ek bar egiſſhialm yfir ollvm folke siþan ek la a arfe minnſ broðurſ ok sva fnyſta ek 
eitri alla vegha fra mer ibrott at einghe þoðe at koma I nad mer ok einghe vopn 
hreddvmzt ek ok alldri fann ek sva margann mann fyrir mer at ek þęttumzt eigi 
miklv ſterkare enn allir voru hreððir vid mik.  
Ever since I began guarding my brother's inheritance, I have been a terror to 
all men. I snorted venom in every direction so no one dared come near me. I 
feared no weapon, and, even though I have faced many men, I have never 
doubted that I was far stronger than all of them together. They were all 
terrified of me. 
 (Vǫlsung saga, Grimstad ed. and trans., 140-1).   
Sigurd replies, "The terror that you described makes few victorious . . . for anyone 
who encounters many is bound to find out, sooner or later, that no one is invincible" 
(sa ęgiſſ hialmr er þu ſagðir fra gefr fám sigr þviat hverr ſa er med mavrgum kemr ma 
þat finna eitthvert ſinn at einge er einna hvataztr; 140-1).  In the mythic case of 
Fafnir, it might have been a generally safe bet that taking the form of a dragon could 
enable the hoarding of wealth despite most attempts at coalitional reprisal.  Though 
Sigurd dealt the dragon his death blow, he was put to the task by Regin, Fafnir’s own 
brother, and strategically counseled by Odin; thus we may refer to the act as a 
coalitional effort.  The role of Odin, who appears to Sigurd in disguise at times when 
the young hero must make strategic dicisions (e.g. choosing his horse, digging the 
pit from which to attack Fafnir, etc.), as adviser both to Sigurd within the narrative 
of the Völsung Saga and to the Northern world more generally as indicated in the 
Hávamál, places the god’s agency heavily within the realm of strategic social 
navigation. 
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The Hávamál acknowledges the potential of ridicule to serve as a means of 
social leveling.  However, it must remain a coalitional practice, since mocking may 
be employed by the upstart strategically against those he sees as rivals of his own 
influence.  Thus, “An unintelligent man, and ill-natured, jeers at everything. This he 
does not know—what he needed to know—that he’s not deficient in faults.” 
(Hávamál 22, “[Ósniallr] maðr/ ok illa skapi/ hlær at hvívetna,/ hitki hann veit/ —er 
hann vita þyrpti—/ at hann er[a] vamma vanr,” Dronke ed. and trans., p. 7; Bray uses 
Vesall for Ósniallr).  The caution is not against jeering, but jeering at everything.   
As tribes merge, whether they take the form of chiefdoms or incipient 
democracies such as that of 10th century Iceland, the means of social leveling 
necessarily change form.  Tact is required for those who would chastise another as 
well as those who might otherwise appear too arrogant.  The full extent of any 
particular coalition is not always evident.  Acting in accord with the instincts that 
functioned well in small-scale societies could set off a perpetual cycle of vengeance 
between competing tribes in an inter-tribal confederation.   
Beowulf, Lofgeornost 
Beowulf’s social world is characterized by a similarly fine line between 
encouragement to fame and censure of bragging.  The last word of the poem 
describes the eponymous hero as lofgeornost, “the most eager for fame.”  Some 
scholars have called this a condemnation by the poet of Beowulf’s hubris (Fjardo-
Acosta).  The last line follows shortly after Beowulf’s death, the result of a battle 
with a dragon that might have been more practically accomplished by a larger force 
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of men-at-arms.  In his long speech foreshadowing the fall of the Geats, Wiglaf, the 
only thane to aid his aged king in the battle, laments that Beowulf’s eagerness to 
fight the dragon and his resulting death will bring more harm than good to the Geats 
once hostile nations hear that they are leaderless (3074-84).  However, he also 
acknowledges that it is Beowulf’s reputation as a warrior that has kept these 
potential invaders at bay. 
The context of lofgeornost in the last line not only describes Beowulf as eager 
for fame, but as one who was known as being eager for fame—that is, his eagerness 
was part of his fame.  “They said that, out of all the kings in the world, he was the 
mildest and most gentle of men, the kindest to his people, and the most eager for 
fame” (cwǣdon þæt hē wǣre wyruldcyning[a]/ manna mildust ond mon(ðw)ǣrust,/ 
lēodum līðost ond lofġeornost; 3180-2).  It is unlikely that such terms as “mildest of 
men,” “most gentle,” or “kindest” would preface an accusation of hubris.  If Beowulf’s 
desire for fame led to his downfall, it also served as one of the traits which made him 
as a character and, therefore, enabled the action of the poem.   
We may take a cue from the coast warden who confronts Beowulf upon his 
arrival to the Danish coast.  “A sharp shield-warrior must discern between two 
things—words and deeds—if he thinks well” (“’Ǣġhwæþres sceal/ scearp scyldwiga 
ġescad witan,/ worda ond worca, se þe wel þenċeð,” 287-9).  The eagerness for fame 
which characterizes Beowulf is one that is based on his deeds and others’ words.  As 
a motivating factor, the desire for fame is mostly commended throughout the poem.  
150 
 
The caution against bragging differs in that it is a caution against praising oneself, 
especially where the deed does not warrant the description.   
The desire for fame is encouraged more often than not throughout the poem.  
Before turning the hall over to Beowulf for the night, Hrothgar reminds him to 
“Think of glory and show mighty courage,” (“ġemyne mǣrþo, mæġenellen cyð 659).  
After his success, Hrothgar commends him by saying, “Now you, 
yourself, have done such deeds that your fame will endure always and forever” (“Þū 
þē self hafast/ dǣdum ġefremed þæt þīn [dōm] lyfað/ āwa tō alder” 953b-55a).  
Likewise, as Wiglaf comes to Beowulf’s aid against the dragon, he encourages his 
king: “Dear Beowulf, do what in your youth you said you would, never let your fame 
diminish as long as you live” (“Lēofa Bīowulf, lǣst eall tela,/ swā ðu on ġeoguðfēore 
ġeāra ġecwǣde/ þæt ðū ne ālǣte be ðē lifiġendum/ dōm gedrēosan” 2663-66b).  
Desire for fame is not the only motivation for action, but it is acknowledged as a 
motivation superior to need.  Before he know’s Beowulf’s identity, Wulfgar, 
Hrothgar’s herald, comments, “I think it for pride and hardiness, and not due to exile, 
that you have sought Hrothgar”(“Wēn’ iċ þæt ġē for wlenċo, nalles for wræcsīðum,/ ac 
for hiġeþrymmum Hrōðgār sōhton” 338-9).  After Grendel’s mother kills Æschere, 
Beowulf, himself, consoles Hrothgar in terms very close to Hávamál 75: “Each of us 
will continue to wait for the end of life in this world.  Let him who can strive for 
glory before death.  That is the best afterward for those bereft of life”(“Ūre ǣġhwylċ 
sceal ende ġebīdan/ worolde līfes; wyrċe sē þe mōte/ dōmes ǣr dēaþe; þæt bið 
drihtguman/ unlifġendum æfter sēlest” 1384-9). 
151 
 
Whereas the familiarity of individuals in small-scale socieities ensured that, 
at least in large part, an individual’s accomplishments would be known by most of 
those with whom that individual interacted and upon whom he depended, the 
increasing anonymity of individuals in a chiefdom may have jeopardized the 
accomplished individual’s opportunities for reciprocity.  Even in an incipient 
chiefdom, the resources controlled by the chief were circulated primarily among his 
comitatus—his military buffer against a reverse dominance hieararchy.  This would 
make membership in the comitatus, or even the chance to serve a chieftain, 
advantageous to any who could provide service.  Since many would, consequently, 
seek to enter the emerging military aristocracy, and since the chieftain would be 
expected to reward all who served him, he would need to show discernment in 
those whom he allowed to serve him. 
When Beowulf comes to Heorot, he must make himself known by his lineage, 
home, and, not least, his accomplishments, as he is allowed to pass deeper into the 
concentric circles of social intimacy with the Danes.  First, the coast guard demands: 
“Now I must know your lineage before you go beyond here, unless as false spies you 
go further into Danish lands”(“Nū iċ ēower sceal/ frumcyn witan, ær ġē fyr heonan,/ 
lēasscēaweras, on land Dena/ furþur fēran” 251b-54a).  Because he recognizes the 
fact that they are a foreign comitatus in military array, the warden must quickly 
categorize them by group-alliance.  From there, they pass on to Heorot, where their 
kinship is questioned by Wulfgar, Hrothgar’s herald.  At this point, still unidentified 
beyond their affiliation with Hygelac, they must depend on Wulfgar as an 
intermediary rather than speaking to Hrothgar directly.  Only when Hrothgar 
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reveals his familiarity with Beowulf, both that he knew him as a boy and that he 
knows of his accomplishments since, are the Geats allowed to approach and speak to 
Hrothgar directly. 
Though Hrothgar knew Beowulf as a child, we are told that early in his life, 
the hero had been a bit of a slacker (2183b-88a).  It is due to the fame earned later 
that Beowulf is welcomed in Heorot.   
Ðonne sæġdon þæt        sǣlīþende, 
þā ðe ġifsceattas        Ġeata fyredon 
þyder tō þance,        þæt hē þritiġes 
manna mæġencræft        on his mundgripe 
heaþorōf hæbbe. . . .  
. . . Iċ þǣm gōdan sceal 
for his mōdþræce        madmas bēodan. 
Reliable seafarers, those who brought the Geats money and goods in thanks, 
have told me that he has the strength of thirty men, strong in battle, in his 
strength of hand. . . . To this good man I shall offer treasures for his true 
courage. (377-81a, 384b-85) 
It is no coincidence that Hrothgar mentions gift-exchange immediately after 
acknowledging Beowulf’s reputation.  In permitting Beowulf to enter the hall and act 
on his behalf, Hrothgar is accepting him into an exchange community.   
The impact of an individual’s social identity in creating access to exchange 
relationships, as discussed above, makes the cultivation of the autobiographical self 
a selection advantage.  As the complexity of the social world increases, the 
individual must craft his or her own autobiographical self to accord with the social 
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exchange communities he or she interacts with.  Beowulf enters with the advantage 
that his reputation precedes him, but he must carefully manage his persona to both 
prove his worth as a thane (and recipient of resources) and avoid appearing as a 
threat to the social equilibrium of Heorot.  In his first dialogue with Hrothgar, 
Beowulf describes his past battles with giants and nicors as prologue to his intended 
combat with Grendel.  By declaring his intention, he creates an ad hoc identity for 
himself as the match to the scourge of Heorot.  He specifies those elements of his 
past that are directly relevant to the unaccomplished event.  He establishes himself 
as the type of person who would defeat Grendel before he becomes the person who 
does defeat Grendel.  If he maintains the narrative he has begun in his introduction, 
he does it as a performance of the script he, himself, has drafted.  This is not to say 
that he takes victory as the foregone conclusion.  He acknowledges the potential for 
a grisly defeat which both demonstrates his grasp of the gravity of the situation and 
allows him to maintain control of how his story is told even if he cannot accomplish 
the action he proposes.  He assures Hrothgar that he will not have to see to his 
burial come victory or defeat, for if he loses, his body will be torn to pieces and 
devoured by Grendel.  Even in this outcome, Beowulf suffers no public shame, and in 
the recitation of this outcome, he exhibits his acceptance of a fate that would evoke 
self-preservation in others.   
While Beowulf’s physical size and past accomplishments enable his access to 
the social world of Heorot, he also poses a potential threat to that social order.  
Hrothgar and his thanes have been overpowered in the one place where they should 
be the most secure.  By declaring his intention to kill Grendel, he is implicitly 
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declaring his martial superiority to the Danes collectively and Hrothgar in particular.  
Unferth, in particular, feels his own social dislocation at Beowulf’s arrival, and 
responds by attacking the story upon which Beowulf’s social status and potential 
action depend.  His challenge comes not in reference to the impending trial, but in 
reference to Beowulf’s identity narrative.  He asks,  
Eart þū se Bēowulf,       se þe wið Brecan wunne 
on sīdne sǣ        ymb sund flite, 
ðǣr ġit for wlenċe        wada cunnedon 
ond for dolġilpe        on dēop wæter 
aldrum nēþdon?  
Are you the Beowulf who strove with Breca on the open sea in a swimming 
race? There for pride you tested the waters and for brash boasts you risked 
your life in the deep water. (504-510a) 
Though lofgeornost may carry positive connotations, Unferth chooses terms 
“for wlenċe…ond for dolġilpe” (508-9) which frame the story in terms of the sort of 
arrogance which is both counter-productive and indicative of an individual who 
would place his own dominance above the good of his group.   
The narration of the poem is unambiguous in asserting that Unferth’s 
motivation is, itself, overweening pride.   
Wæs him Bēowulfes sīð, 
mōdġes merefaran,       miċel æfþunca, 
forþon þe hē ne ūþe        þæt ǣniġ ōðer man 
ǣfre mǣrða þon mā        middanġeardes 
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ġehēdde under heofenum        þonne hē sylfa.  
This quest of Beowulf’s, the brave sea-farer, was a great annoyance 
to Unferth, since he did not think that any other man on earth, under the 
heavens, could achieve more fame than he, himself.  (501b-505) 
In these terms, it is not only the deeds which are the object of Unferth’s jealousy, but 
the desire for glory as a virtue in itself—a virtue publicly exhibited by actions rather 
than by declaration. 
 Recalling the coast guard’s differentiation between words and deeds, 
Beowulf replies by bringing Unferth’s identity narrative into play: 
Nō iċ wiht fram þē 
swylcra searonīða        secgan hȳrde, 
billa brōgan.       Breca nǣfre ġīt 
æt heaðolāce,       nē ġehwæþer inċer, 
swā dēorliċe        dǣd gefremede 
fāgum sweordum.  
I have never heard anything about you in such deadly straights, sword rages. 
In the play of battle neither you nor Breca, with a fine sword, has done a deed 
as bold or daring.  (581b-6a) 
Beowulf goes on to connect coming events to individual backstory: 
Secge iċ þē tō sōðe,       sunu Ecglāfes, 
þæt nǣfre Gre[n]del swā fela        gryra ġefremede, 
atol ǣġlǣċa,       ealdre þīnum, 
hȳnðo on Heorote,        ġif þīn hiġe wǣre, 
sefa swā searogrim,        swā þū self talast.  
I say in truth, son of Ecglaf, Grendel, that awesome terror, never would have 
caused such havoc or humiliation in Heorot against your lord, if your courage 
and spirit were as fierce as you yourself say they are. (590-4) 
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Further, Beowulf reminds Unferth, publicly, of his own past act of 
fratricide—an act that not only violates reflective historical norms but exploits the 
evolved predisposition to familial cohesion.   As many scholars, including Tolkien 
and Klaeber, have noted, it is the act of fratricide which defines Cain and, vicariously, 
Grendel and his mother as Cain’s descendants.  What has received less attention is 
that fratricide is the one particular act that God is said to judge.  Beowulf tells 
Unferth, “you became your brothers' murderer, your next of kin.  For that you will 
suffer punishment in hell, no matter how sharp your wits” (ðū þīnum brōðrum tō 
banan wurde,/ hēafodmǣgum; þæs þū in helle scealt/ werhðo drēogan, þēah þīn wit 
duge; 587-9).  At the end of his life, as Beowulf lies mortally wounded and reflects  
on his life, he only mentions one crime that could condemn him: “For all that I may 
have some joy, though sick with life’s wounds, because the ruler of men will not 
charge me with the murder of my own kinsmen, when my life goes out from my 
body”(“Iċ ðæs ealles mæġ/ feorhbennum sēoc ġefēan habban;/ forðām mē wītan ne 
ðearf waldend fīra/ morðorbealo māga, þonne mīn sceaceð/ līf of lice” 2739b-43a).  In 
limiting God’s judicial relevance to the judgment of kin-slaying, the poem differs 
significantly from other Old English works such as the Christ poem or the two Soul 
and Body poems. 
In the verbal sparring between Beowulf and Unferth, past is more than 
prologue.  It is identity.  An individual’s past actions are indicative of future actions, 
and, as we saw with Hrothgar’s promise to share treasure with Beowulf upon 
recounting his fame, future actions merit a share in resources and an elevation in 
status.  To control an individual’s social power, one challenges not only his potential 
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for accomplishments yet to be done, but the story by which he his known.  Each 
aspersion Unferth makes is more than an ad hominem attack.  It is an attempt at 
social leveling aimed at rival who is perceived as a threat despite—or precisely 
because of—the shared goal of Grendel’s defeat. 
Hrothgar, too, stands to lose a great deal of status upon Beowulf’s success.  
Hrothgar’s epithet, “helm Scyldinga,” “helmet (or protector) of Scydings” (371, 456, 
1321), has become unsustainable after Grendel’s unchecked rampage.   If Hrothgar 
wishes to use Beowulf’s desire for glory as a means to motivate him to achieve the 
mutually beneficial deed, he would not want to resort to the sort of immediate social 
leveling through ridicule that Unferth employs.  The old king needs Beowulf to be 
confident to the point of heedlessness, but his need is a potential weakness.  As with 
any relationship between chieftain and thane, Hrothgar will be expected to pay 
Beowulf in treasure for his deeds, but terms have not been set.  With such a grave 
threat he will be faced with finding an equally great means of leveling the exchange.   
It is possibly for this reason that Hrothgar also takes an interest in Beowulf’s 
autobiographical self.  He adds to Beowulf’s backstory a motive which Beowulf, 
himself, did not mention—and one which significantly elevates Hrothgar’s status in 
the tallies of social reciprocity.   Immediately after Beowulf initially declares his 
intention to fight Grendel and publicly acknowledges that he might be torn to pieces 
as a result, Hrothgar responds, “For past protection, my friend Beowulf, and for old 
favors, you have sought us out” (“For ǂfyhtum þū, wine mīn Bēowulf,/ ond for 
ārstafum ūsiċ sōhtest” 456-72). He goes on to describe a past event in which 
Beowulf’s father, Ecgtheow, killed a man, resulting in his exile and the possibility of 
158 
 
war between the Geats and Wylfings.  Hrothgar settled the conflict by sending a 
boatload of treasure to the Wylfings, thus allowing Ecgtheow to return to Geatland, 
where he married the king’s daughter thereby bringing Beowulf into the world.  If 
not for Hrothgar’s generosity, Beowulf would not exist.  This information alters 
Beowulf’s narrative identity by changing his motivation from one of self-initiated 
heroism to that of the repayment of a family debt.  Rather than an act of selfless 
heroism, we now see an unreciprocated act of kindness initiated by Hrothgar.  
According to the revised identity narrative, Hrothgar will not be as significantly in 
Beowulf’s debt after the defeat of Grendel.  Rather he will occupy the role of a 
generous benefactor who has finally received reciprocity.  The story of the debt of 
Ecgtheow has been stated publicly by a figure of high social status, and it is not an 
insult like Unferth’s, which one would intuitively seek to dispute in order to save 
face.   
Hrothgar’s motivation in reinterpreting Beowulf’s backstory sheds light on 
the motivations of the author of the poem’s Christian coloring.  To find a role for God 
in the poem, a reason to give God credit for what is clearly Beowulf’s 
accomplishment, several lines in the poem reify Beowulf’s strength as a gift of God.  
Like Hrothgar’s insertion of his own generosity into Beowulf’s past as a causal factor 
in his present task, the theological correction of the otherwise mythic story must 
remove Beowulf’s autonomy and make the hero, on whom the poem depends, 
himself dependent.  I will return to this undermining of the hero’s autonomy outside 
the narrative in the following chapter.  Within the narrative, the king’s insertion of 
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Beowulf’s debt acts a means of social leveling which protects Hrothgar’s status as 
“protector of Scyldings.”    
Beowulf’s responds to the tension his presence has created within the social 
world of Heorot by restraining the boasts he has just made in response to Unferth.   
As Boehm’s theory predicts, any self-promotion is likely to elicit hostility from other 
group members.  If a minimum of self-promotion is necessary against the anonymity 
of populous chiefdoms, it must be mixed with a minimum of modesty—modesty 
which must be displayed to appease those who might feel threatened.  Beowulf, 
even as he meets Unferth’s derision with boasting, follows with a renunciation of 
boasting: “In the play of battle neither you nor Breca, with a fine sword, has done a 
deed as bold or daring.  I do not boast of it!”(nō iċ þæs [fela] ġylpe; 586b).  Gylpe, the 
boasting Beowulf claims he does not employ, is the same negative characterization 
of boasting by which Unferth had criticized Beowulf in 509a (dol-gilpe).  Of the 
motivation for his swimming match with Breca, he admits, “We were just boys when 
we agreed in our boasts,” but tacitly apologizes when he repeats, “we were both still 
in our youth” (“Wit þæt ġecwǣdon cnihtwesende/ ond ġebēotedon – wæron begen þa 
git/ on geogoðfeore” 535-7b). 
Though his accomplishments are frequently attributed to his own motivation 
for glory, in this moment Beowulf explains his mission as the result of a group 
decision based on his own attributes as these were described by others, rather than 
his own boast: 
Þā mē þæt ġelǣrdon        lēode mine 
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þā sēlestan,       snotere ċeorlas, 
þēoden Hrōðgār,        þæt iċ þē sōhte, 
forþan hīe mæġenes cræft        mīn[n]e cūþon, 
selfe ofersāwon,        ðā iċ of searwum cwōm, 
fāh from fēondum,       þǣr iċ fīfe ġeband, 
ȳðde eotena cyn,       ond on ȳðum slog 
niceras nihtes,       nearoþearfe drēah, 
wræc Wedera nīð       —wean  ahsodon—,  
forgrand gramum.  
Then the best warriors and the wisest men of my own people advised me 
that I should seek you out, Lord Hrothgar, because they knew the extent of 
my strength; they had seen me, themselves, coming from the fight, stained 
with my enemies’ blood after I subdued five, slew a tribe of giants, and fought 
sea-monsters amidst the waves in the night.  I survived that gauntlet, 
avenged the Weders’ persecution as they asked of me, beset by enemies.  
(415-24a). 
In these lines, Beowulf walks the narrow space between self-disclosure and 
bragging.  He cannot assume that Hrothgar and the Danes know about his previous 
fights with giants, though such information is quite relevant to the current situation.  
However, he has already been provoked into doing quite a bit of boasting.  By 
describing himself from another’s point of view, he demonstrates an admirable level 
of social intelligence.  Elsewhere, Wiglaf, the only other character in the poem who 
describes, in his own words, an action previously described by the narrator, exhibits 
ambivalence toward his own boast.  Having just scolded the Geats for not showing 
the same courage that he himself showed in assisting Beowulf against the dragon, he 
follows his account of his own valor by dimishing it. 
Iċ him līfwraðe        lӯtle meahte 
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ætġifan æt gūðe,       ond ongan swā þēah 
ofer mīn ġemet        mǣġes helpan; 
symle wæs þӯ sǣmra,       þonne iċ sweorde drep 
ferhðġenīðlan,       fӯr unswīðor 
weoll of ġewitte.  
I could only offer him a little life-protection in battle, but nonetheless I 
offered help to my kinsman beyond my own means; with every strike of my 
sword our mortal enemy grew weaker, the fire from his mouth less severe. 
 (2877-82a) 
The ambivalence toward boasting results in the employment of other hedges, 
as well.  It is in similar descriptions of his own exploits that Beowulf includes 
references to God, Wyrd (fate), and other place-holders for his own agency.  In 
describing, before Hrothgar and Unferth, his sea race with Breca, he comments: “The 
hostile, scathing fiend drug me down to the ocean floor, held me in his constricting 
grasp.  Yet it was given to me to stab that monster with the point of my sword,”(“Me 
to grunde teahfah/ feondscaða, fæste hæfde/ grim on grape;  hwæþre me gyfeþe 
wearð/ þæt ic aglæcan orde geræhte,/ hildebille;” 553b-7a).  What or who “gave” him 
the ability to stab the creature and how an action might be reified and exchanged is 
unclear, though it allows him to show some humility before his new peers by which 
he might temper his own autobiographical diplay.  Subsequently, he adds: “Wyrd 
often spares an undoomed man while his courage endures!”(“Wyrd oft nereð/ 
unfægne eorl, þonne his ellen deah” 572b-3).   
It is conspicuous that Beowulf only refers to God in providential terms when 
speaking to Hrothgar.  Elsewhere in the poem, God is either synonymous with fate 
or takes the role of an unseen agent akin to Odin in the Völsung saga.  It might 
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require too much speculation to argue that this was the deliberate choice of an 
author or a feature which took precedence from the actual interactions of non-
Christians with Christian kings.  Both are possible.  Regardless, Beowulf mentions 
God’s assistance when speaking to Hrothgar, but not when recounting his fights to 
Hygelac.  In describing his battles in Grendel’s mere to Hrothgar, Beowulf says:  
Iċ þæt unsōfte        ealdre ġedīġde 
wiġġe under wætere,       weorc ġenēþde 
earfoðlīċe;       ætrihte wæs 
gūð ġetwǣfed,       nymðe meċ god scylde. 
Ne meahte iċ æt hilde        mid Hruntinge 
wiht ġewyrċan,       þēah þæt wǣpen duge; 
ac mē ġeūðe        ylda waldend 
þæt iċ on wāge ġeseah        wlitiġ hangian 
eald sweord eacen,       ofost wīsode 
winiġea lēasum,        þæt iċ ðӯ wǣpne ġebrǣd.  
I did not gently escape that undersea battle with my life.  I performed my 
deed with difficulty.  The fight was decided against me at first, but God 
protected me. I could not use Hrunting for that fight, though that weapon is 
good; but the ruler of men granted to me that I might see on the wall an old, 
gigantic sword, shining as it hung.  He has often guided the friendless one.  So 
I took that weapon.  (1655-64) 
Upon his return to Geatland, Beowulf leaves the attribution of divine agency out of 
his story.  He tells his uncle that, though Grendel meant to kill him, “it would not be 
so once I stood up in anger”(“hyt ne mihte swā,/syððan iċ on yrre uppriht āstōd” 
2091b-92).  It should be noted that the point at which the hero stands up is also the 
turning point in the fight with Grendel’s mother, though the narration attributes 
agency to both God and Beowulf (1554-5, discussed above).  This is not to say that 
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Beowulf shows no modesty before the Geats.  In his speech to Hygelac, Beowulf 
skips the details of his own actions and focuses on the fact that his fame will be 
shared by the Geats as a group:  “It is too long to tell how I there repaid the people's 
enemy for all his crimes, my prince. I did honor to your people with my actions” (“Tō 
lang ys tō reċċenne hū i(ċ ð)ām lēodsceaðan/ yfla ġehwylċes ondlēan forġeald;/ þǣr iċ, 
þēoden mīn, þīne lēode/ weorðode weorcum” 2093-6a).  In both scenarios, Beowulf 
tells his own story (displays his autobiographical self) in terms favored by the 
particular king.  In doing so, he would need to metarepresent the Danes to 
understand how they perceived him and what they desired from him in order to 
present himself accordingly.  
Besides the ambivalence toward bragging, the social customs exhibited in 
Beowulf further illustrate Boehm’s characterization of the incipient chiefdom in the 
comparative egalitarianism within the court.  Though the social order is not 
dissimilar to the king-and-courtier arrangement of late medieval monarchies, there 
are few demonstrations of subordination, and these are as easily interpretable as 
acknowledgements of the host-guest relationship or the tempering of perceived 
boasting discussed above.  The terms used for kings (cyning, hlaford, dryhten) are 
never used in contexts that imply unrestrained dominance, or the king’s freedom 
from compensating thanes for their service in objective standards of requital.  These 
terms of rank are also interspersed with terms describing familial relations or 
responsibilities of the king.  Both Hrothgar and Beowulf are described as “wine-
dryhten” (“friend-lord,” Hrothgar: 360, 862, 1183, 1604; Beowulf: 2722, 3175).  
Hrothgar is frequently described as “wine Scyldinga” (“friend of the 
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Scyldings/Danes,” 30, 148, 170, 350). Their thanes are described as “winemágas” 
(“friend-men,” 65).  The customs of the court exhibit no prostration or shows of 
subordination.  Though Beowulf must, upon first arrival, speak to Hrothgar via 
Wulfgar as the king’s herald, this may be due to the fact that Beowulf is still 
unfamiliar to the group.  The poem specifies that Wulfgar, himself, speaks to the 
king eye-to-eye and on equal terms.  “He hastily returned to where Hrothgar, old 
and gray-haired, sat with his band of earls; he boldly went and stood shoulder-to-
shoulder with the Danish king.  He knew the proper custom. Wulfgar spoke to his 
friend and lord” (“Hwearf þā hrædlīċe þǣr Hrōðgār sæt/ eald ond anhār mid his eorla 
ġedriht;/ ēode ellenrōf, þæt hē for eaxlum ġestōd/ Deniġa frean; cūþe hē duguðe 
þēaw./  Wulfgār maðelode tō his winedrihtne” 356-60).   
Beowulf’s relationships to Hrothgar and Hygelac, as well as Wiglaf’s 
relationship to Beowulf, are described in particularly egalitarian terms.  In 
metarepresenting Beowulf’s motives, Hrothgar describes himself in saying that, by 
coming to Heorot, Beowulf sought not a lord (e.g. hlaford or dryhten), but “a loyal 
friend” (holdne wine, 376b).  Beowulf says of his relation to Hygelac, 
“We are Hygelac's board-companions” (“We synt Hiġelāces bēodġenēatas,” 342b-3a).  
When Wiglaf comes to Beowulf’s aid, the bond between kinsmen is not 
differentiated from the bond between king and thane.  “They felled the fiend.  Their 
courage took its life and they destroyed it together, the two nobles; So should a man 
be a thane in need!” (Fēond ġefyldan ferh ellen wræc,/ ond hī hyne þā bēġen ābroten 
hæfdon,/ sibæðelingas. Swylċ sceolde secg wesan,/ þeġn æt ðearfe!  2706-09a). 
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The relationship between king and thane is of the reciprocal, do ut des variety.  
As is characteristic of the chiefdom, the chief distributes common resources which 
he thanes both share in and help secure from foreign groups (and, often, the labor 
class which is no longer able to exert a reverse dominance hierarchy).   The 
background narrative of Scyld Scefing’s son enunciates the expectations of a chief: 
Bēow wæs brēme        –blǣd wīde sprang— 
Scyldes eafera        Scedelandum in.   
Swā sceal ġe(ong) guma        gōde ġewyrċean,  
fromum feohġiftum        on fæder (bea)rme,  
þæt hine on ylde        eft ġewuniġen  
wilġesīþas,       þonne wīġ cume,  
lēode ġelǣsten;        lofdǣdum sceal  
in mǣġþa ġehwǣre        man ġeþoeon.  
Beowulf, son of Scyld, was renowned, his glory spread wide in Scandinavian 
lands. So should a young man bring about good in his father’s domain 
through the splendid bestowal of wealth,  so that thereafter loyal comrades 
will stand beside him when war comes, the people will support him.  By such 
noble deeds a man will prosper in any nation. (22-25) 
The king-thane relationship is not based strictly on economic exchange but 
an exchange community which involved intimate social ties beyond any formal 
division of labor.  The thanes were not easily replaceable the way a modern factory 
owner might replace one worker with another.  In attempting to rally the Geats to 
support Beowulf against the dragon, Wiglaf evokes the past comraderie of the beer-
hall as well as the sharing of treasure: 
Iċ ðæt mǣl geman,       þǣr wē medu þēgun, 
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þonne wē ġehēton        ūssum hlāforde 
in bīorsele,       ðē ūs ðās bēagas ġeaf, 
þæt wē him ðā gūðġetawa        ġyldan woldon 
ġif him þyslicu        þearf ġelumpe, 
helmas ond heard sweord.        Ðē hē ūsiċ on herġe ġeċēas 
tō ðyssum sīðfate        sylfes willum, 
onmunde ūsiċ mǣrða,       ond mē þās māðmas ġeaf, 
þē hē ūsiċ gārwīġend        gōde tealde, 
hwate helmberend,       þēah ðe hlāford ūs 
þis ellenweorc āna āðōhte 
tō ġefremmanne,       folces hyrde, 
forðām hē manna mǣst        mǣrða ġefremede, 
dǣda dollicra.       Nu is se dæġ cumen 
þæt ūre mandryhten        mæġenes behōfað, 
gōdra gūðrinca;        wutun gongan tō, 
helpan hildfruman,        þenden hyt sŷ, 
glēdeġesa grim.  
I remember the time when we drank mead, when in the beer-hall we made 
promised our lord, who had given us these rings knowing that we would pay 
him back for such accoutrements, these helmets and hard swords, if such a 
need arose. When he chose us for his band for this foray, by his own will, he 
reminded us of glories and gave me presents  because he thought we were 
good warriors, bold helm bearers, although our lord, as defender of the 
people, intended to perform this brave deed alone, because he, of all men, 
had achieved the most glory through dangerous deeds.  The day has now 
come that our kin-lord needs the strength of good warriors.  Let us go help 
the war-chief, though the terrible fire is hot. (2633-50b). 
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 While such gifts bind the thane to king, the thane’s service equally binds the 
king to showing material favor.  Beowulf commends Hrothgar’s fulfillment of this 
obligation when speaking to Hygelac: 
Swā se ðēodkyning         þēawum lyfde. 
Nealles iċ ðām lēanum        forloren hæfde, 
mæġnes mēde,       ac hē mē (māðma)s ġeaf, 
sunu Healfdenes,       on (mīn)ne sylfes dōm; 
ðā iċ ðē, beorncyning,       bringan wylle, 
ēstum ġeȳwan.       Ġēn is eall æt ðē 
lissa ġelong;       iċ lȳt hafo, 
hēafodmāga        nefne, Hyġelāc, ðeċ. 
So the people’s king lived by good custom.  By no means did I lack for 
rewards to match my might.  He paid me, the son of Halfdan, according to my 
own strength, which I now give to you, war-king, gladly make available.  I still 
depend on your good will.  I have few close kinsmen, Hygelac, besides you. 
(2144-51a) 
The treasures given to Beowulf by Hrothgar signify an exchange between two 
equally magnanimous parties.  Hrothgar follows the custom of a good king in 
rewarding a warrior who has fought a battle for him.  Beowulf has earned the 
reward, and adds to Hrothgar’s renown by describing the gifts he distributed to a 
foreign court.  The fact that Beowulf then gives the reward of his own work to his 
king might seem to indicate that, as Hygelac’s subordinate, he was required to show 
some sort of homage to his superior.  However, Beowulf specifies that he bestows 
Hrothgar’s treasure on Hygelac not because it is Hygelac’s due, but because “I have 
few close kinsmen, Hygelac, except for you” (“iċ lȳt hafo,/ hēafodmāga nefne, Hyġelāc, 
ðeċ”; 2150b-51).  It is not that a subordinate owes his possessions to his superior, 
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but that an individual is expected to share with his close kin (heafod-maga)—an 
ethic of close-knit, egalitarian, band-level societies.  The narration makes a swa sceal 
teaching moment of the scene, repeating the designation of “kinsman” (“mæg”): “so 
should a kinsman do, never weaving a net of malice for another with secret plots, 
devising death for close comrades” (“Swā sceal mǣġ dôn,/nealles inwitnet ōðrum 
breġdon/ dyrnum cræfte, dēað rēn(ian)/ hondġesteallan,” 2166b-69a).   
Hrothgar’s Sermon I: Heremod 
Hrothgar is affirmed in the narration and by Beowulf to embody the ideal 
chief.  His past victories brought him wealth and renown which he shared with his 
retainers by building Heorot.  “Then military success was given to Hrothgar, glory in 
battle, so that his friend-kin eagerly obeyed him, until the young band grew into a 
mighty war company,” (“Þā wæs Hrōðgāre herespēd ġyfen,/ wīġes weorðmynd, þæt 
him his winemāgas ġeorne hȳrdon, oðð þæt sēo ġeogoð ġewēox magodriht miċel” 65-
66).  Hrothgar never neglects to redistribute wealth.  “He did not forget his promise; 
he gave out rings, treasure at the feast” (“Hē bēot ne ālēh: bēagas dǣlde, sinċ æt symle.  
Sele hlīfade hēah ond hornġēap,” 80-1).  However, it is Beowulf, rather than Hrothgar, 
who has become the “protector of Scyldings” (helm Scyldinga) after the defeat of 
both Grendel and his mother.  Presenting the head of Grendel to Hrothgar, Beowulf 
no longer needs to boast.  Everyone in the court is as aware of Beowulf’s 
accomplishment as the fact that Hrothgar and all of the Danes failed in that same 
task.   
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After examining the tokens of Beowulf’s victory, especially the engraved 
sword hilt, Hrothgar acknowledges the level social ground he shares with Beowulf 
by calling the hero “my friend,” (“wine mín Béowulf” 1704), just as he did after 
Beowulf’s initial declaration of intent to fight Grendel (456).  He assures Beowulf 
that he has won the glory which motivated his feat, and simultaneously affirms that, 
despite his unequaled abilities, he is not a threat to his weaker peers:   
Blǣd is ārǣred 
ġeond wīdwegas,       wine mīn Bēowulf, 
ðīn ofer þēoda ġehwylċe.       Eal þū hit ġeþyldum healdest, 
mæġen mid mōdes snyttrum.       Iċ þē sceal mīne ġelǣstan 
frēode, swā wit furðum sprǣcon.       Ðū scealt tō frōfre weorþan 
eal langtwīdiġ        lēodum þīnum, 
hæleðum tō helpe.  
Your glory has spread throughout the world, my friend Beowulf, over every 
people; you take it all in stride and balance power with wisdom. I will 
perform an act of friendship for you, as we agreed before. You will be a 
comfort forever for your own people, help of heroes. (1705-9a) 
By this account, Beowulf would make an ideal member of any small-scale society, 
from egalitarian band to incipient chiefdom.  It is at this point that Hrothgar tells the 
story of Heremod, an arrogant and greedy king who killed his own thanes.  As 
Heremod grew (geweox) in personal power, he turned against his own men: 
Ne ġeweox hē him tō willan,        ac tō wælfealle 
ond tō dēaðcwalum        Deniġa lēodum; 
brēat bolgenmōd        bēodġenēatas, 
eaxlġesteallan,       oþ þæt hē āna hwearf, 
170 
 
mǣre þēoden,       mondrēamum from.  
He grew not for their benefit, but for their destruction and the annihilation of 
the Danish people. Enraged, he cut down his table-companions, shoulder-
companions, until he turned away alone from the joys of men, that famous 
prince.  (1711-15) 
The point of comparison is not between Beowulf as king and Heremod as king, since 
Beowulf is not a king at this point, nor is his inheritance of Hygelac’s throne 
assumed.  The comparison is between Heremod and Beowulf as individuals who 
have the unchecked power to do violence to their companions.  The slaying of one’s 
own in-group is not a crime which needs to be explained in order to be condemned.   
Heremod violated the expectation established for a king’s treatment of his thanes as 
well as for any individual’s treatment of his in-group companions.  The inclusion of 
this comparison is hardly necessary if Hrothgar’s intent is to commend Beowulf.  
Comparing the hero to what would seem to be a worst case scenario is hardly a 
compliment.  However, in what follows, we see a shift in conceptions of personal 
accomplishment and standards of modesty that will mark both the shift from 
incipient chiefdom to rigid hierarchy as well as the shift from polytheism to 
monotheism.  Hrothgar’s story of Heremod contains the basic moral premise 
expressed in the Hávamál and Volsung saga—a moral premise rooted in a cognitive 
predisposition and exhibited globally by small scale societies as documented by 
Boehm.  However, Hrothgar’s reasoning for this moral does not invoke the dangers 
of provoking a stronger foe or the universal feelings that inspire anti-authoritarian 
coalitions.  Instead, he invokes a non-egalitarian exchange relationship in which the 
individual—every individual—is born into debt. 
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Ðēah þe hine mihtiġ god        mæġenes wynnum, 
eafeþum stēpte,       ofer ealle men 
forð ġefremede,       hwæþere him on ferhþe grēow 
brēosthord blōdrēow,         nallas bēagas ġeaf 
Denum æfter dōme;       drēamlēas ġebād 
þæt hē þæs ġewinnes        weorc þrōwade, 
lēodbealo longsum.         Ðū þē lǣr be þon, 
gumcyste onġit. 
Though mighty god had exalted [Heremod] in the bliss of vigor, raised him 
above other men, yet in his heart grew a blood-ravenous breast-hoard.  He 
gave no rings to the Danes to match their honor; he abided joyless, suffered 
the misery of war, a protracted affliction to his people. Learn from him; 
understand virtue!  (1716-23a; Fulk, Bjork, & Niles adopt Klaeber’s 
capitalization of God, though the manuscript uses the lower case g). 
Hrothgar reifies Heremod’s strength and skill at violence as objects which are 
distributed by a central authority, God, in the same way a chief distributes actual 
objects of wealth.  This means that the treasure won by Heremod was actually won 
by his application of treasure given by a second-tier chief.  Heremod then fails as a 
middle-level chief by not being as generous with his thanes as his divine lord was 
with him.  Unlike the incipient chiefdom in which chiefs depend on their thanes, and 
the status of the thane is protected by his ability to serve the chief in feats the chief 
could not perform alone, the vertical relationship Hrothgar describes resembles the 
three-level hierarchy of the Roman Empire in which Cingetorix or Dumnorix were 
able to raise themselves above their peers by becoming the link to the higher 
authority and source of wealth presented by Julius Caesar. 
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 The narration has already presented this idea of God as prime-giver from 
which kings receive the wealth they bestow upon their people.  Describing 
Hrothgar’s virtues as a king, the narrator states that: “all he distributed to young and 
old” (71b-72, “eall ġedǣlan, ġeongum ond ealdum swylċ”).  Rhetorically, this 
obfuscates the fact that the thanes who receive treasure from the king actually 
enabled the acquisition of that treasure.  With their contributions ignored, the 
relatively horizontal exchange community becomes a vertical, tiered hierarchy.  All 
distributed wealth comes from above, via the king, and all that the subordinates can 
do is to pass on that generosity to those in their power.  Though they may serve 
their king and God, the king no longer looks to his thanes as providers.  Moreover, 
there is less potential for censuring the king, and none at all for censuring God.  This 
model of centralized authority fits the model of the feudal king, placing God at the 
top of the hierarchy as the ultimate emperor who creates and justifies the social 
stratigraphy beneath him.  Such a vertical social order may well have been as 
familiar to the author and audience at the time of the manuscript’s production as it 
is today.  When we translate “dryhten” as “king” rather than “chief,” we may too 
easily associate Hrothgar with a later model of feudal king.  The prevailing social 
order depicted in the poem, however, appears much more horizontal, though it 
exhibits the rhetorical first step toward a feudal hierarchy.   
 Besides actual material goods, the defining characterists of each individual, 
and thus that individual’s autobiographical self model, are susceptible to being 
reified and reinterpreted as gifts given by God.  Hrothgar continues in his story of 
Heremod: 
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Iċ þis ġid be þē 
āwræc wintrum frōd.      Wundor is tō secganṇẹ 
hū mihtiġ      god manna cynne 
þurh sīdne sefan      snyttru bryttað, 
eard ond eorlscipe;      hē āh ealra ġeweald. 
Hwīlum hē on lufan       lǣteð hworfan 
monnes mōdġeþonc       mǣran cynnes, 
seleð him on ēþle       eorþan wynne 
tō healdanne,       hlēoburh wera, 
ġedēð him swā ġewealdẹne       worolde dǣlas, 
sīde rīċe,        þæt hē his selfa ne mæġ 
for his unsnyttrum        ende ġeþenċean.  
I tell this story for you, the wisdom of many winters.  It is a wonder to say 
how mighty god to the race of man through ample spirit deals out wisdom, 
land and title; he holds all power.  Sometimes he permits the mind’s thought 
of a man of great family to wander, gives him joys to hold in his homeland, a 
stronghold of men, makes broad regions of the earth subject to him, a great 
kingdom, that he himself cannot see an end to it, in his foolishness. (1723b-
34) 
Wisdom (snyttru), like strength, is no longer a trait but a gift.  This conceptual 
shift fundamentally changes the autobiographical self model possible in one who 
adopts it.  This deference of credit and agency resembles the previous one in which 
Hrothgar reframed Beowulf’s story by adding the story of his gift to Ecgtheow, 
making Beowulf the debtor rather than the benefactor.  Just as, after Hrothgar’s 
story of Ecgtheow, Beowulf looked less like a self-motivated hero and more like a 
son paying the debts of a father, so too, as the recipient of God’s gift of strength, 
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Beowulf is merely passing on the agency of another when he risks his life against 
Grendel.   
As with his invocation of Ecgtheow’s debt, Hrothgar demonstrates quite a bit 
of skill at stripping Beowulf of his characteristic virtues even as he praises them.  In 
his parting speech to Hrothgar, Beowulf declares that he will come to Hrothgar if 
another time of need besets Heorot.  Hrothgar responds, “The wise Lord has sent 
those words into your heart; I have never heard a smarter speech from such a young 
man.  You are strong in might, mature in mind, and wise in words!” (Þē þā 
wordcwydas wiġtiġ drihten/ on sefan sende; ne hӯrde iċ snotorlicor/ on swā ġeongum 
feore guman þingian./ Þū eart mæġenes strang ond on mōde frōd,/ wīs wordcwida” 
1841-45a).  Hrothgar praises the words, but only after stating that they did not 
originate in Beowulf himself.  Similarly, the narration reifies Beowulf’s characteristic 
attributes, especially strength, as objects given out by God.  “he held battle-ready the 
generous gift God had given him, the greatest strength of all mankind,” (“hē 
mancynnes mǣste cræfte/ ġinfæstan ġife, þe him god sealde,/ hēold hildedēor”; 2181-
83a).  After Beowulf’s defeat before the dragon, the narration surmises: “he was 
forced, against his will, to find a place of rest elsewhere just as every one of us must 
give up these loaned days” (sceolde [ofer] willan wīċ eardian/ elles hwerġen, swā 
sceal ǣġhwylċ mon/ ālǣtan lǣndagas; 2589-91a).  Not only strength and wisdom, 
but time is an object to be given. 
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Crediting Providence as Pro-Social Signal 
Though Hrothgar and the narrator maintain a social model of divine 
feudalism in which all things originate and flow from God, Beowulf’s references to 
God, as discussed above, occur only in his speeches before Hrothgar and only at 
times when his words might be interpreted as bragging.  The social function of these 
deferences to God’s participation, as well as similar references to Fate, Death, and 
other abstract agents, are more akin to the !Kung’s “finding” a carcass on the 
hunting ground.  Rather than requiring any specifically Christian understanding of a 
monotheistic cosmos, they meet a cross-cultural cognitive predisposition to avoid 
the appearance of bragging which might precipitate coalitional censure.  To some 
extent, many invocations of God by Hrothgar and the narrator are limited to 
discouraging bragging in ways that resemble social leveling mechanisms described 
by Boehm.  They fall far short of the omnipresent god concepts in Christian 
narratives like Bede’s Life of Cuthbert.  The theological corrections in Bede follow 
the mundane as well as the miraculous and are identifiable not by the difficulty of 
their accomplishment but by their utility in forwarding the ministry.  In Beowulf, 
God is only cited after-the-fact; never as a motivation for action or a judge of actions 
(beyond that of fratricide).  Characters are not motivated to seek God’s will.  No one 
cites God’s will as something to which their own agendas should aim.  No one looks 
forward to divine intervention.  They are motivated by the quest for personal glory 
and the glorification of their kin groups, and this motivation is, itself, regarded as a 
virtue.  This would mean that the custom exhibited by Beowulf would differ in 
purpose than the custom exhibited by Hrothgar and the lines of narration which 
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insert theologically correct abstractions about God’s providence.  It is likely that the 
poem contains vestiges of oral tradition originating in incipient chiefdoms, given the 
amount of egalitarian social intelligence exhibited in the conversations taking place 
within Heorot.  If certain passages assume a more vertical hierarchy, characteristic 
of feudalism and Christian occasionalism, this would indicate that these passages 
originated at a later date.   
Regardless of the history of the poem’s composition, two distinct social 
purposes may be served by references to God’s agency.  On the one hand, attributing 
Beowulf’s actions to God’s agency serves the theological tenets of Christian 
dispensationalism, the belief that God, rather than any other human or supernatural 
agent, orders the universe.  On the other, it serves as a strategy of revealing one’s 
own abilities and accomplishments in a largely anonymous social milieu without 
triggering evolved predispositions to censure potential upstarts.  Reading the poem 
as a representation of social intelligence at work, we need not give so much weight 
to the truth value of individual claims by characters or narration.  Telling something 
other than the facts can serve a social purpose and constitute a causal action within 
a narrative.  When Beowulf tells Hrothgar that God decided the outcome of his fight 
with the Grendel-kin, he represents himself according to the way he perceives 
Hrothgar to prefer.   
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CHAPTER V 
INGELD, CHRIST, AND BEOWULF 
 
Hierarchy 
The shift from lateral community to vertical hierarchy requires a parallel 
shift in social cognition from metarepresentation to attachment schema.  The likely 
reason for this correlation is the fact that once the population with which one must 
interact exceeds the Dunbar number, the individual’s cognitive resources dedicated 
to tracking social interactions are overwhelmed and new strategies must be invoked 
to ensure pro-social behavior from others and signal one’s own pro-social behavior 
to others.  This is not to say that the author of Beowulf, much less the character of 
Hrothgar, would need to be aware of this shift.  It would likely characterize social 
interactions, particularly those of the aristocracy, and be so familiar as to be 
adopted into narrative without special consideration.  The fact that social schemas 
originating both before and after this shift are juxtaposed somewhat incongruously 
may argue that elements of the poem were composed both before and after such a 
shift.    
In the mythic (as opposed to the monotheistic) conception of the world, gods 
and humans, ghosts and monsters, although they may differ in attributes, do not 
differ in the fact that they are the objects of metarepresentation, or, as Byrne and 
Whiten phrase it, of Machiavellian intelligence.  Anthropologists such as Robin 
Dunbar prefer the designation “social brain hypothesis” due to the negative 
connotations “Machiavellian” evokes—itself an unfortunate association derived 
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from a limited and too literal reading of Machiavelli.  However, the connotations of 
self-serving social intelligence were inevitably a factor in the evolution of human 
intelligence.  Those who could fool their fellows into sharing resources while they, 
themselves, gave little or nothing in return, would stand to have more genetic 
offspring.  In order to maintain mutually beneficial relationships and to not 
jeopardize one’s own genetic fitness by expending resources on self-serving 
cheaters, humanity’s ancestors had to be able to differentiate beneficial from 
detrimental alliances.  As the brain developed new innovations in cheater-detection, 
it also developed new innovations to deceive the capacity to bypass such skepticism 
in others.  While our social intelligence evolved to successfully maintain pro-social 
alliances in small-scale societies, it did not evolve to the extent that it could reliably 
ascertain the intentions and trustworthiness of the thousands of people that would 
depend on each other in chiefdoms and states.  Whereas, as Boehm notes, many 
societies dealt with this problem by dividing into manageably small communities, 
these communities would remain vulnerable to any society that somehow managed 
to ensure individual cooperation by thousands of mostly anonymous in-group 
members.  As discussed in the previous chapter, monotheism occasionally emerged 
independent from but parallel with centralized states.  These monotheisms differed 
not only in the reduction in number of gods but, as Kaufmann argues, in the 
fundamental nature of the one god that remained.  So too, the way in which the 
individual was expected to interact with this omni-god fundamentally changed.  The 
omni-god was not to be addressed in the do ut des fashion by which humans had 
previously allied with pagan gods (not to mention powerful humans).  He was not 
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subject to metarepresentation by humans the way other gods had been, and, 
therefore, could not be deceived.  One might seek His Will, but not as a means of 
seeking ultimate ends, limitations, or motivations.  The only part of God’s mind a 
monotheist was permitted to wonder about was His will for that individual.  It was 
not in the power of the individual to reveal or conceal anything from God, nor to 
enable or hinder God’s design.  The only thing the individual could do was to obey or 
disobey, and the effect of that choice would affect none but the individual himself.  
The effects of obedience or disobedience would be reward or punishment from God, 
who is characterized by the omnipotence to reward and punish, the omniscience to 
know who had been naughty or nice, and the omnipresence to be the hidden cause 
behind any fortune or misfortune that the believer encountered.  In short, when the 
population outgrew the limits of mature social cognition, the dominant religio-social 
model of the cosmos regressed to the attachment schema which precedes 
metarepresentation in individual development. 
The monotheist assumes that God knows everything about him, even his 
thoughts, while he can know nothing about God.  This effectively disables the 
inclusion of God in metarepresentation.  Once believed, this conception ensures the 
cooperation of even the most successful cheater—at least his cooperation with the 
will of God.  As we shall see, this does not make the monotheist any more altruistic.  
In fact, it functions in exactly the opposite direction, requiring the individual to 
devalue other individuals and even his own autonomy.  It is this sort of derogation 
of the individual that we see in Hrothgar’s dialogue and in the Christian didactic 
asides in Beowulf.  This single virtue of subordination to divine will is exactly the 
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opposite of the social intelligence demonstrated by Beowulf’s dialogue and the 
episodic digressions that constitute the vast majority of the poem.  The Christian 
coloring of the poem attributes human action to either divine gifts or unholy sin and 
affiliation with Satan.  The pagan-heroic coloring of the poem, by contrast, 
demonstrates a level of social intelligence far more complex than anything 
permitted in orthodoxy Christianity.  The shift to metarepresentation to attachment 
also results in the division of the world into just two groups: the faithful and the 
infidels.  With this reduction of complexity, an individual no longer needs to 
differentiate between Wylfing, Scylding, Brising, Bronding, Weder, and Frisian, 
much less recall their past interactions or track their motivations for future action. 
If humans are naturally inclined to reject upstarts, braggarts, and chiefs, to 
the point that they are willing to forgo the advantages a centralized hierarchy can 
provide (increased population, military, resources, division of labor, etc.), it would 
seem that the only thing necessary to enable the development of hierarchies is a 
means of diffusing such anti-authoritarianism.  The reverse dominance hierarchy, as 
Boehm has described it, functions through techniques aimed at the rising authority 
(ridicule, sanctioning, exile, assassination) and techniques which bypass that 
authority (fission, stealth).  Julius Caesar acted as a deferred authority in cases such 
as that of Dumnorix and Cingetorix where he possessed the capability of military 
enforcement but remained aloof from the population he controlled, operating 
through subordinates.  In such a case, the subordinate qua subordinate could feign 
modesty through his deference to a higher authority and still centralize political 
power.  However, as Caesar himself learned from Brutus and Cassius, a human 
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authority cannot remain out of range of all potential censure.  The function of the 
higher power may explain the successful confluence of centralized political power 
and monotheism, but it is only higher when it remains beyond reproach.  
Nevertheless, is perceived as near enough to punish cheating or defection. 
Panoptic Monotheism 
In their essay, “Birth of the High Gods,” evolutionary psychologists Azim 
Shariff, Ara Norenzayan, & Joseph Henrich argue that the monotheistic conception of 
God functions to “outsource” (124) the job of cheater-detection in societies that 
have outgrown the ability of human social intelligence to do the job. 
Moralizing high gods gradually moved to the forefront of religious systems as 
cultural evolution—driven by processes favoring larger, more cooperative, 
more harmonious groups—favored rituals and practices that instill greater 
degrees of committed belief in people about gods who (a) cared about 
cooperative and harmony-enhancing behavior (the group's moral norms), 
(b) could and would reward and punish appropriately, and (c) had the power 
to monitor all behavior all the time. These religious beliefs helped expand the 
sphere of human cooperation. In particular, we suggest that the fear of 
imagined supernatural policing agents helped overcome the constraints 
imposed on the scale of human social interaction and cooperation by our kin 
and reciprocity-based psychologies. (124)   
Unlike human social intelligence, with its limit of around 150 familiars, “there are no 
restrictions on how many transgressions these supernatural agents can keep track 
of.  The consequence is that ‘hidden defection,’ which was still a viable individual 
strategy in groups with indirect reciprocity, is markedly reduced” (124). 
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In the scenario we propose, cultural group selection favored those culturally 
transmitted social norms that best promoted cooperation within the group 
and success in competition with other groups. The evolution of such norms, 
which has been extensively modeled, can stabilize costly behaviors through 
the effects of reputation on the withdrawal of help and through direct costly 
punishment (as well as some other mechanisms).  Cultural group selection 
merely favors the combinations of particular norms that are most beneficial 
to the group.  As this process continues, however, it favors larger and larger 
cooperative groups (Roes & Raymond, 2003). As group size increases, it 
begins to stress the limits of reputational information and diffuse 
punishment's capacity for stabilizing cooperation and maintaining within-
group harmony. We argue that widespread beliefs in certain kinds of 
supernatural agents can help extend the potency of social norms by covering 
the expanding opportunities for cheating and free riding that emerge as the 
group expands and coverage of reputational information begin to crack. 
Eventually, these groups, with widespread commitment to powerful, 
omniscient moralizing gods, would become larger and generally more 
competitive than groups whose belief structures did not increase 
cooperation. (131) 
 Whether or not an individual planned to cheat his social group, he would 
need exhibit his own commitment to that group in order to convince his fellows that 
he was worthy of shared resources (costly-signaling).  The social brain hypothesis 
holds that we are predisposed to not only show the general attributes of sociality 
but to adapt our outward persona to fit the specific preferences of the particular 
society.  This is likely the original function of metarepresentation (Mesoudi, Whiten, 
& Dunbar; Dunbar “Social Brain Hypothesis”; Malle).  This phenomenon of 
cultivating one’s social identity, including observable behaviors and even 
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internalized self-description, corroborates many aspects of the cultivation of the 
individual subject proposed by Michel Foucault.  In Discipline and Punish, Foucault 
uses Jeremy Bentham’s design for a prison, the Panopticon, as an example of the 
exercise of power through visibility.  In a prison designed to make every inmate 
observable from a central tower, the potential for catching and punishing deviant 
behavior is obvious.  Foucault notes that the normative power of the Panopticon 
does not depend on actual observation and punishment but on the inmate’s 
awareness that he is being watched by those with the potential to punish.  
Bentham laid down the principle that power should be visible and 
unverifiable.  Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall 
outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon.  Unverifiable: the 
inmate must never know whether he is being looked at at any one moment; 
but he must be sure that he may always be so. . . . Hence the major effect of 
the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent 
visibility that . . . should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary. 
(Foucault 201) 
As long as the inmate believes he is being observed, actual observation becomes 
unnecessary.   
He who has been subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes 
responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play 
spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in 
which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his 
own subjection.  By this very fact, the external power may throw off its 
physical weight; it tends to the non-corporeal; and, the more it approaches 
this limit, the more constant, profound and permanent are its effects. (202-3) 
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As Shariff, Norenzayan, and Henrich suggest of an omniscient God, so too in 
the Foucauldian exercise of power, “A real subjugation is born mechanically from a 
fictitious relation" (202).  The level of fictitiousness in the relation of the 
monotheistic believer to his God would seem to exceed that of the prisoner to the 
prison administrator.  Surrounded by walls and seeing the central tower, the inmate 
would seem bound to a physical and social reality.  It is the administrator himself, 
rather than the system that surrounds and depends on him, Foucault argues, that is 
the fiction.  While the ability of the administrator of the Panopticon to punish 
insubordination may be directly observed (e.g. physical abuse by jailers, reduction 
of rations, etc.), the actual enforcement is unlikely to be observed in the action of the 
administrator himself.  Prison guards, taking their orders from the central 
administrator, intermediates, or pre-established codes of conduct, provide the only 
enforcement visible to the inmates.  It is necessary that these enforcers believe that 
they act according to the administrator’s will.  In other words, it is necessary that 
they believe in the administrator, not that the administrator actually exist or act as 
the source of the actions justified by invoking him.   
As such, the jailers in the Panopticon have their analogues in the worldly 
enforcement of the fictitious relation of God to man.  A popular rhetorical model for 
monotheistic apologists involves finding or creating some event which can be 
interpreted as the work of God and leaping to the conclusion that this singular event 
proves everything in their theological doctrine.  This is the model laid out in 1 Kings 
18:20-40 in which Elijah challenges the priest of Baal to a lightening dual with 
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Yahweh.  Though the story focuses on the fact that Baal did not send lightening and 
Yahweh did, we see Elijah seize the opportunity to do more than prove his point:   
When all the people saw it, they fell on their faces and said, ‘The LORD indeed 
is God; the LORD indeed is God.’ Elijah said to them, ‘Seize the prophets of 
Baal; do not let one of them escape.’  Then they seized them; and Elijah 
brought them down to the Wadi Kishon, and killed them there. (1 Kings 
18:40) 
The turning points of Europe’s conversion to Christianity were consistently 
accompanied by the appearance of divine intervention in the form of martial victory 
and the suppression, often bloody, of any native religious sovereignty.  Constantine’s 
victory at the Milvian bridge set a precedent for equating submission to God with 
divinely ordained elevation above one’s peers on a centralized hiearchy.  Just as 
Bede’s Life of Cuthbert interpreted even the most mundane events as the expression 
of divine Providence, so many hagiographies, as well as the tactics of conversion 
employed by the saints they described, carried a clear message to potential 
converts: God is watching you, and he will reward or punish you accordingly.  
Armed with the actual power of centralized imperial military might, zealous 
Christians targeted the most conspicuous icons of non-Christian religious and 
philosophical sovereignty for destruction, which they then interpreted as evidence 
of Providence.   Germanic polytheists frequently venerated especially large and 
ancient trees as cites of worship.  As a result, these trees made especially easy 
targets for Christian missionaries to demonstrate the power of God to punish or 
reward, with Roman or Caroligian troops along for good measure.  Willibald relates 
of the mission of Boniface in Germany: 
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Now at that time many of the Hessians, brought under the Catholic faith and 
confirmed by the grace of the sevenfold spirit, received the laying on of 
hands; others indeed, not yet strengthened in soul, refused to accept in their 
entirety the lessons of the inviolate faith.  Moreover some were wont secretly, 
some openly to sacrifice to trees and springs; some in secret, others openly 
practised inspections of victims and divinations, legerdemain and 
incantations; some turned their attention to auguries and auspices and 
various sacrificial rites; while others, with sounder minds, abandoned all the 
profanations of heathenism, and committed none of these things. With the 
advice and counsel of these last, the saint attempted, in the place called 
Gaesmere, while the servants of God stood by his side, to fell a certain oak of 
extraordinary size, which is called, by an old name of the pagans, the Oak of 
Jupiter.  And when in the strength of his steadfast heart he had cut the lower 
notch, there was present a great multitude of pagans, who in their souls were 
most earnestly cursing the enemy of their gods. But when the fore side of the 
tree was notched only a little, suddenly the oak s vast bulk, driven by a divine 
blast from above, crashed to the ground, shivering its crown of branches as it 
fell; and, as if by the gracious dispensation of the Most High, it was also burst 
into four parts, and four trunks of huge size, equal in length, were seen, 
unwrought by the brethren who stood by.  At this sight the pagans who 
before had cursed now, on the contrary, believed, and blessed the Lord, and 
put away their former reviling. (Willibald, Life of St. Boniface, Robinson trans., 
62-4) 
The tree, more likely consecrated to Donar/Thor and translated in the interpretatio 
Romana as that of Jupiter, was reasoned to be sacred and therefore the most likely 
place for the god to demonstrate his agency in the world.  Destroying the site, even 
though the work of human agency, played upon expectations that such agency 
would be prevented by the god if it were in his power.  It was a case of monotheists 
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using metarepresentation, but doing so poorly.  Willibald relates that people 
practiced divination, but Boniface is not concerned with proving the Christian God 
was a superior source of divine knowledge.  Bede’s History and Life of Cuthbert 
contain several stories about pagans being converted after Christian missionaries 
foretell significant events which then come to pass.  However appropriate that 
might be when preaching to those who sought foreknowledge through divination, 
Willibald has no such story.  Boniface does not try to beat the pagans at their own 
game.  He simply destroys whatever he takes to serve as a link between a people 
and their non-Christian beliefs.  The fact that the tree fell more easily than expected 
emboldened the interpolation of Providence, never mind that extremely old and 
thick oaks are prone to collapse under their own weight.  Willibald emphasizes that 
the act was, therefore, “unwrought by the brethren who stood by.”  It was therefore 
evidence that a jealous God was actively involved in the affairs of the world.  In the 
Panoptic model of religious affiliation, it validated one ficticious relation by curbing 
another. 
Syncretism and Conversion 
Significantly, one of the reasons that Willibald gives for Boniface’s 
destruction of the sacred Hessian oak is that many of the Hessians, “refused to 
accept in their entirety the lessons of the inviolate faith” (my emphasis).  This is not 
to say that Boniface was refused out of hand.  Another missionary in pagan Northern 
Europe and a contemporary of Boniface, Wulfram of Sens, tried to convert Radbod, 
king of the Frisians.  In an oft-cited anecdote of conversion, Radbod is initially open 
to accepting the new belief and the new God, but recoils at the last second, once 
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Wulfram establishes that choosing Christianity entails rejecting his native beliefs 
and his own kin. 
Praefatus autem princeps Rathbodus, cum ad percipiendum baptisma 
inbueretur, percunctabatur a sancto episcopo Vulframno, iuramentis eum per 
nomen Domini astringens, ubi maior esset numerus regum et principum seu 
nobilium gentis Fresionum, in ilIa videlicet caelesti regione, quam, sit crederet 
et baptizaretur, percepturum sit promittebat, an in ea, quam dicebat 
tartaream dampnationem. Tunc beatus Vulframnus: ‘Noli errare, inclite 
princeps, apud Deum certus est suorum numerus electorum.  Nam 
praedecessores tui principes gentis Fresionum, qui sine baptismi sacramento 
recesserunt, certum est dampnationis suscepisse sententiam; qui vero abhinc 
crediderit et baptizatus fuerit, cum Christo gaudebit in aeternum.’  Haec 
audiens dux incredulus – nam ad fontem processerat, – et, ut fertur, pedem a 
fonte retraxit, dicens, non se carere posse consortio praedecessorum suorum 
principum Fresionum et cum parvo pauperum numero residere in illo caelesti 
regno; qui potius non facile posse novis dictis adsensum praebere, sed potius 
permansurum se in his, quae multo tempore cum omni Fresionum gente 
servaverat.  
First prince Radbod, when he was wettened with an eye toward true 
understanding through baptism, binding the oath in the name of God, 
earnestly questioned the holy apostle Wulfram where the greater number of 
kings, princes, and nobles of the Frisian people would be if he believed and 
was baptized and sent himself forth into true understanding—namely, 
whether they be in that heavenly region or in that one which is called hellish 
damnation.  The blessed Wulfram replied, “Do not err, illustrious prince, the 
number of those chosen people among God is certain.  For those preceding 
princes of the Frisian people who died without the sacrament of baptism, it is 
certain, underwent the judgment of damnation; but truly those who hence 
believe and are baptized, will rejoice with Christ in eternity.”  Hearing these 
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things the incredulous chief—having proceeded to the baptismal font—as he 
was borne, drew back his foot from the font, saying that he was not able to 
neglect the fellowship of those earlier Frisian people to reside in the 
heavenly realm with a small number of poor people; that it was not so easy to 
affirm these new doctrines, but he would rather endure with those which had 
served all the Frisian people for so long a time.  (from Krusch and Levinson, 
eds., Vita Vulframni, 668, found in Drout, 219. Independent translation by 
Britta Spann) 
It is not just the water in the baptismal font but the “new words” (novis dictis) from 
which Radbod recoiled once it became clear that this meant the public 
abandonment of his ancestors.  This act, familiar in Christianity as a public 
profession of faith, may be taken as a change of belief but it is primarily a public act.  
In particular, it is a public act of social affiliation.  Actual belief, the way one assumes 
the world, seen or unseen, to actually exist, remains unobservable.  Whether or not 
Radbod actually believed Wulfram’s assertion that he was choosing between heaven 
and hell is unknowable.  Perhaps, in his own mind, he was actually willing to burn in 
Hell in order to be with his ancestors, though this is not necessarily the case.  What 
is clear is that his decision was based on social ties with an imagined community.  
Though gods differ from ghosts, at least in the Christian cosmology, Radbod is 
choosing between two social affiliations.  He may either maintain his affiliation with 
the spirits of his ancestors or forsake this to affiliate with a few modest Christians 
and their God.  For Radbod, the new doctrine (novis dictis or percepturum) was not 
something distinct from social affiliation but part of an existence in social reality.  
His initial openness and subsequent rejection of Christianity is less surprising if we 
allow that gods, like living kin and ghosts of ancestors, are part of an imagined 
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community.  For Radbod, welcoming Jesus into his pantheon would be no different 
than welcoming Wulfram into his own home.  Welcoming Wulfram did not require 
him to eject all of his other acquaintances from his home and from his company.    
 Radbod’s initial predisposition to religious syncretism seems to have been 
the norm rather than the exception in new converts.  Augustine of Hippo, in his 
Explaining the Psalms, was required to refute members of his flock who were of the 
opinion, “Just because I frequent idols and get advice from visionaries and fortune 
tellers, that does not mean I have left the church—I am a Catholic!” (Explaining the 
Psalms 88.2.14, in Gary Wills’ Saint Augustine, 6-7).  Pluralism, though abhorrent to 
Augustine, was quite the norm for paganism.  Historian Charles Freeman observes: 
One finds pagans actually treating Christian shrines as another manifestation 
of the divine, not necessarily of greater or less significance than any other 
spiritual site. There is a story of a pagan lady from Seleucia who broke her leg 
and travelled first to Jewish magical healers, then to the supposed tomb of 
Sarpedon, a mythical hero from the Trojan war, and then to the shrine of the 
Christian saint Thecla in search of a cure. Bowersock shows how pagan cults, 
far from being curtailed or overwhelmed by Christianity, even adopted 
Christian images. (Freeman, 265) 
The lady from Seleucia demonstrates a contigent belief rather than devotion.  It is 
almost empirical in testing the powers.   
Bede, like Augustine, shows little regard for religious pluralism in his 
accounts of the conversion of England. 
Reduald iamdudum in Cantia sacramentis Christianae fidei imbutus est, sed 
frustra: nam rediens domum, ab uxore sua et quibusdam perversis doctoribus 
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seductus est, atque a sinceritate fidei depravatus habuit posteriora peiora 
prioribus; ita ut in morem antiquorum Samaritanorum et Christo servire 
videretur, et diis quibus antea serviebat.  Atque in eodem fano et altare haberet 
ad sacrificium Christi, et arulam ad victimas daemoniorum.  
King Redwald had long since been instructed in Kent in the mysteries of the 
Christian faith, but in vain: for returning home again he was led away by his 
wife and certain false teachers, and being in such wise corrupted from the 
simplicity of the faith, his end was worse than his beginning; so much so that 
he seemed after the manner of the old Samaritans to serve both Christ and 
the gods he served before. And so in one temple he had both an altar for the 
sacrifice of Christ and another little altar for offerings made to devils. 
(Historia Ecclesiastica 2.15, pp. 292-3, my emphasis) 
Bede doesn’t seem to consider whether Redwald ever realized that by accepting 
Christianity he was expected to reject all else.  Though Bede says little of what 
particular role Redwald’s wife played in his tie to other gods, the story resembles 
that of Radbod in that the king’s familial and spiritual commitments are thoroughly 
enmeshed.  Rather than appreciating Redwald’s inclusion of Christ in his temple, 
Bede echoes Elijah’s reaction to syncretism: "How long will you go limping with two 
different opinions? If the LORD is God, follow him; but if Baal, then follow him" (1 
Kings 18:21).  Elijah offers two options: follow either Yahweh or Baal.  Maintaining a 
relationship with both seems to be even less valid, in the prophet’s eyes, than 
complete rejection of Yahweh.  So too, Bede says of Redwald that “his end [religious 
pluralism] was worse than his beginning [complete ignorance of Christianity].”   
Constantine, though singularly responsible for the merger of monotheism 
and empire, may not have been entirely clear about monotheistic exclusionism.  The 
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arch constructed to commemorate his victory at the Milvian Bridge contains 
representations of Mars, Jupiter, Heracles, Victory (as a goddess), and the sun, Sol 
Invictus, which Constantine frequently took as a patron.  Charles Freeman argues: 
For committed Christians, the idea that their support might have been sought 
for purely political reasons would have been abhorrent. In so far as theirs 
was a religion requiring absolute dedication and the rejection of all other 
cults, conversion meant a complete change of lifestyle and the rejection of the 
conventional values and beliefs of Greco-Roman society. Constantine may not 
have been aware of this. As a traditional Roman, he had been brought up in a 
society where allegiance to several cults could be held simultaneously, as his 
own patronage of Hercules, Apollo and Sol Invictus shows. He seems to have 
assumed that Christianity would be the same and that any involvement he 
might have in Christian rituals would not be at the expense of earlier 
allegiances. This would explain why he continued to use the traditional 
imagery of the sun to support his authority. Constantine was still issuing 
coins bearing images of Sol Invictus as late as 320, and in the great bronze 
statue he later erected to himself in the Forum in Constantinople he was 
portrayed with the attributes of a sun-god, with rays emanating from his 
head. (160) 
In the Arch of Constantine, we have an unlikely parallel with Beowulf in one regard: 
though both originate in what we now take to be a Christian context, neither one 
uses names or concepts unique to Christianity.  Neither uses the names Christ or 
Jesus.  The arch is dedicated “To the Divinity,” which, as Freeman points out, was a 
term already widely used before the arrival of Christianity.  Similarly, nearly all 
terms for God in Beowulf are vague enough to be equally applicable to non-Christian 
193 
 
gods or earthly princes.   William Whallon, in examination of terms for God in 
Beowulf, argues:    
As god is common in Beowulf, goð is common in the Edda.  The Cleasby-
Vigfusson dictionary remarks that the ON word is often used without the 
definite article and seems, like the Hebrew Elohim, to be singular in meaning 
though plural in form. The phrase halig god of Beowulf 381 and 1553 
answers to the ginnheilog goð of Voluspa 6, 9, 23, 25, and Ls. 11.4.  The words 
metod and wyrd stand in apposition in Beow. 2526-27. . . For the words fæder, 
alwalda, and metod are as biblical as pater, omnipotens, and fatum are in the 
Aeneid, and Beowulf is to this extent neither Christian nor unchristian but 
pre-Christian. (Whallon, 19-20) 
Constantine’s arch contains images which are easily recognized as specific pagan 
gods, but these are not specifically named in the inscription, except for Victory, 
which might be equivocal, taken as event rather than goddess.  Similarly, Beowulf 
contains at least vestigial imagery with parallels in what little survives of Germanic 
myth (Stitt, Glosecki, North, Davis).  The reason that the figures of Mars, Jupiter, and 
Heracles are recognizable as Mars, Jupiter, and Heracles is that we have a wealth of 
literature and art produced before conversion on material more durable than that 
available in polytheistic Northern Europe.  Given that comparatively little physical 
art or writing existed representing non-classical polytheism, it is not hard to see 
why so little remains of the material which might help to identify the vestiges in 
Beowulf. 
Whatever pluralism Constantine may have held for himself, Christianity 
seems perfectly designed to turn toleration of itself into elimination of alterity in a 
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very short time—quickly enough for people like Bede and Elijah to forget that they 
ever depended on the very pluralism they abhor.  In 381, within three generations 
of the Edict of Toleration, emporer Theodosius banned all things pagan in the 
empire and its environs. This suppression included the destruction of the Serapeum 
library at Alexandria and the banning of the 1200 year old Olympic Games (Freeman 
224-5).   In 382, Bishop Ambrose prevailed upon the emporer Gratian to remove the 
Alter of Victory from the Roman Senate.  Pagan senators sent a delegation to Gratian 
at Milan to discuss the matter, but, on Ambrose’s insistence, the senators were 
denied an audience.  Following Gratian’s death, the pagan orator and prefect of 
Rome, Quintus Aurelius Symmachus wrote an appeal to Valentinian II on the same 
matter.  Freeman observes: 
It was not just the removal of the altar that he deplored but the denigration 
of all that it symbolized, the diverse spiritual world of paganism and the 
freedom of thought it allowed.  "What does it matter," he wrote, "by which 
wisdom each of us arrives at the truth? It is not possible that only one road 
leads to so sublime a mystery."  Ambrose saw the letter and replied, "What 
you are ignorant of, we know from the word of God. And what you try to infer, 
we have established as truth from the very wisdom of God." Again, Ambrose 
prevailed and Valentinian refused Symmachus' request. (230) 
These two patterns of reasoning evoke the maxim that philosophy consists of a set 
of questions that can never be answered, whereas religion consists of a set of 
answers that can never be questioned.  Ambrose’s ontological certainty derives from 
his complete blindness to questions of epistemology.  He can declare that he knows 
the truth without any compulsion to explain how he knows it is the truth, and he 
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may do so because he has the ear of the emperor.  If Ambrose had the ear of the 
emperor in 382, he would have the emperor’s subordination within a decade.  In 
390, emperor Theodosius ordered the suppression of riots in Thessolonika which 
resulted in the death of thousands.  His resulting unpopularity became an 
immediate political vulnerability, and was seized upon as such by Bishop Ambrose, 
who denied Theodosius communion due to his sinful act.  As a result, Theodosius 
came to Ambrose’s basilica in Milan to prostrate himself before the bishop and ask 
God’s forgiveness, which would of course be granted vicariously through Ambrose 
(Freeman 324-5).  From this point on, both political and religious authority were 
dependent upon a ficticious relation with a deferred agent of reward and 
punishment.  Truth, as indicated in Ambrose’s dismissal of Symmachus, was no 
longer conceived as something to be sought or found but something to be given—
and given only by that deferred central agent.   
 Ambrose’s abstenance from the difficulties of epistemology was not unique.  
In Acts 17, Paul comes to Athens and is distressed to see idols in the city.  When he 
begins to preach in the marketplace, he attracts the attention of Epicurean and Stoic 
philosophers.  “So they took him and brought him to the Areopagus and asked him, 
‘May we know what this new teaching is that you are presenting? It sounds rather 
strange to us, so we would like to know what it means’” (19-20).  The attitude of the 
Greeks toward Paul’s different point of view was not only one of toleration but 
genuine excitement.  The Areopagus had been the site of Athenian debate, political 
and philosophical, since pre-classical times.  It had been the seat of the Athenian 
council and the site of the trial of Orestes in Aeschylus’ Eumenides.  The author of 
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Acts, however, fails to appreciate the context, commenting: “Now all the Athenians 
and the foreigners living there would spend their time in nothing but telling or 
hearing something new”(21). The Athenians were, in effect, treating Paul like a 
Greek philosopher in inviting him to debate them at the Areopagus.  Paul seizes 
upon the Greek’s receptiveness but refuses to even pretend to reciprocate, turning 
the inclusiveness he exploits into the exclusion of any view other than his own.   
Then Paul stood in front of the Areopagus and said, "Athenians, I see how 
extremely religious you are in every way. For as I went through the city and 
looked carefully at the objects of your worship, I found among them an altar 
with the inscription, 'To an unknown god.' What therefore you worship as 
unknown, this I proclaim to you. The God who made the world and 
everything in it, he who is Lord of heaven and earth, does not live in shrines 
made by human hands, nor is he served by human hands, as though he 
needed anything, since he himself gives to all mortals life and breath and all 
things. From one ancestor he made all nations to inhabit the whole earth, and 
he allotted the times of their existence and the boundaries of the places 
where they would live, so that they would search for God and perhaps grope 
for him and find him--though indeed he is not far from each one of us. For 'In 
him we live and move and have our being'; as even some of your own poets 
have said, 'For we too are his offspring.' Since we are God's offspring, we 
ought not to think that the deity is like gold, or silver, or stone, an image 
formed by the art and imagination of mortals. While God has overlooked the 
times of human ignorance, now he commands all people everywhere to 
repent, because he has fixed a day on which he will have the world judged in 
righteousness by a man whom he has appointed, and of this he has given 
assurance to all by raising him from the dead." (Acts 17:22-31) 
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Ironically, the thing Paul seizes upon as evidence of his own truth is an icon of the 
Socratic wisdom he lacks.  In raising a marker to an unknown god, the Greeks 
acknowledged the limits of their own knowledge.  Paul, however, remains blissfully 
unaware of his own ignorance.  Rather than concerning himself with explaining how 
he knows that he is right and they are all wrong, much less offering evidence, Paul 
enforces his claims with the threat of divine judgment. 
Like Ambrose, Wulfram, Bede, and Boniface after him, Paul does not care to 
know what his interlocutors know, much less to hear how they arrived at their 
conclusions.  In other words, he has no appreciation for metarepresentation beyond 
categorizing his interlocutors as either Christian or other, one of us or one of them.  
His arguments are less arguments than imperatives.  They are based not on 
comparing methods of knowledge but on submission to the only authority he 
acknowledges.  As such it abdicates social intelligence for attachment. 
Augustine 
The Christian concept of conversion depends on an absence of the sort of 
contingency and openness characteristic of polytheism.  Originating in the Latin 
verto, to turn, it excludes metaphorical schema which might allow openness or 
inclusion.  If we characterize belief as, for example, a container, we could easily 
conceive of many objects included together within it.  However verto implies a 
schema of bodily reorientation.  One can only face one direction at a time.  To turn 
from one object to another makes the connection of the individual to the object 
zero-sum.  It requires a choice—the acceptance of one thing and the rejection of all 
198 
 
others.  This schema fits quite well with the attachment model of interaction with 
the world.  While the child explores the world, he is turned away from his mother.  
When too much time passes or a strange situation ensues, he turns away from 
whatever worldly object has previously caught his attention and turns toward his 
attachment figure to reestablish contact and a sense of security. 
Perhaps no monotheistic apologist has done more to promote the word and 
its underlying schema than Augustine of Hippo.  In a fashion analogous to Paul and 
Ambrose, Augustine describes religious understanding in terms which evoke a 
child’s turning alternately toward an attachment figure or toward the world.  He 
characterizes his philosophically-minded contemporaries as “inquieti iniqui,” which 
Watts and Rouse translate as “unquiet naughty people” (209).  “Iniqui” carries 
connotations of imperfection, impurity, and lacking appropriate measure, and may 
not have necessarily carried the same connotations that Watts and Rouse’s choice of 
“naughty.”  However, Augustine’s imagery frames human reason and self-reliance in 
the schema of a child wandering away from a parent in the typical exploratory 
phase of attachment behavior.  
Let them be turned back; and behold, thou art there in their heart, in the 
heart of those that confess thee, and that cast themselves upon thee, and that 
pour forth their tears in thy bosom, after all their tedious wanderings.  Then 
shalt thou most gently wipe away their tears, and they do weep the more, yea, 
and delight in their weeping; even for that thou, O Lord, and not any man of 
flesh and blood, but thou Lord who madest them, canst refresh and comfort 
them. 
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Ipsi convertantur, et ecce ibi es in corde eorum, in corde confitentium tibi, et 
proicicntium se in te, et plorantium in sinu tuo post vias suas difficiles: et tu 
facilis tergens lacrimas eorum, et magis plorant et gaudent in fletibus, 
quoniam tu, domine, non aliquis homo, caro et sanguis, sed tu, domine, qui 
fecisti, reficis et consolaris eos. (Confessions 5.2, pp. 208-211.  All English and 
Latin excerpts of Confessions, unless otherwise noted, are Page & Rouse eds. 
& trans.). 
Augustine clearly maintains an attachment model for adult life.  Those who 
explore the world through human reason are noisy and disobedient children.  They 
are assumed to need to return, crying and anxious, to God the way a child who has 
reached his attachment anxiety threshold feels the need to reestablish contact with 
the parental attachment figure.  As Lee Kirkpatrick describes it, the attachment 
system exhibits a parallel sequence of turnings:  
Attachment and exploration are linked in a kind of “dynamic equilibrium” 
(Cassidy, 1999): The exploration system is activated under normal, familiar 
circumstances, with the child metaphorically or literally keeping one eye on 
the mother’s whereabouts while at play. (Actually, the child is likely to 
periodically move back closer to the attachment figure at regular intervals to 
check in and make sure he or she is still attentive and available, a 
phenomenon labeled social referencing by Campos and Stenberg, 1981.) If 
the attachment figure moves away, or if the child becomes frightened or 
injured, the attachment system is activated and attachment behaviors 
appear; the exploration system is simultaneously deactivated. Assuming that 
attachment behaviors are successful in restoring adequate proximity, the 
attachment system is then deactivated and exploration can begin anew. It is 
in this sense that attachment figures offer two relational provisions: a haven 
of safety to which to turn in times of distress or danger, and a secure base for 
exploration at other times. Confidence in the accessibility and reliability of 
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the attachment figure enhances the ability to explore and to do so with 
confidence. (30) 
The thing from which one turns doesn’t matter.  In Augustine’s thought, as in 
the child’s attachment schema, there are only two classes of objects: the attachment 
figure and everything else.  The everything else could consist of people, objects, or 
simply distance between parent and child.  The conversion in his ipsi convertantur 
creates a duality between God and everything else.  When an individual turns, he 
faces away from one thing and toward another.  Once engaged, anything which 
causes the faithful to turn their faces away from God becomes antithetical to an 
attachment relationship with God.  As Robert J. O’Connell observes, Augustine’s 
orientation schema is not limited to use of the word conversio.  
How he revels in ringing the changes on that word vertere! "Because we 
turned away from [You] [aversi sumus], we have become perverted [perversi 
sumus]. Let us turn back now, Lord [revertamur], lest we be overturned [ut 
non evertamur] . . ." (Conf 4.31) is one of the best examples; only his 
unquestionable favorite, convertere, is absent. But it gives a fairly accurate 
idea of how Augustine intends the term pervertere: he thinks of it as an act of 
"turning in the wrong direction," in a direction in which one ought not 
turn. . . . Things are all upside down (eversi sumus). So, Augustine thinks, 
there is a natural and inexorable connection whereby "turning away" from 
God ("aversion") leads to "perversion," which leads to "subversion" (or 
"eversion"); and the only cure for this monstrous situation is that we 
"convert" and "revert," turn around and return to our original contemplative 
submission to God.  So, too, there is a similar natural and inexorable 
connection between the soul's proud desire for independence of the One and 
its "vain" itch to exult in its power to act upon and dominate the many.  (179-
80) 
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Augustine’s Confessions is celebrated for its originality as the first 
autobiography in Western literature.  Phillip Cary describes the form of the 
autobiography within the Augustinian conversio schema as an inward turn.  In 
creating his autobiography, Augustine turns away from the material and social 
world and toward the world of Platonic ideals and contemplation of God.  This is 
largely consistent with the way Augustine describes himself—at least the self which 
narrates, though not the self of his errant youth.  However, we may see Augustine’s 
autobiography as a written form of the autobiographical self as described by 
Damasio and other cognitive psychologists (above, Ch. 3): as a narrative of the self, a 
confabulation, designed primarily for presentation to one’s community.  A 
confabulation is not necessarily false, but, as illustrated in the case of Damasio’s 
amnesiac patient, David, it involves the creation of a narrative which begins with a 
present situation and works backwards, generating a story which will explain the 
present to an interlocutor in terms which facilitate the individual’s social acceptance.  
Augustine’s anecdotes from his youth are selected and interpreted only insofar as 
they promote his theological point of view as a Christian apologist.  If he had been 
asked why he had stolen pears from a neighbor’s orchard at the time of the event, it 
is unlikely he would have responded “I did not care to enjoy the thing which I had 
stolen, but I joyed in the theft and sin itself” (“nec ea re volebam frui, quam furto 
appetebam, sed ipso furto et peccato”; 2.4, pp. 76-9, my translation, after Page & 
Rouse).  However, this reframing of young Augustine’s action in old Augustine’s 
religious commitments is meant to serve the elder narrator rather than the younger 
character.  In its use, the Confessions are a story about an inward turn, but one 
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fabulated for an outwardly directed sermon.  Insofar as he writes for a human 
readership, he is constructing an autobiography for public display and a foundation 
for self-representation.  However, it is not himself he wants his reader to come to 
know.  This is why he does not seem concerned with how he, himself, is perceived, 
either as the subject of the work or its author. 
Quid ad me, si quis non intellegat? gaudeat et ipse dicens: quid est hoc? gaudeat 
etiam sic, et amet non inveniendo invenire, potius quam inveniendo non 
invenire te.  
What concerns it me, if any understand not this.  Let him rejoice 
notwithstanding and say: ‘What is this?’ Let him so also rejoice, and rather 
love to find in not finding it out, than by finding it, not to find thee with it.  
(Confessions 1.6, 18-19) 
His purpose is not to lead the reader to an understanding of God but to an 
attachment to God. 
Of course, it is God to whom Augustine directs his confession.  Confession, 
however, is not communication.  He does not reveal anything to God that God did 
not already know.  “And from thee, O Lord, unto whose eyes the bottom of man's 
conscience is laid bare, what could be hidden in me though I would not confess it” 
(“Et tibi quidem, domine, cuius oculis nuda estabyssus humanae conscientiae, quid 
occultum esset in me, etiamsi nollem confiteri tibi”; 10.2, vol. II, pp. 74-75).  Neither 
does he learn anything from a reply.  Rather, the confession acts as a profession of 
faith—a public act which signals to others that Augustine is devoted to God. 
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Cary observes that, as conversion, the inward turn is incomplete because, for 
Augustine, even the inward self is a created thing.  Only the Creator himself serves 
as that to which one should ultimately turn (63-6).  It is God rather than Augustine’s 
self which serves as the fixed point by which all other objects, including Augustine’s 
autobiographical self, are to be oriented.  Insofar as the autobiographical self is 
constructed as an act of social communication, it demonstrates a level of 
metarepresentation more advanced and autonomous than the social referencing 
characteristic of attachment behavior.  Though Augustine clearly describes his own 
relationship with God as a model for other Christians, this seems to be the extent of 
his metarepresentation. The overarching social schema which guides the 
characterizations of characters in the narrative is that of attachment behavior.  
Ironically, Augustine’s metarepresentation goes only as far as it must to 
communicate to the reader that metarepresentation is a frivolous distraction from 
attachment to God.  As such, Augustine is not terribly concerned to explore how 
others think.  He is, rather, motivated to describe their thinking in his own terms—
namely those of sin, conversion, and grace.    
Augustine initiates his autobiography, appropriately enough, in his infancy—
the years in which attachment styles are the only form of social interaction.  
However, he strips his actual attachment figures of their natural roles.  Having 
chosen God as his lifelong attachment figure, he recasts his parents and nurses as 
peripheral stand-ins for a deferred attachment figure.  Their social roles are 
vicarious.  Even their own bodies are reduced to mere vessels through which God 
acts.   
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Quid enim est quod volo dicere, domine, nisi quia nescio, unde venerim huc, in 
istam, dico vitam mortalem, an mortem vitalem nescio.  et susceperunt me 
consolationes miserationum tuarum, sicut audivi a parentibus carnis meae, ex 
quo et in qua me formasti in tempore; non enim ego memini. exceperunt ergo 
me consolationes lactis humani, nec mater mea vel nutrices meae sibi ubera 
implebant, sed tu mihi per eas dabas alimentum infantiae, secundum 
institutionem tuam, et divitias usque ad fundum rerum dispositas.  tu etiam 
mihi dabas nolle amplius, quam dabas, et nutrientibus me dare mihi velle quod 
eis dabas : dare enim mihi per ordinatum affectum volebant quo abundabant 
ex te.  nam bonum erat cis bonum meum ex eis, quod ex eis non, sed per eas erat.  
What is it that I would say, Lord my God, but even this: that I know not 
whence I came hither; into this, a dying life (shall I call it) or a living death 
rather?  I know not.  And the comforts of thy mercies did take me up, as I 
have heard it of the parents of my flesh, out of whom, and in whom thou 
sometimes did form me, for I myself cannot remember it.  The comfort 
therefore of a woman's milk did then entertain me: yet did neither my 
mother nor nurses fill their own breasts; but thou, O Lord, didst by them 
afford a nourishment fit for my infancy, even according to thine own 
institution, and those riches of thine, reaching to the root of all things. Thou 
also ingraftedst in me a desire to suck no more than thou suppliedst them 
withal; and in my nurses to afford me what thou gavest them: for they were 
willing to dispense unto me with proportion, what thou suppliedst them with 
in abundance. For it was a blessing to them, that I received this blessing from 
them: which yet was rather by them, than from them.  (Confessions 1.6, pp. 
12-15) 
Consequently, the importance of Augustine’s mother and wet nurses to Augustine 
lies, not in themselves as sovereign individuals, nor even in their contribution to his 
sustenance, but only in their function as conduits of God’s agency.  The modern 
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reader will recognize a rejection of the Kantian regard for human autonomy.  For 
Augustine, people are not valuable in and of themselves. 
For we are commanded to love one another: but it is a question whether man 
is to be loved by man for his own sake, or for the sake of something else. If it 
is for his own sake, we enjoy him; if it is for the sake of something else, we 
use him. It seems to me, then, that he is to be loved for the sake of something 
else. For if a thing is to be loved for its own sake, then in the enjoyment of it 
consists a happy life, the hope of which at least, if not yet the reality, is our 
comfort in the present time. But a curse is pronounced on him who places his 
hope in man . . . For if we find our happiness complete in one another, we 
stop short upon the road, and place our hope of happiness in man or angel. 
Now the proud man and the proud angel arrogate this to themselves, and are 
glad to have the hope of others fixed upon them (On Christian Doctrine, pp. 
836 & 843) 
The world was not waiting for Kant to formulate his categorical imperative in order 
to appreciate people as ends in themselves.  In Book 2, Augustine dwells on the 
period of sorrow which followed the death of a close friend in early adulthood.  
“Wretched I was; and wretched is every soul that is bound fast in the friendship of 
mortal things” (“miser eram, et miser est omnis animus vinctus amicitia rerum 
mortalium” Confessions 4.6, pp. 164-5).  But Augustine the apologist corrects 
Augustine the mourner by redirecting his attention toward the only friend who 
cannot die:  
Beatus qui amat te, et amicum in te, et inimicum propter te. solus enim nullum 
carum amittit, cui omnes in illo cari, qui non amittitur. et quis est iste nisi deus 
noster, deus, qui fecit caelum et terram et inplet ea, quia inplendo ea fecit ea? te 
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nemo amittit, nisi qui dimittit, et quia dimittit, quo it aut quo fugit nisi a te 
placido ad te iratum?  
But blessed is the man that loves Thee, and his friend in Thee, and his enemy 
for Thee. For he alone loses none that is dear unto him, to whom all are dear, 
in him that can never be lost. And who is this but our God, the God that made 
heaven and earth, and who filleth them, because in filling them he created 
them? Thee, no man loses, but he that lets Thee go.  And he that lets Thee go, 
whither goes he, or whither runs he, but from Thee well pleased, back to 
Thee offended?  (Confessions 4.9, pp. 172-3) 
Augustine’s reduction of his social world, in these lines, to the singular attachment 
to God again evokes the image of a child running to and from the secure base of the 
parent.  Augustine, like a child who stops to reestablish contact with a parent, 
focuses not on the plight or thought of the human but on whether God is pleased or 
displeased.   
 As mentioned above, confessions to God are not communication if God 
already knows their content and the confessor does not communicate for the 
purpose of learning from or changing mind of his interlocutor.  As such, there is no 
role for metarepresentation in a relationship with God.  Like the parent-child 
relationship, the believer is concerned with social referencing—maintaining visual 
contact with the attachment figure and looking for signs of approval or disapproval.  
In addition to this, Augustine’s denial of sovereignty to other human beings, even his 
mother and best friend, makes the activity of metarepresenting the thinking process 
of any other mind nearly pointless. 
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Quid mihi ergo est cum hominibus, ut audiant confessions meas, quasi ipsi 
sanaturi sint omnes languores meos? curiosum genus ad cognoscendam vitam 
alienam, desidiosum ad corrigendam suam.  quid a me quaerunt audire qui sim, 
qui nolunt a te audire qui sint.  
What therefore have I to do with men, that they should hear my confessions, 
as if they would cure all my infirmities?  A curious people to pry into another 
man's life, but slothful enough to amend their own. Why do they desire to 
hear from me what I am, who will not hear from thee what themselves are? 
(Confessions 10.3, II 76-77) 
Augustine seems to have trouble understanding the point of communication.  He 
assumes that, when one individual inquires into the life of another, it must be for the 
purpose of judging or correcting him.  Therefore he responds by claiming that it is 
they, not he, who need correction (corrigendam).  Augustine’s social intelligence is 
aware of the importance of cheater detection, as well as the social imperative that 
one not be identified as a cheater.  But catching and correcting cheaters is hardly the 
only aim of social curiosity.  People often take interest in others as ends in 
themselves, models for behavior, and potential rivals, allies, mates, or kin in need.  
Because social intelligence is an evolved trait, we do not need to know why we take 
such a strong interest in other people’s business.  It is as likely to feel to the nosey 
gossiper like an impulse to knowledge for its own sake. 
 Knowledge for its own sake, for Augustine, is no better than the 
overvaluation of social ties.  In the implicit attachment metaphors above, Augustine 
always priviledges the child who turns toward the parent (God) over the one who 
explores, or turns toward the world.  Just as Paul and Ambrose dismissed the Greeks’ 
208 
 
and Romans’ appreciation for the unknown, Augustine, too, rejects what he calls 
morbus cupiditatis, the “disease of curiosity.” 
Ex hoc morbo cupiditatis in spectaculis exhibentur quaeque miracula.  hinc ad 
perscrutanda naturae, quae praeter nos non est, operata proceditur, quae scire 
nihil prodest et nihil aliud quam scire homines cupiunt.  hinc etiam, si quid 
eodem perversae scientiae fine per artes magicas quaeritur. (10.35, Confessions 
II, 176-7) 
And out of this disease of curiosity are all those strange sights presented unto 
us in the theatre.  Hence also men proceed to investigate some concealed 
powers of that nature which is not beyond our ken, which it does them no 
good to know, and yet men desire to know for the sake of knowing. Hence 
proceeds it also, if with that same end of perverted learning, the magical arts 
be made use of to enquire by.  
As one who prefers the safe haven of attachment to God, Augustine does not 
appreciate the impetus to exploration—the impulse to know for the sake of knowing.  
As Kirkpatrick notes, the attachment system overrides the exploratory impulse 
when a strange situation occurs or prolonged separation causes the child anxiety.  
Though Augustine rarely admits having felt any such separation anxiety in his 
prodigal past, he often claims that he should have felt some similar anxiety.  He also 
asserts that his science-minded contemporaries ought to feel it.  
Per impiam superbiam recedentes, et deficientes a lumine tuo, tanto ante solis 
defectum futurum praevident, et in praesentia suum non vident—non enim 
religiose quaerunt, unde habeant ingenium, quo ista quaerunt—et invenientes, 
quia tu fecisti eos, non ipsi se dant tibi, se, ut serves quod fecisti, et quales se ipsi 
fecerant occidunt se tibi, et trucidant exaltationes suas sicut volatilia, et 
curiositates suas sicut pisces maris, quibus perambulant secretas semitas abyssi.  
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Out of a wicked pride turning back from thee, failing thereby of thy light, they 
foresee an eclipse of the sun so long beforehand, but perceive not their own 
which they suffer in the present. For they enquire not religiously enough 
from whence they are enabled with the wit to seek all this withal: and finding 
that 'tis thou that made them, they resign not themselves up unto thee, that 
thou mayest preserve what thou hast made, nor do they kill in sacrifice unto 
thee, what they have made themselves to be; nor slay their own exalted 
imaginations, like as the fowls of the air; and their own curiosities, like as the 
fishes of the sea, in which they wander over the unknown paths of the 
bottomless pit. (Confessions 5.3, pp. 212-13) 
The folly Augustine perceives is the failure of anxiety and the perpetuation of self-
reliance.  Turning one’s attention toward oneself or to other people or other 
elements of creation on the impulse of one’s curiosity or imagination, in Augustine’s 
view, only distracts the errant individual from the anxiety he aught to feel. 
One of the adolescent transgressions over which Augustine expresses regret 
is his love of epic literature—particularly Virgil’s Aeneid.  Becoming emersed in the 
story of Aeneas and Dido, he recounts that he wept in sympathy with Dido upon her 
separation from Aeneas and subsequent suicide.   
Quid enim miserius misero non miserante se ipsum et flente Didonis mortem, 
quae fiebat amando Aenean, non flente autem mortem suam, quae fiebat non 
amando te, deus.  
For what can be more miserable than a wretch that pities not himself; one 
bemoaning Dido's death, caused by loving of Æneas, and yet not lamenting 
his own death, caused by not loving of thee, O God. (Confessions 1.13, pp. 38-
9) 
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In order to appreciate Dido’s emotion, he had to engage in a level of 
metarepresentation which he does not achieve as an author.  The fact that he is 
ashamed of his ability to do this illustrates the antagonism between his own social 
orientation and the complexities of third and fourth-order intentionality.  He is 
clearly capable of thinking about people thinking about other people, but he seeks to 
discredit the skill altogether.    
Sine me, deus meus, dicere aliquid de ingenio meo, munere tuo, in quibus a me 
deliramentis atterebatur.  proponebatur enim mihi negotium animae meae 
satis inquietum, praemio laudis et dedecoris vel plagarum metu, ut dicerem 
verba Iunonis irascentis et dolentis, quod non possit Italia Teucrorum avertere 
regem: quae numquam Iunonem dixisse audieram, sed figmentorum 
poeticorum vestigia errantes sequi cogebamur, et tale aliquid dicere solutis 
verbis, quale poeta dixisset versibus: et ille dicebat laudabilius, in quo pro 
dignitate adumbratae personae irae ac doloris similior affectus eminebat 
verbis sententias congruenter vestientibus.  Ut quid mihi illud, o vera vita, deus 
meus? Quid mihi recitanti adclamabatur prae multis coaetaneis et 
conlectoribus meis? nonne ecce ilia omnia fumus et ventus?   itane aliud non 
erat, ubi exerceretur ingenium et lingua mea?  laudes tuae, domine, laudes tuae 
per scripturas tuas suspenderent palmitem cordis mei, et non raperetur per 
inania nugarum turpis praeda volatilibus.  non enim uno modo sacrificatur 
transgressoribus angelis.  Quid autem mirum, quod in vanitates ita ferebar, et a 
te, deus meus, ibam foras, quando mihi imitandi proponebantur homines, qui 
aliqua facta sua non mala si cum barbarismo aut soloecismo enuntiarent, 
reprehensi confundebantur; si autem libidines suas integris et rite 
consequentibus verbis copiose ordinateque narrarent, laudati gloriabantur?   
Give me leave, O my God, to tell thee something of mine own wit, which was 
thy gift, and what dotages I spent it upon. My master put a task upon me, 
troublesome enough to my soul, and that upon terms of reward of 
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commendations, or fear of shame and whipping: namely, that I should 
declaim upon those words of Juno, expressing both her anger and sorrow, 
that she could not keep off the Trojan King from going into Italy: which 
words I had heard that Juno never uttered; yet were we enforced to imitate 
the passages of these poetical fictions; and to vary that into prose which the 
poet had expressed in verse. And he declaimed with more applause, in whose 
action, according to the dignity of the person represented, there appeared an 
affection nearer to anger or grief, set out with words agreeable to the matter.  
But to what end was this, O my true Life, my God?  Why was my declamation 
more applauded than so many others of mine own age and form?  Was not all 
this mere smoke and wind.  And could no other subject be found to exercise 
my wit and tongue in?  Thy praises, O Lord, thy praises, might have stayed 
the tender sprig of my heart upon the prop of thy Scriptures, that it might not 
have been cropped off by these empty vanities, to be caught up as a prey by 
those flying spirits.  For by more ways than one is there sacrifice offered to 
the collapsed angels.  But what wonder was it, if I were thus carried towards 
vanity, and estranged from thee, O my God; whenas such men were 
propounded to me to imitate, who should they deliver any of their own acts, 
though not evil, with any barbarism or solecism, they were utterly dashed 
out of countenance: but should they make a copious and neat oration of their 
own lusts, in a round and well followed style, would take a pride to be 
applauded for it.  (Confessions 1.17-18 I 50-53) 
Augustine metarepresents Juno, a pagan goddess, in a way that he does not permit 
himself to metarepresent God.  While he regularly describes God as loving, patient, 
etc., he cannot actually recreate God’s thinking process the way he can with Juno.  
Juno is frustrated.  Being omnipotent, God cannot be frustrated.  He can be 
perpetually loving, understanding, merciful, or any other positive trait because his 
omnipotence removes him from the world of change, conflict, strategy, 
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reconsideration, and desire.  Augustine may attach adjectives to God’s thinking 
process, but this is not representation. He can seek to know God’s will for himself.  
He can wonder, “What does God want me to (want/think/say/know)?”  But his 
mindreading cannot extend to “What does God think I think?” much less, “How do I 
get God to think that I think (x)?”  As such, it is limited to seeking and maintaining 
attachment, exhibiting no more metarepresentation than a child uses to maintain 
attachment with a parent.  If he had access to God’s mind the way he has to Juno’s, 
he would simultaneously elevate his own social status relative to God and bring God 
into a world of social peers rather than a world of creatures.  But the danger in 
acting the role of Juno is not only that he might want to, next, metarepresent God 
and hence lose some of his fear and reverence.  An equal danger lies in the fact that 
weeping for Dido or voicing Juno’s anger creates an emotional bond between 
Augustine and another self.  Though Dido or Juno might be fictional, their stories 
provide enough detail for Augustine to fill in the rest and create a bond which is no 
less real for being imaginary.   
Dunbar’s social brain hypothesis has illustrated that our social intelligence 
works just as well in representing the minds of fictional characters as it does of real 
people who are at some remove.  Fiction and myth emerge from the same cognitive 
systems which collect, synthesize, and spread gossip.  Fiction and myth, like gossip, 
are more interesting when they evoke more emotions.  Stories of conflict are 
intuitively more compelling than stories in which nothing is risked or won.  For this 
reason, the threat Juno poses to the Christian god emerges from the very fact that 
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she is not omnipotent.  She is more like Augustine and, therefore, easier to 
sympathize with. 
Ingeld and Christ 
Like Augustine, Alcuin, Charlemagne’s most esteemed resident scholar, saw a 
dichotomy between interest in secular narrative and devotion to God.  In a letter 
dating from 797 addressed to Speratus (likely Unuuona, Bishop of Leicester 
according to Bullough, 1993), Alcuin reacts to the thought that tales of the legendary 
king Ingeld were being told within ecclesiastical circles.     
Verba Dei legantur in sacerdotali convivio; ibi decet lectorem audiri, non 
citharistam, sermones patrum, non carmina gentilium. Quid Hinieldus cum 
Christo? Angusta est domus; utrosque tenere non poterit. Non vult rex celestic 
cum paganis et perditis nominetenus regibus communionem habere; quia rex 
ille aeternus regnat in caelis, ille paganus perditus plangit in inferno. Voces 
legentium au dire in domibus tuis, non ridentium turbam in plateis.  
Let the words of God be read at the refectory of the priests; there let the 
lector be heard, and not the lyre-player, the sermons of the fathers, not the 
songs of the heathens. What has Ingeld to do with Christ? Narrow is the 
house; it cannot hold both of them. The Heavenly King does not desire to 
have communion with pagan and forgotten kings listed by name; the Eternal 
King reigns in heaven, while the forgotten king laments in hell. The voices of 
readers should be heard in your houses, not the laughing rabble in the 
courtyards.  (Drout 221) 
Though who precisely was telling or hearing stories of Ingeld is in doubt, Alcuin 
draws his distinction in clearly social terms.  There is only one king, “rex celestic,” 
worthy of attention.  All others are “lost” (“perditus,” which Drout translates as 
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“forgotten”).  The implication is that if Christians associate with Ingeld and with God, 
then God is forced to associate with Ingeld.  But since Ingeld did not himself submit 
to God, then he is to be lost or forgotten by Christians.  After dividing the eternal 
king from all others, Alcuin goes on to make a value-laden distinction between the 
voice of a reader and the laughing or babbling of the crowd (“ridentium turbam”).  
Recall that Wulfstan imposed a particular understanding of what pagans aught to 
believe based on the fact that certain books recorded that Mercury was the son of 
Jupiter, “for we have read in books” (“forðan þe we rædað on bocum”).  Like Wulfstan, 
Alcuin privileges the solitary voice of a singular authority who speaks through 
literature rather than the back-and-forth of communication.  In literature, as with 
God, no response is possible.  The book fixes knowledge and the reader must 
conform.  The antithesis of this, the courtyard, like the Areopagus, is an exchange of 
ideas.  One need not believe what he hears, but he may nonetheless entertain 
interest, as the Athenians did with Paul.  Alcuin, like Paul, associates contingent 
belief with ignorance.   
 The fact that Ingeld is a threat indicates that stories connect the listeners to 
the social milieu of the story.  If, as Dunbar has suggested, fiction excites the brain 
systems that evolved for monitoring our actual social network, we may understand 
why Alcuin found Ingeld to be such a threat.  The Christians Alcuin scolds, while 
showing no actual disrespect to God or their church superiors, were maintaining a 
type of fictive kinship with out-group (non-Christian) individuals.  By entertaining 
the stories of non-Christians, the individual fleshes out a fuller picture of another 
human being.  The imagined other need not have the same desires as the individual 
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who metarepresents those desires in order to evoke empathy.  This is the 
phenomenon Augustine identified when he commented that actors, even when they 
express sinful desires of their characters, are applauded for the power of their 
empathy.  Ingeld and Juno, like Radbod’s ancestors and Augstine’s family and friends, 
threaten to disrupt the monotheist’s devotion to God because they engage the social 
intelligence—the cognitive mechanisms which attempt to read the minds of our 
peers through metarepresentation.  This social intelligence does not require 
conscious focus.  When it is engaged, it dampens the attachment schema.  
Reduction of Social Relations 
If, as I argue, monotheism depends for its salience on the attachment system, 
and if the engagement of social intelligence disengages and redirects the individual’s 
focus from dependence to comprehension and self-reliance, we might expect to see 
monotheistic literature attempting to sever social ties—converting or turning the 
individual away from multiple social bonds and toward the solitary bond to God.  
While Judeo-Christian literature is full of references to God as a father and fellow 
Christians as brothers and sisters, it frequently advocates the reduction of 
interpersonal bonds even within the family.  Jesus says in Matthew 10:37 “Anyone 
who loves his father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; anyone who loves 
his son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me.”  In an analogous passage, 
Luke 14:26, he says, “If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and mother, 
his wife and children, his brothers and sisters—yes, even his own life—he cannot be 
my disciple.”  The correspondence between these two passages locates it with the 
range of the Q text, a likely source for both Luke and Matthew consisting of sayings 
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of Jesus, which was subsequently lost.  This at least argues that the passage emerged 
quite early in the Christian movement.   
While this division of familial relations might seem harsh, it is a key reason 
that monotheism works to ensure cooperation among non-genetic kin.  We do not 
need religion to empathize and share resources with our biological kin or with 
community members who reciprocate our altruism.  However, where people do not 
personally know the majority of their fellow group members, they will be unlikely to 
cooperate with those they do not know, especially in zero-sum interactions where 
they must choose between benefitting themselves and their kin or benefitting 
strangers.  Cognitive psychologists Scott Atran and Ara Norenzayan explain: “One 
evolutionary problem with religion is explaining how and why biologically 
unrelated individuals come to sacrifice their own immediate material interests to 
form genetically incoherent relationships under an imagined permanent and 
immaterial authority” (716).  For a social organization to function as well as a small 
band comprised mostly of genetic kin, it has to remove the genetic kin and reallocate 
the individual’s loyalties.  “These culturally contrived cell loyalties mimic and (at 
least temporarily) override genetically based fidelities to family kin while securing 
belief in sacrifice to a larger group cause” (Atran & Norenzayan, 716).  This 
functions to replace actual kin with what Rudolf Nesse has dubbed fictive kin.  
For religion to work at a level of population too large for the monitoring (via 
metarepresentation) of every individual with whom one must cooperate, every 
individual must demonstrate a level of commitment to the group.  In the case of 
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monotheism, commitment to the group does not have to be understood as a 
commitment to the group.  As noted above, Augustine asserts that Christians are to 
love each other, not for each other’s sake, but for God’s sake.  This is a commitment 
to the group, even if it’s not understood that way by the individual.  God acts as a 
stand-in for the group.  If one Christian sees another Christian expressing absolute 
submission to God’s will, she can more easily trust him than she could another 
individual who is obviously engaged in social (e.g. Machiavellian) intelligence.  
Nesse explains: 
It is difficult to create committed relationships, one by one. You never know 
if the other person will live up to the commitment. But if you are a member of 
a group, and if everyone in the group makes sacred vows to follow certain 
rules, especially rules to help each other when there is no hope of reward, 
and if they monitor each other to be sure that all are following the rules, this 
can create a community of believers. This may explain why it is so important 
that belief be based, as Kierkegaard emphasized, on faith itself, and not on 
reasons. Communities of believers are networks of fictive kin that can 
provide huge benefits for their members. (3) 
Reasoning, like social intelligence, evolved for the promotion of self and kin (Mercier 
& Sperber).  Consequently, it does not inspire trust.  Likewise, a promise of 
commitment cannot be taken by itself.  Not only might someone deliberately lie, but, 
as illustrated in cases of confabulation, we are not always aware that we are 
formulating our thoughts and identities for social approval rather than for the 
communication of truth.  We might be genuine in promising commitment but be 
unable to foresee a conflicting commitment interfering with the reciprocation of 
another’s aid.  Nesse explains: 
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There are inherent problems and paradoxes in commitment strategies. First, 
it is always tempting to promise more than can be delivered. Some excess 
solidifies the commitment, but more arouses skepticism and testing. Second, 
so many benefits come from having committed friends, that people are eager 
to create such relationships. Soon, there are too many to make good on each 
commitment, or one finds oneself in a triangle, committed to helping two 
people who are fighting. Some commitments, especially marriage and 
political alliances, are defined, in part, by prohibition of other commitments. 
(4) 
Prohibiting other commitments from the outset serves as the surest method of 
ensuring an individual’s commitment, even if the other commitments would not 
actually cause conflict.  Monotheism, qua monotheism, excels other forms of religion 
in its rigid limiting of individual commitments to real and imagined kin.  The fact 
that such limits apply not only to other gods but to other individuals, real and 
imagined, is evidenced by the decision of Radbod, and Augustine’s rejection of Dido 
as well as Juno. Nesse comments on the reorientation of familial attachment in 
religion: 
This may explain why religious fervor is responsible for so much good in the 
world.  Paradoxically, this same capacity for subjective commitment may 
explain why religions have also been responsible for so much evil, whether in 
the form of crusades against out-group members, or drastic enforcement of 
conformity within the ranks. (4) 
By converting the ties that bind an individual to kin and community, religious 
orthodoxy also exploits the tendency to be hostile to outsiders.  Normally, the 
division between insider and outsider remains contigent upon appraisal of 
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individual outsiders who could potentially become allies, trading partners, or mates.  
However, if the only permissible relationship is with God, and all others are either 
brothers through Christ or damned heathens, there is no reason even to appraise 
those outside of the centralized group.  Without this check, the predisposition to the 
two evils Nesse mentions, crusades and drastic conformity, become a dominant 
characteristic.   
Herem  
The Hebrew bible sets an unequivocal precedent for the expansion of the 
faith and the elimination of potential human or divine ties.  Yahweh instructs the 
Hebrews on the proper way to invade and subjugate a country: 
Take care not to make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land to which 
you are going, or it will become a snare among you. You shall tear down their 
altars, break their pillars, and cut down their sacred poles (for you shall 
worship no other god, because the LORD, whose name is Jealous, is a jealous 
God). You shall not make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land, for 
when they prostitute themselves to their gods and sacrifice to their gods, 
someone among them will invite you, and you will eat of the sacrifice. And 
you will take wives from among their daughters for your sons, and their 
daughters who prostitute themselves to their gods will make your sons also 
prostitute themselves to their gods. (Exodus 34:12-16) 
The prohibition against a covenant with the land’s native inhabitants is based on the 
fact that they could act as intermediaries between their own gods and the Hebrews.  
The use of imagery from sexual unions (“jealous God,” “they prostitute themselves 
to their gods”) confirms Nesse’s comparison to marriage and political alliances 
which prohibit other commitments.  That is to say that these commitments are zero-
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sum.  In this schema, an individual is like a consumable good.  Only one god can 
possess the individual.  The fact that this schema is not shared by polytheistic 
societies is viewed as prostitution by the biblical author.  Deutoronomy mirrors the 
passage from Exodus and incorporates the turning metaphor that will later be 
adopted by Augustine. 
When the LORD your God brings you into the land that you are about to enter 
and occupy, and he clears away many nations before you--the Hittites, the 
Girgashites, the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the 
Jebusites, seven nations mightier and more numerous than you--and when 
the LORD your God gives them over to you and you defeat them, then you 
must utterly destroy them. Make no covenant with them and show them no 
mercy. Do not intermarry with them, giving your daughters to their sons or 
taking their daughters for your sons, for that would turn away your children 
from following me, to serve other gods. Then the anger of the LORD would be 
kindled against you, and he would destroy you quickly. But this is how you 
must deal with them: break down their altars, smash their pillars, hew down 
their sacred poles, and burn their idols with fire. (Deuteronomy 7:1-5, my 
emphasis) 
As in the case of Boniface’s destruction of the Jupiter’s Oak and Ambrose’s removal 
of the Altar of Victory from the Curia, the strategy in Exodus and Deuteronomy 
focuses on the destruction of sites sacred to other gods. 
But as for the towns of these peoples that the LORD your God is giving you as 
an inheritance, you must not let anything that breathes remain alive. You 
shall annihilate them--the Hittites and the Amorites, the Canaanites and the 
Perizzites, the Hivites and the Jebusites--just as the LORD your God has 
commanded, so that they may not teach you to do all the abhorrent things 
that they do for their gods, and you thus sin against the LORD your God. 
(Deuteronomy 20:10-20)    
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The author does not mention what, exactly, is abhorrent about things these people 
do for their gods.  The only reason he gives for the prohibition is that it would 
constitute a sin against God.  We may invert Socrates’ question to Euthyphro to ask 
whether a thing is sinful in itself or if it is the arbitrary judgment of God that makes 
it sinful.  To call God’s will arbitrary might seem unusual in a monotheistic context.  
It makes explicit the anthropomorphism of Yahweh, which Kaufmann argues is 
antithetical to his nature.  However, these verses establishe the doctrine of herem, 
the belief that a commitment to Yahweh is threatened by any other commitment to 
the extent that non-Yahwehists must be annihilated before they are allowed to 
communicate.  It is important to note that the action called for is not merely 
abstinence from these polytheistic practices.  It commands the annihilation of the 
entire people based on the possibility that (1) they might teach the Hebrews their 
own practices and (2) that the Hebrews would actually do it.  Even learning of such 
practices is enough to warrant genocide, as if Hebrews could not abstain from 
practicing what they learned in the event they communicated with the Hittites or 
other foreigners.  This logic employs a contagion metaphor.  The Hebrews are in 
danger of being infected by the beliefs of foreigners.  It is as if, once infected, they 
would not have the ability to withdraw from idol worship.  We should not overlook 
the openness and potential syncretism that is revealed by this prohibition.  The 
prohibition would be unnecessary if there were not a persistent curiosity on the 
part of the people as to the beliefs of others—at least it would not need to be 
repeated so frequently.  However, syncretism is the target of this censure.  The 
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people, edifices, and practices that must be destroyed are targeted because they are 
so promising to the open social intelligence.   
Charlemagne and the Saxons 
Though remote in place and time, the fusion of political and religious group 
identification functioned similarly through the imperial and missionary 
expansionism of Christian Roman (Freeman, 2005, 2010) and Carolingian emperors.   
Though celebrated as a civilizing influence on medieval Northern Europe, 
Charlemagne, the patron of Boniface and Alcuin, practiced the same policy of 
genocide called for in Exodus and Deuteronomy.  His war against the Saxons of the 
770s-80s, while clearly a war of political conquest, was consistently bolstered in its 
relentlessness and severity by the drive to convert polytheists to Christianity, 
leading eventually to the 782 Massacre of Verden in which he ordered the execution 
of 4,500 Saxon captives who would not convert to Christianity.  Richard Fletcher 
comments, “As wars of Christians against barbarians who were also pagans, they 
had from the outset a religious tinge.  It was, after all, on his very first Saxon 
campaign in 772 that Charlemagne destroyed the heathen sanctuary of the Irminsul 
or ‘World Tree’”(213).  The Irminsul was either a pillar or a tree that seems to have 
been connected to a pole cults that appeared in Europe in the late Bronze Age 
(Simek, 176).   
After subduing Saxons by force, Charlemagne’s army would oversee their 
forced baptism en masse.  The Saxon Capitulary (or Capitulary of Paderborn) 
records the laws imposed to enforce commitment.  Refusal of baptism became a 
223 
 
capital offence, along with eating meat during Lent, cremating the dead, or 
participating in rituals deemed to be pagan.  Other laws enforced tithes, infant 
baptism, churchyard burial, cessation of business on Sundays and feast days, and the 
provision of churches with local land and slaves.  Richard Fletcher observes: 
It was not simply that the sanctions were of an extreme harshness.  It was 
also that the measures to be adopted in Christianization would destablilize 
and dislocate the social texture of Saxon life at the most intimate levels of 
family existence, touching birth, marriage and death. . . . It seems reasonable 
to infer that this tearing apart of Saxon society was deliberately intended, 
and that the measures were framed by persons who knew how to inflict the 
maximum damage (216). 
The conversion forced upon the Saxons was the same that had been proffered to 
Radbod a generation earlier.  The presence of God was being inserted into a close-
knit social network, and the Saxons were expected to connect to each other not as 
autonomous individuals, but through God (i.e. through the church and imperial 
authorities).  
Fletcher notes, “It is fairly clear that Charles and his advisers misjudged the 
Saxon potential for resistance both to the Franks and to Christianity”(214).  Like 
Radbod, the Saxon’s refusal of Christianity rested not on a commitment to one or 
several gods, but on a model of contingent social interaction with political as well as 
supernatural powers.  Robert Bartlett notes: 
There are numerous cases where conversion and the imposition of a newly 
powerful monarchy are associated and, conversely, instances where 
paganism and decentralized rule seem to belong together, one of the most 
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celebrated being that of the pagan Saxons, who had no kings and decided 
matters in local assemblies in the period before Frankish conquest brought 
them monarchy, a comital system and Christianity. The Saxon rising of 841–2 
pitted the Saxon freemen and freedmen against the new class of lords, and 
one of their aims was to re-establish ‘the law that they had had in the time 
when they were worshippers of idols’; they wished to expel the lords and 
‘each man to live by the law he wished, in the old style’. Paganism and a 
popular constitution are here explicitly connected. (66) 
The Saxon’s local assembly and the egalitarianism it expresses seems to have posed 
as great a challenge to imperial subjugation as any specifically religious 
commitments.  This makes sense if we see Charlemagne’s centralized imperial 
hierarchy as originating from the same cognitive model as the centralized 
cosmology as Christianity.  The Saxons weren’t rejecting God any more than they 
might reject the advice of member of the local assembly.  They were exerting a 
reverse dominance hierarchy against a god and a Frank who both sought to elevate 
themselves at the expense of all others.   
Conversely, incipient chiefdoms seem to have been easier prey for 
assimilation, as they already had a chief who at least maintained control of 
resources and the alliance of the warrior caste.  Bede transcribes a letter from Pope 
Gregory to the recently converted King Ethelbert: 
Et ideo, gloriose fili, eam quam accepisti divinitus gratiam, solicita 
mente custodi, Christianam fidem in populis tibi subditis extendere 
festina, zelum rectitudinis tuae in eorum conversione multiplica, 
idolorum cultus insequere, fanorum aedificia everte.  
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Therefore, my illustrious son, zealously foster the grace that God has 
given you, and press on with the task of extending the Christian Faith 
among the people committed to your charge.  Make their conversion 
your first concern; suppress the worship of idols, and destroy their 
shrines.  (HE 1.32, pp. 168-71) 
In these passages, Gregory reveals the engine of conversion: incorporate the chief 
into the religio-political hierarchy and then use his political and military status to 
destroy all alternatives.  In doing so, he reveals his own view of the king as his 
subordinate, “gloriose fili,” “my glorious son.”  The pope goes on to ensure the king’s 
subordination to Augustine of Canterbury. 
Reverentissimus frater noster Augustinus episcopus, in monasterii 
regula edoctus, sacrae Scripturae scientia repletus, bonis auctore Deo 
operibus praeditus, quaeque vos ammonet, audita, devote peragite, 
studiose in memoria reservate : quia si vos eum in eo quod pro 
omnipotente Domino loquitur, auditis, isdem omnipotens Deus hunc pro 
vobis exorantem celerius exaudit. Si enim, quod absit, verba eius 
postponitis, quando eum omnipotens Deus poterit audire pro vobis, 
quem vos negligitis audire pro Deo?  
Our most reverend brother Bishop Augustine has been trained under 
monastic Rule, has a complete knowledge of holy scripture, and, by 
the grace of God, is a man of holy life.  Therefore I beg you to listen to 
his advice ungrudgingly, follow it exactly and store it carefully in your 
memory; for if you listen to him when he speaks in God’s name, God 
himself will listen more readily to the prayers he utters on your behalf.  
But if you ignore his advice, God forbid, and disregard him when he 
speaks for God, how should God pay attention when he speaks for 
you?  (HE 1.32, pp. 170-3) 
Gregory is explicit that Ethelbert’s submission to God requires his submission to 
both Augustine and Gregory himself.   
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Assuming a similar subordination of king to church, Bede tells the story of 
the Christian King Oswy, who, according to Bede, was an innocent man slain through 
treachery.  Despite this, Bede asserts that his death was deserved because he did not 
follow the command of a bishop in one particular matter. 
Contigit ipsum regem instigante omnium bonorum inimico, propinquorum 
suorum manu interfici. Erant autem duo germani fratres qui hoc facinus 
patrarunt qui cum interrogarentur quare hoc facerent, nil aliud respondere 
potuerunt, nisi ob hoc se iratos fuisse et inimicos regi, quod ille nimium suis 
parcere soleret inimicis, et factas ab eis iniurias mox obsecrantibus placida 
mente dimitteret. Talis erat culpa regis pro qua occideretur, quod evangelica 
praecepta devoto corde servaret: in qua tamen eius morte innoxia, iuxta 
praedictum viri Dei, vera est eius culpapunita. Habuerat enim unus ex his, qui 
eum occi-derunt comitibus, inlicitum coniiigium, quod cum episcopus prohibere 
et corrigere non posset, excommunicavit eum, atque omnibus qui se audire 
vellent praecepit ne domum eius intraret neque de cibis illius acciperent. 
Contempsit autem rex praeceptum, et rogatus a comite, Intravit epulaturus 
domum eius: qui cum abiisset, obviavit ei antistes. At rex intuens eum, raox 
tremefactus desiluit equo, ceciditque ante pedes eius, veniam reatus postulans.  
Nam et episcopus pariter desiluit: sederat enim et ipse in equo. Iratus autem 
tetigit regem iacentem virga quam tenebat manu, et pontifical! auctoritate 
protestatus: "Dico tibi," inquit," quia noluisti te continere a domo perditi et 
damnati illius, tu in ipsa domo mori habes.” 
It fell out that, by the instinct of the enemy of all good, the king was himself 
murdered by the hands of his own alliance. Now the executors of this heinous 
act were two brothers german; who, being examined upon what motion they 
committed this act, were able to answer nothing else save that they were 
angered with the king and made his enemies for this cause, that he was wont 
to shew overmuch clemency to his enemies and meekly to let be offences 
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done by them, when presently they entreated him. Such was the fault of the 
king, for which he was murdered, because with a devout heart he observed 
the commandments of the Gospel: his guiltless death nevertheless, a true 
fault of his was punished, according as the man of God had foretold him. For 
one of these retainers who murdered him had lived in unlawful wedlock, and 
when the bishop was not able to let or amend it, he excommunicated him and 
commanded all that should be ready to hear him, not to enter that offender's 
house or partake of his meat. But the king set at nought the sentence of the 
bishop, and when invited by the retainer, entered his house to feast there: 
and after departing therefrom he met with the bishop. Thereon the king 
looking upon him, by and by being much afeared, lighted off from his horse 
and fell down before the bishop's feet, asking pardon for his offence. For the 
bishop too lighted off his horse at the same time as the king for he was 
himself too on horseback. But in anger he touched the king, as he lay on the 
ground, with the rod he held in his hand and protested unto him with 
bishoply authority, saying: "I tell thee, because thou wouldest not refrain 
from the house of that wicked and damnable person, thou hast to die in that 
very house.  (HE 322; pp. 438-41). 
Though we may note that Bede does not expect Oswy to show the same sort of 
intimate connection to God expressed by Augustine, he resembles Augustine in his 
disregard for the actual social interactions in the matter.  He praises Oswy for the 
forgiveness which his murderer cites as a reason for the murder.  Bede says that 
when Oswy showed clemency to his enemies, it was “with a devout heart he 
observed the commandments of the Gospel.”  However, when he forgives the man 
whom the bishop commands him to exile, Bede takes this for a crime which 
warranted his death.  This last offense differed only in the fact that he disobeyed the 
bishop and, presumably, disobeyed God. 
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Olaf Tryggvason  
If Christianity reserves the pinnacle of its social hierarchy for God alone, it 
creates many subordinate offices which are nonetheless superior to the majority of 
the population.  By converting Ethelbert, Augustine of Canterbury placed the king 
below himself in the chain of command—as Ambrose did to Theodosius, and Oswy’s 
bishop expected to do.  As a social strategy, this is the same ploy Dumnorix used to 
exalt himself over his egalitarian council when he allied himself with Julius Caesar.  
By demonstrating commitment to God, the only commitment validated in the 
centralized social order of a monotheistic society, a king could become rather 
ruthless with those to whom he was not bound in Christ.   
In his Heimskringla, Snorri Sturlusson describes King Olaf Trygvason’s 
mission to convert Scandinavia to Christianity by a strategy that the author of 
Exodus would approve.  Olaf, having a long career as a Viking before his conversion 
to Christianity, was not only not pacified by conversion, but, through it, progressed 
from pillage to conquest and religious genocide.  He made his first convert, Jarl 
Sigurd Lodverson of Orkney by the ultimatum of conversion or death.  “They had not 
talked long before the king said that the jarl and all his folk should become Christian, 
otherwise he should die forthwith; the king said he would go with fire and sword 
over the isles and waste the land if the folk would not take up Christianity” (Ch. 47, p. 
153; similarly reported in Orkneyinga saga, ch. 12, p. 37).  To ensure conversion, 
Olaf took Sigurd’s son as a hostage.  After having Haakon Sigurdsson, king of Norway, 
murdered, Olaf took the throne and began a campaign of religious conquest.  His 
typical strategy consisted of calling a thing (diplomatic convocation of earls), 
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arriving with an army, and threatening to kill any who did not convert.  Snorri tells 
us that Olaf “bade all men take up Christianity, and those who spoke against it he 
dealt with hard; some he slew, some he maimed and some he drove away from the 
land” (Ch. 53, p. 159, following the same strategy in chapters 54, 55, 59, 62, 65).  The 
local chiefs, who by custom came to the thing unarmed, were left with no alternative.  
Olaf would then destroy pagan temples such as that at Lade, taking all of its treasure 
for himself.  When word of these tactics spread, subsequent locals formed coalitions 
and arrived at Olaf’s thing armed, which “turned this bidding to the thing into an 
arrow of war meeting . . . and when the king came to the thing, the body of bonders 
were come there fully weaponed.”  Unable to enforce Christianization through 
intimidation, Olaf resorted to treachery, saying:  
“I wish that we shall be friends again, as we have formerly agreed between 
ourselves.  I will go there where ye have your greatest offering and see your 
worship. Then shall we all take counsel about what worship we shall have 
and we shall all be as one about it.”  And when the king spoke mildly to the 
bonders, they were softened in their minds and all their talk was reasonable 
and peaceful. (ch 65, p. 168)   
Meeting with the chiefs at the observance of summer solstice, Olaf arrives with an 
army of thirty ships.  Addressing the pagans he was unable to convert when their 
army outnumbered his own, he now changed the story to say: 
We held a thing in Frosta and I bade the bonders let themselves be baptized; 
but they bade me turn myself to sacrificing with them, just as King Hacon the 
foster-son of Athelstan had done.  Then we came to an agreement between 
ourselves to meet at Mæren and there make a great offering.  But if I turn to 
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the offering with you, then I will have you make the greatest sacrifice that can 
ever be made, and sacrifice men. (Ch. 67, p. 169) 
The men he proposes to sacrifice are the unconverted chieftains themselves.  
Outnumbered, the chiefs capitulate.  One of them, named Iron-Skeggi, attempts to 
reason with Olaf to take a syncretistic approach.  Olaf feigns diplomacy and 
accompanies the chiefs to the pagan temple.   
King Olav now went into the temple with a few of his men and a few of the 
bonders, and when he came thither where the gods were, he saw Thor sitting 
there, the most honoured of all the gods and adorned with gold and silver.  
King Olav then heaved up a gold-chased spike-axe that he had in his hand and 
struck Thor so that he fell from his place.  The king’s men leaped up and 
thrust down all the gods from their places; and whilst the king was in the 
temple Iron-Skeggi was slain outside the temple door.  The king’s men did it.  
When the king came out to his men, he bade the bonders choose between 
two things: one was that they should all take up Christianity, and the other 
was that they should hold battle with him. . . . King Olav had all the folk who 
were there baptized, and took hostages of the bonders that they should hold 
to Christianity.  After that, King Olav let his men go round all the folk districts 
in Trondheim; no man spoke against Christianity and all the folk in Trondlaw 
were baptized. (Ch. 69, p. 170)  
To add insult to injury, Olaf took Iron-Skeggi’s daughter and forced her to wed him.   
 In Tunsberg, Olaf arranged for a feast to host pagan priests, including Eyvind 
Kelda, the grandson of King Harald Fairhair.  “King Olav had all these men gathered 
in a room and had it all well laid out; he made a great feast for them and gave them 
strong drink; and when they were drunk Olav had the place set on fire and burned it 
and all of the folk who where therein,” (Ch. 62, p. 165-6).  His tactics for coercive 
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Christianization were carried to Iceland when he sent the Saxon priest Tangbrand to 
convert the Icelanders.  In his two-year mission, Tangbrand murdered three men 
who insulted him, (171).  Njal’s saga records that Tangbrand and Olaf laid the 
groundwork for a violent clash between Christians and pagans at the Icelandic thing, 
which was only averted when the Lawspeaker, Thorgeir Tjorvisson, was bribed into 
making Christianity the law.  “The heathens thought they had been grossly 
defrauded.  Nevertheless, the new faith became law, and all people in the land 
became Christians” (Njal’s saga, ch. 105, p. 212). 
Olaf’s contempt for non-Christians extended to his personal life, as well.  He 
pursued Queen Sigrid “Strong-mind” of Sweden by sending her what he alleged to 
be a ring seized from the razed pagan temple at Lade.  However, the ring proved to 
be a forgery.  Though Sigrid agreed to discuss Olav’s proposal, she would not 
convert to Christianity.  “Then King Olav said that Sigrid should be baptized and take 
the true faith.  She answered, ‘I will not go from the faith I have had before, and my 
kinsmen before me.  I will not say anything against thee if thou believe in the god 
that pleases thee.’” (Heimskringla 163-5).  Olaf and Sigrid both exhibit the degree of 
openness of their respective religions.  Though Sigrid is open to marriage to a 
believer of another god, she regards her own religious identity as an affiliation with 
her ancestors.  Olaf, however, is indignant.  “King Olav was very wroth and 
answered hastily, ‘Why should I wed thee, thou heathen bitch?’ and he struck her in 
the face with the glove that he was holding in his hand.”  In Olaf’s social schema, 
marriage would not be enough to tie him to Sigrid.  As with Augustine’s dictum, Olaf 
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can only relate to another through God.  If Sigrid has no connection to God, Olaf 
cannot connect to her directly.   
Olaf’s career ended with his death in 1000, within a decade of the production 
of the Beowulf manuscript.  In his zeal to force converts to Christianity at spear point, 
Olaf rivaled Charlemagne.  In his quest to destroy non-Christian holy sites, he 
exceeded Boniface.  In his rejection of social ties to “heathens,” he followed the 
model of Augustine.  Ironically, Olaf was despised by Anglo-Saxons as a Danish 
heathen.  Since the mid 800s, Danish and Norwegian Vikings (generally referred to 
by the Anglo-Saxons simply as Danes) had raided coastal villages and monasteries of 
England.  In 991, King Æthelred’s ealdorman, Byrhtnoth, was defeated by a band of 
Vikings at Moldon, and soon afterwards became a folk hero embodying English 
resistance to the “Danes” (Wilcox, 81).  After this defeat, Æthelred attempted to pay 
for a cessation of raiding with tributes that the English referred to as danegeld.    
St. Brice's Day  
Eventually, in 1002, reacting to an alleged plot against him, Æthelred ordered 
the massacre of all Danes within his realm.  The Anglo-Saxon chronicle describes the 
event: 
7 on ðam geare se cyng het ofslean ealle ða Deniscan men þe on Angelcynne 
wæron on Bricius messedæg. forþon þam cynge wæs gecydd þæt hi woldon hine 
besyrewian æt his life. 7 syððan ealle his witan. 7 habban syþðan his rice. 
And in that year the king commanded that all the Danish men among the 
English race be slain on Brice’s mass day because the king had been alerted 
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that they plotted against his life and all his councillors, and would seize his 
kingdom afterwards. (Wilcox, 79) 
In 1004, Æthelred issued a charter for the reconstruction of a church at the 
monastery of St. Frideswide in Oxford.  The charter describes the events which, two 
years prior, following Æthelred’s order for the extermination of the Danes, involved 
a group of Danish residents of Oxford fleeing from militant townspeople and into a 
church.  As Wilcox notes, lawcodes dating from before Æthelred had guaranteed 
sanctuary within churches.  However, as the charter notes, the English burned their 
own church in order to kill the Danes inside. 
Omnibus enim in hac patria degentibus satis constat fore notissimum quoniam 
dum a me decretum cum consilio optimatum satrapumque meorum exiuit vt 
cuncti Dani, qui in hac insula velut lollium inter triticum pululando emerserant, 
iustissima exinanitione necarentur, hocque decretum morte tenus ad effectum 
perduceretur, ipsi qui in prefata vrbe morabantur Dani, mortem euadere 
nitentes, hoc Xpi sacrarium, fractis per vim valuis ac pessulis, intrantes asilum 
sibi repugnaculumque contra vrbanos suburbanosque inibi fieri decreuerunt, 
set cum populus omnis insequens, necessitate compulsus, eos eiicere niteretur 
nec valeret, igne tabulis iniecto, hanc Ecclesiam, vt liquet, cum ornamentis ac 
libris combusserunt.  
For it is fully agreed that to all dwelling in this country it will be well known 
that, since a decree was sent out by me with the counsel of my leading men 
and magnates, to the effect that all the Danes who had sprung up in this 
island, like cockle amongst the wheat, were to be destroyed by a most just 
extermination, and this decree was to be put into effect even as far as death, 
those Danes who dwelt in the afore-mentioned town [Oxford], striving to 
escape death, entered this sanctuary of Christ, having broken by force the 
doors and bolts, and resolved to make a refuge and defence for themselves 
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therein against the people of the town and suburbs; but when all the people 
in pursuit strove, forced by necessity, to drive them out, and could not, they 
set fire to the planks and burnt, as it seems, this church with its ornaments 
and its books.  (trans. Wilcox  80) 
Æthelred compares the Danes to “cockle amongst wheat,” an allusion to the Parable 
of the Tares in Matthew 13: 24-30. 
The kingdom of heaven is like a man who sowed good seed in his field. But 
while everyone was sleeping, his enemy came and sowed weeds among the 
wheat, and went away.  When the wheat sprouted and formed heads, then 
the weeds also appeared. The owner’s servants came to him and said, “Sir, 
didn’t you sow good seed in your field? Where then did the weeds come 
from?” “An enemy did this,’ he replied. The servants asked him, “Do you want 
us to go and pull them up?” “No,” he answered, “because while you are 
pulling the weeds, you may root up the wheat with them. Let both grow 
together until the harvest. At that time I will tell the harvesters: First collect 
the weeds and tie them in bundles to be burned; then gather the wheat and 
bring it into my barn.”  
When pressed for an explanation of the parable, Jesus responds: 
The one who sowed the good seed is the Son of Man. The field is the world, 
and the good seed stands for the sons of the kingdom. The weeds are the sons 
of the evil one, and the enemy who sows them is the devil. The harvest is the 
end of the age, and the harvesters are angels. As the weeds are pulled up and 
burned in the fire, so it will be at the end of the age. The Son of Man will send 
out his angels, and they will weed out of his kingdom everything that causes 
sin and all who do evil. They will throw them into the fiery furnace, where 
there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth. Then the righteous will shine 
like the sun in the kingdom of their Father.    
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In the parable as well as in Æthelred’s application of it, both the wheat and the 
cockles represent people.  The metaphor removes human agency as a factor in the 
selection of the saved and the damned.  They are judged by their origin.  In the 
metaphor, there is nothing either wheat or cockles can do to effect their 
categorization.  Æthelred does not seem concerned that the Danes who died at 
Oxford were not Viking raiders.  They share a common origin.  Their association 
with the cockles in the parable also implies that they were pagan, as least as far as 
the English were concerned.  They were not put in place by God (or perhaps 
Æthelred saw himself in the place of the sower of wheat), so, therefore, they must 
have been planted by the devil.   
 Cockles are genetically kin to domesticated wheat, so they naturally spread 
anywhere wheat grows.  However, the parable inserts a more sinister agent behind 
the spread of the cockles.  While it is causally unnecessary, the insertion of an enemy 
agent functions turns a natural phenomenon into a perceived attack.  The only 
actual difference between the cockles and the wheat is the desirability of each to the 
owner of the field.  The wheat grows at his will and for his use.  The incursion of a 
malicious agent evokes a host of cognitive predispositions which incline people 
toward group-based prejudice and obedience to authoritarianism to an extent they 
would otherwise resist.  In their survey of studies in psychological authoritarianism 
and cultural conservatism, John T. Jost, Jack Glaser, Arie Kruglanski, and Frank 
Sulloway (2003) found a wealth of evidence that individuals who were confronted 
with imagery of personal loss and death were significantly more likely feel 
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suspicious of non-group members, people who they perceived as different, and 
group members who sympathized with non-group members. 
Mortality salience leads people to defend culturally valued norms and 
practices to a stronger degree and to distance themselves from, and even to 
derogate, out-group members to a greater extent.  In addition, the fear of 
death has been linked to system-justifying forms of stereotyping. . . . 
Mortality salience has also been shown to evoke greater punitiveness, and 
even aggression, toward those who violate cultural values (Jost et al, 2003, 
364). 
Whether the Danes in Oxford actually posed a threat or not matters less once they 
have been associated with the devil and with a plot to murder the king.  Moreover, 
Jost et al observe, “There is by now substantial archival research suggesting that 
during times of societal crisis, people are more likely to turn to authoritarian leaders 
and institutions for security, stability, and structure” (365).  Not only does 
Æthelred’s evocation of the devil and plotting Danes make his English subjects more 
hostile to out-group members, it also makes them look to him for security.   
The effect of fear on group identity and submission to authority resembles, 
and likely originates in the brain’s attachment system.  Recall that one of the ways 
Mary Ainsworth created the strange situation which sent a child crying for his 
mother was merely by approaching the child herself, when he was separated from 
his attachment figure.  The introduction of an unknown person, especially one larger 
than the child, creates separation anxiety.  Recall also that Augustine criticized 
contemporary scientists for the fact that they focused on learning about and 
navigating the world on their own understanding and agency rather than feeling the 
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anxiety of immanent damnation.  The introduction of fear bolsters both religious 
and group commitment.  As discussed above, monotheism helps to disengage 
antiauthoritarianism by allowing the actual authorities to show subordination and 
defer the origins of their actions to God.  The inclusion of a threat in an otherwise 
ambiguous event would then help to cement that authority structure and individual 
group commitment. 
Hrothgar’s Sermon II: Mind as Fiefdom, Self as Vassal  
With the Parable of the Tares in mind, we may return to the second half of 
Hrothgar’s “sermon,” which began with a warning to Beowulf not to become like 
Heremod.  Hrothgar explains: 
Iċ þis ġid be þē 
āwræc wintrum frōd.       Wundor is tō secganṇẹ 
hū mihtiġ god        manna cynne 
þurh sīdne sefan        snyttru bryttað, 
eard ond eorlscipe;       hē āh ealra ġeweald. 
Hwīlum hē on lufan        lǣteð hworfan 
monnes mōdġeþonc        mǣran cynnes, 
seleð him on ēþle        eorþan wynne 
tō healdanne,       hlēoburh wera, 
ġedēð him swā ġewealdẹne        worolde dǣlas, 
sīde rīċe,       þæt hē his selfa ne mæġ 
for his unsnyttrum        ende ġeþenċean. 
Wuna(ð) hē on wiste;        nō hine wiht dweleð 
ādl nē yldo,         nē him inwitsorh 
on sefa(n) sweorceð,       nē ġesacu ōhwǣr 
ecghete eoweð,       ac him eal worold 
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wendeð on willan        hē þæt wyrse ne con. 
It is a wonder to say how mighty god to the race of man through ample spirit 
deals out wisdom, land and title; he holds all power.  Sometimes he permits 
the mind’s thought of a man of great family to wander, gives him joys to hold 
in his homeland, a stronghold of men, makes broad regions of the earth 
subject to him, a great kingdom, that he himself cannot see an end to it, in his 
foolishness. He dwells in opulence, not the least hindered by illness or old 
age or sorrows, in darkened awareness, nor anywhere does enmity bring the 
raging sword, but the whole world goes as he wishes.  He knows no worse. 
(1724b-1739)  
Hrothgar invokes the model of God as feudal lord who owns and distributes as 
possessions even the abstract characteristics which constitute an individual.  His 
description of the man who cannot imagine an end to his comfortable life “to his 
folly” resembles Augustine’s assertion that people are deluded into comfort when 
they should be terrified for the state of their souls.  Hrothgar goes on to include a 
lurking evil, like the devil sewing cockles in the Parable of the Tares.   
Oð þæt him on innan        oferhyġda dǣl 
weaxe(ð) ond wrīdað.        Þonne se weard swefeð, 
sāwele hyrde;        bið se slǣp tō fæst, 
bisgum ġebunden,       bona swīðe nēah, 
sē þe of flānbogan        fyrenum scēoteð. 
Þonne bið on hreþre        under helm drepen 
biteran strǣle        him bebeorgan ne con, 
wom wundọrbebodum        werġan gāstes; 
þinċeð him tō lӯtel        þæt hē lange hēold, 
ġӯtsað gromhӯdiġ,       nallas on ġylp seleð 
fǣtte bēagas,       ond hē þa forðġesceaft 
forġyteð ond forġӯmeð,        þæs þe him ǣr god sealde, 
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wuldres waldend,       weorðmynda dǣl.  
Until within him the amount of arrogance waxes and spreads, when the 
guard, the soul’s keeper, sleeps.  The sleep is too sound, weighed by troubles. 
The killer, close by, hatefully shoots from his bow.  Then he the bitter arrow 
strikes beneath the helm and in the heart.  He cannot protect himself from 
the evil wonderful compulsion of the evil spirit.  It seems too little to him 
which he had held for so long.  Grim-minded, he wants more.  In his pride he 
gives no rich rings, and he forgets and neglects the impending work, because 
God, ruler of glory, has given him his share of worth.  (1740-52)   
The thing which one should be afraid of in Hrothgar’s speech differs from its 
counterpart in Augustine in that it becomes more specific.  Augustine advises that an 
individual should be afraid of the state of his soul and impending judgment of God.  
Hrothgar seems less concerned with damnation than with the encroachment of an 
enemy within the mind.  It is unclear who or what is the guardian (“weard”) or the 
soul’s shepherd (“sawele hyrde”).  The evil spirit wielding a bow has an analogue in 
Ephesians 6:16.  “In addition to all this, take up the shield of faith, with which you 
can extinguish all the flaming arrows of the evil one.” The confrontation between the 
soul’s guardian and the evil archer is taken as the cause of the man’s emerging anger 
and greed.  Again the individual is somewhat divested of autonomy.  It is no longer 
the man who is the origin of his own greed.  His change of state is now the result of 
an attack by an evil spirit.  The self has become a place rather than an intentional 
agent. 
Hit on endestæf        eft ġelimpeð 
þæt se līċhoma        lǣne ġedrēoseð, 
fǣġe ġefealleð;        fēhð ōþer tō, 
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sē þe unmurnlīċe        mādmas dǣleþ, 
eorles ǣrġestrēon,       eġesan ne ġӯmeð. 
Bebeorh þē ðone bealonīð,            Beowulf lēofa, 
secg bet[e]sta,       ond þē þæt sēlre ġeċēos, 
ēċe rǣdas;        oferhӯda ne ġӯm, 
mǣre cempa.       Nū is þīnes mæġnes blǣd 
āne hwīle;        eft sōna bið 
þæt þeċ ādl oððe ecg        eafoþes ġetwǣfeð, 
oððe fӯres fenġ,        oððe flōdes wylm, 
oððe gripe mēċes,       oððe gares fliht, 
oððe atol yldo;        oððe ēagena bearhtm 
forsiteð ond forsworceð;       semninga bið 
þæt ðeċ, dryhtguma,       dēað oferswӯðeð.  
In the end it happens afterward that his body lies miserable, falls to fate; 
another arises who deals out treasure without mourning it, the earl’s 
previous conquest, and is not dissuaded by terror.  Beware of that evil, my 
dear Beowulf, best warrior, and choose for yourself the higher, the eternal 
wisdom.  Do not think arrogantly, mighty soldier.  Now is the peak of your 
might, but only a while.  Soon enough disease or sword-edge will separate 
you from your power, or the fire’s grip, or flood’s whelm, or sword’s bite, or 
spear’s flight, or terrible old age, or eye’s brightness fails, soon dimmed.  
Suddenly it happens, warrior-lord, that death overtakes you.  (1753-68) 
In this light, it seems that Hrothgar is speaking from a point on the theological 
spectrum between metarepresentation and Augustinian faith.  He reduces the 
agency of the individual by anthropomorphizing characteristics such as greed and 
pride.  However, he does not depend on God as the reference point for prescribing 
behavior.  The behaviors he advises against are the same as those which provoke 
censure in small-scale societies.     
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Beowulf and Ingeld 
In contrast to Hrothgar, and in contrast to the majority of the monotheistic 
tradition described so far, Beowulf engages in a complex metarepresentation which 
alots each individual sovereign causal agency over his or her thoughts and actions.  
After his return to Geatland, Beowulf tells Hygelac of his adventures as well as the 
state of the Danish court.  One matter he touches on is the intended marriage of 
Hrothgar’s daughter to Ingeld the Heathobard.  The Heathobards and Danes had 
until recently been at war, and Hrothgar hopes that a marriage will cement a truce 
between the two nations. 
Sīo ġehāten (is), 
ġeong, goldhroden,       gladum suna Frōdan; 
(h)afað þæs ġeworden        wine Scyldinga, 
rīċes hyrde,       ond þæt rǣd talað, 
þæt hē mid ðӯ wīfe        wælfǣhða dǣl, 
sæċċa ġesette.  
[Freawaru, Hrothgar’s daughter] young and dressed in gold, is betrothed to 
the gracious son of Froda; the friend of the Scyldings has arranged this, the 
kingdom's shepherd, and reckons it a good plan that with a wife he should 
settle his share of the feud and slaughter. 
 (2024-29a) 
In order to tell the story, Beowulf engages in third-order intentionality.  He 
describes an intentional action which has taken place (level 1).  Intentional actions 
differ from events insofar as they are caused by an intentional agent (person, animal, 
spirit, etc.).  This is only first-order intentionality because one need not understand 
why a person initiates an action in order to realize that a person, rather than 
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random chance, has caused the action. Beowulf moves into second-order 
intentionality when he metarepresents Hrothgar’s reason for arranging the 
marriage, namely that forming a union between the two warring factions will create 
a new sense of comraderie.  In order to understand Hrothgar’s reasoning (i.e. why 
Hrothgar thinks a marriage will result in peace), Beowulf must then represent 
Hrothgar’s metarepresentation of Ingeld (level 3).  Though diplomatic marriage was 
common, Hrothgar would have to know Ingeld well enough to know that he would 
allow such a marriage and would see it as sufficient to deter further conflict.  It is in 
this third tier that Beowulf understands Hrothgar’s thinking about Ingeld’s thinking, 
but simultaneously compares it to his own metarepresentation of players in coming 
events: 
Oft seldan hwǣr 
æfter lēodhryre        lӯtle hwīle 
bongār būgeð,       þēah sēo brӯd duge 
Mæġ þæs þonne ofþynċan        ðēodẹn Heaðobeardna 
ond þeġna ġehwām        þāra lēoda, 
þonne hē mid fǣmnan        on flett gæð, 
dryhtbearn Dena,       duguða biwenede; 
on him gladiað        gomelra lāfe, 
heard ond hrinġmǣl       Heaða-Bear[d]na ġestrēon 
þenden hīe ðām wǣpnum        wealdan mōston, 
oð ðæt hīe forlǣddan        tō ðām lindplegan 
swǣse ġesīðas        ond hyra sylfra feorh.  
Too seldom, anywhere, in the the time immediately following the fall of a lord, 
does the spear rest, even though the bride is worthy.  This may, then, agitate 
the Heathobard prince and every thane of that people, when a noble son of 
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the Danes attends the lady in their hall and is splendidly received.  On his 
person hangs a shining, ancient heirloom, hard-forged and pattern-welded, 
the inheritance of a Heathobard as long as they were able to maintain their 
weapons, until they were led to disaster in that shield-play, their dear 
companions and their own lives.  (2029b-2040)    
At this point, Beowulf is imagining the same basic scenario which Hrothgar must be 
imagining—the peaceful union of Dane and Heathobard—but he also 
metarepresents the thinking of people whom Hrothgar (as Beowulf metarepresents 
him) does not consider. We may say that Beowulf is comparing one third-tier 
representation with another.  In other words, Beowulf could be comparing his idea 
of Ingeld’s thinking (level 2) to his idea of Hrothgar’s idea of Ingeld’s thinking (level 
3).  This lateralizes the vertical tier schema, but does not simplify it or reduce the 
number of minds Beowulf has to track in order to maintain his imagined scenario 
(not to mention that he is communicating this to another mind: Hygelac’s).  In fact, 
Beowulf moves beyond Ingeld in his metarepresentations. 
Þonne cwið æt bēore        sē ðe bēah ġesyhð, 
eald æscwiga,       sē ðe eall ġe(man), 
gārcwealm gumena        him bið grim (se)fa, 
onġinneð ġeōmormōd        geong(um) cempan 
þurh hreðra ġehyġd        hiġes cunnian, 
wīġbealu weċċean,       ond þæt word ācwyð: 
“Meaht ðū, mīn wine,       mēċe ġecnāwan 
þone þīn fæder        tō ġefeohte bær 
under heregrīman        hindeman sīðe, 
dӯre īren,       þǣr hyne Dene slōgon, 
wēoldon wælstōwe,       syððan Wiðerġyld læġ, 
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æfter hæleþa hryre,        hwate Scyldungas? 
Nū hēr þāra banana        byre nāthwylċes 
frætwum hrēmiġ        on flet gæð, 
morðres ġylpe(ð),       ond þone māðþum byreð, 
þone þe ðū mid rihte        rǣdan sceoldest.' 
Manað swā ond myndgað        mǣla ġehwylċe 
sārum wordum,       oð ðæt sǣl cymeð 
þæt se fǣmnan þeġn        fore fæder dǣdum 
æfter billes bite        blōdfāg swefeð, 
ealdres scyldiġ;       him se ōðer þonan 
losað (li)figende,        con him land ġeare. 
Þonne bīoð (āb)rocene        on bā healfe 
āðsweord eorla;        (syð)ðan Inġelde 
weallað wælnīðas,       ond him wīflufan 
æfter ċearwælmum        cōlran weorðað. 
Þӯ iċ Heaðo-Bear[d]na        hyldo ne telġe, 
dryhtsibbe dǣl        Denum unfǣcne, 
frēondscipe fæstne.  
Then, over beer, an old spear-warrior will speak.  He will see the ring, 
remember all of those men impaled on spears, his spirit will be grim.  Sad in 
mind, he will begin to search the thoughts in the heart of a young warrior, to 
test his spirit, to awaken foul war, and speak these words: “Can you, my 
friend, recognize that sword, that precious iron, which your father carried 
into battle under his battle mask on that last expedition where the Danes 
slew him, created that killing field when Withergyld lay dead after the fall of 
heroes by sharp Scyldings?  Now, here some son of those slayers goes across 
the floor exulting in that armament, boasting of that murder and bearing that 
treasure which you, by rights, should possess!”  He admonishes and reminds 
him all the time with bitter words, until the opportunity comes, and 
Freawaru's thane sleeps bloodied from the bite of a sword, forfeiting his life 
for his father’s deeds.  The other one escapes from there alive, for he knows 
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the land well. Then oaths sworn by earls on both sides will be broken.  
Afterwards deadly hatred wells up in Ingeld, and his love for his wife cools 
after the whelm of grief.  Thus I account the Heathobard’s loyalty in this 
noble alliance not without human weakness, nor their friendship solid. 
(2041-69) 
With the incorporation of the Heathobard provacateur’s tale, the number of 
metarepresentations multiplies exponentially.  The provocateur must understand 
what will move the thane of Ingeld to break the peace cemented by the marriage of 
Freawaru and Ingeld.  This means that Beowulf metarepresents the provocateur 
metarepresenting the Heathobard thane.  But the provocateur doesn’t stop there.  
He not only awakens the thane’s sorrow by reminding him that his father was slain, 
he urges the son to represent how the son of his father’s slayer’s son thinks.  He 
represents this Dane, who has inherited the Heathobard’s father’s sword from his 
own father, as bragging of the murder.  As discussed at length in Chapter 3, bragging 
about anything at all identifies an individual as a threat to the group.  Bragging 
about the murder of the thane’s father, a boast made visual by the Dane’s possession 
of the sword of the Heathobard’s slain father, targets three expected emotional 
responses: motivation to censure braggarts, indignation at the theft of one’s 
property, and vengeful outrage at murdered kin.   
This last motivation, the desire for vengeance, has deep roots in evolved 
cognition.  It would seem to be a useful emotion in small-scale societies when one’s 
community members were likely to be genetic kin.  As a social strategy, it is not 
always rational in the immediate case, but as a deterrent, a commitment to revenge 
can deter cheaters.  Nesse notes:  
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A commitment to spiteful retaliation can be equally useful. . . . A person 
whose briefcase was stolen might spend extra expensive days in a distant 
city just to testify against the thief.  Such spite is, from a rational point of view, 
senseless. Until, that is, you consider reputation. If a potential thief knows a 
particular person is committed to spiteful retaliation, he won’t touch that 
person’s briefcase. (2) 
This assumes that the potential offender knows who he is dealing with.  
Consequently, revenge becomes less advantageous in the long or short term as 
societies become larger and more anonymous. Perhaps it is not coincidence that the 
incipient chiefdoms of early medieval Europe, particularly those preserved in 
Iceland, contain an overwhelming preoccupation with vendetta cycles.  The same 
population levels which rely on social intelligence rather than attachment in their 
religious beliefs also show a propensity for narratives of murder and revenge, 
frequently featuring kin to avenge slain kin. 
The accounts of vengeance feuds in Icelandic sagas became the subject of two 
studies of the effect of biological kinship on coalitional alliance.  Steve B. Johnson 
and Ronald C. Johnson (1991) compiled a list of murders from several sagas 
(Orkneyinga, Njal’s, Egil’s, Grettir’s, Laxdaela, Sworn Brothers, Jomsvikings) and 
compared the kin relationship of those involved as a test of Daly and Wilson’s 
(1988) hypothesis that the degree of social relation is factored into decisions to kill 
for selfish motives or to risk one’s life to defend another.  Johnson and Johnson 
demonstrated that, in the Icelandic sagas, brothers were less likely to murder each 
other for personal gain or in retaliation for personal slights. They were also more 
likely to avenge a brother’s murder than were those of more distant biological 
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relatedness (cousins, uncles, nephews) and non-biological foster brothers.  Even in 
cases where brothers competed for status or resources (especially in matters of 
inheritance which direcly pit brother against brother), they were less likely to kill 
each other than parallel competitions with non-kin or more distant kin.  Dunbar, 
Clark, and Hurst (1995) followed the previous study with an examination of the 
Orkneyinga saga and Njal’s Saga, observing that individuals were only likely to 
engage in the enforcement of justice if the wounded party was a close family 
member or if there was a common interest with non-kin.   
In Germanic hero narratives, the natural drive to avenge one’s slain kin was a 
culturally reinforced imperative.  As predicted in the above studies, the demand for 
avenging of murdered kin was only rivaled by the prohibition against killing one’s 
own kin.  In another demonstration of his talent for metarepresentation, Beowulf 
tells a story in which these two desires clash.  Hæþcyn, father of Hygelac, lost one of 
his sons at the hands of another. 
Wæs þām yldestan        unġedēfeḷịċẹ 
mǣġes dǣdum        morþọrbed strêd, 
syððan hyne Hæðcyn        of hornbogan, 
his frēawine,       flāne ġeswencte, 
miste merċelses        ond his mǣġ ofscēt, 
brōðọr ōðerne        blōdigan gāre. 
Þæt wæs feohlēas ġefeoht,       fyrenum ġesyngad, 
hreðre hyġemēðe;       sceolde hwæðre swā þēah 
æðeling unwrecen        ealdres linnan 
A bed of slaughter was made for the eldest son by the action of a kinsman 
after Haethcyn struck down his own friend-lord with an arrow from his horn-
248 
 
bow.  He missed his target and hit his kinsman, one brother to the other with 
a bloody shaft.  That was an unredeemable strike, wickedly sinful, spirit-
crushing; yet, nevertheless, a nobleman who lost his life remains unavenged. 
(2435-43) 
Beowulf goes on to imagine the plight of a father who, having lost one son, must 
contemplate losing another.  The dilemma might seem strange to modern society 
since the state takes responsibility for prosecuting crime out of the hands of the 
victim.   
Dilemmas such as that of Hæþcyn illustrate the limitations of the strategy of 
vengeance.  Other, likely, more common shortcomings of vengeance feuds include 
the vulnerability of those without strong kin groups able to avenge them and the 
fact that such feuds can go on for generations.  In the latter case, the deterent 
function of vengeance is overwhelmed by the instinctual drive to avenge.  A society 
which could maintain the threat of vengeance as a deterrent but, simultaneously, 
inhibit the execution of the vendetta would be far more conducive to integrating 
factions which would otherwise stay at each other’s throats.  In Shariff, Norenzayan, 
and Henrich’s description of the function of an omnipotent and omniscient God, the 
agent of retaliation is conceived to be fully capable of punishment and therefore 
constitutes a deterrent from anti-social behavior.  If God is imagined to observe and, 
eventually, punish murder and other wrongs, it relaxes the necessity of clan 
vengeance.  This would indicate that, due to its destructiveness and difficulty to 
maintain, the vengeance impulse, though it would remain a biological predisposition, 
would be selected out of cultural narrative.  The prohibition against revenge, at least 
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within the in-group, is an integral characteristic of Judeo-Christian faith.   “Do not 
say, ‘I’ll pay you back for this wrong!’ Wait for the LORD, and he will deliver you” 
(Proverbs 20:22; cf.  Leviticus 19:18, Deuteronomy 32:35, 1 Samuel 26:10-11, Psalm 
94:1, Proverbs 24:29, Jeremiah 51:36, Romans 12:17, Thessalonians 4:6, Hebrews 
10:30).  By deferring the role of avenger to God, monotheism requires a regression 
of the individual’s autobiographical self conception from self-reliant warrior to child 
of a powerful father.  This greatly reduces the necessity for Machiavellian social 
intelligence.  If all of those one interacts with are afraid of divine punishment, the 
individual does not need to portray himself as committed to avenging wrongs done 
against him.  It is no longer as necessary to metarepresent the mind of a potential 
cheater to wonder what he’s hiding, what his motives are, or his strengths and 
weaknesses. As populations increase, it becomes less likely that an individual’s 
commitment to revenge will be known by the potential cheater.  In this scenario, 
beyond the Dunbar number, the ability to remember who is who and metarepresent 
accordingly becomes nearly impossible, and thus less effective a strategy for 
ensuring altruism.  For this reason, the ontogenetically primitive social strategy of 
attachment behavior actually facilitates the development of the society as a whole.  
Looking back at the vendetta cycles produced in small-scale societies in 
which the revenge motive might have been more functional than it is today, it is easy 
regard these narratives as more primitive.  We may agree that they are at least less 
civilized insofar as this term is divested of its value judgment and linked solely to 
the civitas.  However, more civilized narratives are not less complex.  In their 
requirements of social cognition, they are very often much more so.   
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We might argue that Beowulf’s tale of Hæþcyn points to the futility of 
revenge, but appears that the impossibility of revenge is part of what makes the 
story lamentable.  This accords with his response to Hrothgar, “Do not grieve, wise 
man.  It is better for every man that he avenge his friend rather than mourn too 
much” (“Ne sorga, snotor guma.  Sēlre bið ǣġhwǣm þæt hē his frēond wrece, þonne 
hē fela murne” 1384-5).   Even Klaeber cites this passage as a point of departure 
from the poem’s supposed Christianity and connection to “the Germanic code of 
blood vengeance—quite incompatible with the ethos of the New Testament”(55). 
Beowulf’s meditation upon Hæþcyn’s situation, like his insight into the future 
conflict between Heathobards and Danes, demonstrates a level of 
metarepresentation that does not figure into Christian representations of thought.  
He does not attribute human actions or mental states to sin as Hrothgar and 
Augustine do.  He sees people reacting to specific social interactions, and he does so 
with admirable sympathy for all individuals involved.  He does not define Grendel by 
his descent from Cain or his association with sin.  He extends his thoughts into 
Grendel’s mind to recognize that Grendel fights unarmed and unarmored as a 
deliberate means of demonstrating his superiority in combat.  In response to this, 
Beowulf determines to fight Grendel on equal terms.  This decision has a 
demonstrable causal role—intuitive rather than reflective—in Beowulf’s victory.  
The poem reveals that Grendel is protected from human weapons by spells, 
unbeknownst to the Danes.  By relying on weapons, the Danes are actually 
handicapping themselves.  By attempting to understand Grendel, and by meeting 
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him on his own terms, Beowulf becomes Grendel’s counterpart—a fellow aglæca 
and as much a creature of myth as the monsters of the poem.   
To the extent he attributes agency to God, it is the sort of agency 
demonstrated by mythic gods.  If God revealed to him the giant sword in Grendel’s 
lair, this level of divine agency pales in comparison to that demonstrated when Odin 
appeared in the court of Volsung to deliver the sword that will be claimed by 
Sigmund.  It is the agency of an unseen agent, not the sort of omnipotence described 
by Kaufmann and exhibited in the Life of St. Cuthbert.  Beowulf does not seek God’s 
will or expect reward or punishment.  The closest he comes to acknowledging 
something like Providence, it is in dialogue with Hrothgar.  The context of these 
references parallels of that of a prominent hunter or warrior in small band society.  
Discounting his own agency serves a specific social purpose in the company of 
warriors suspicious of an overconfident outsider.  When he learns that the dragon 
has awakened to wreak havoc on his kingdom, Beowulf wonders if he has offended 
God and if the event is divine punishment.  This is a metarepresentation of God’s 
mind that could be compatible with the social referencing of attachment behavior.  
However, it is equally compatible with metarepresentation in actual human 
interaction.  Neither gods nor humans need to be omnipotent to retaliate for real or 
perceived insult.   
How to Read the Poem: Is Syncretism Disintegration? 
The question is whether or not these elements are vital to the poem—
whether, as some scholars have claimd, Beowulf without the Christian elements 
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would be a different poem.  If we remove all elements of the poem that have 
parallels in Christianity, then this would be an accurate assertion.  However, this 
assumes that anything found in orthodox Christian texts must have originated in 
Christianity.  It is not the commonality with Christianity that is decisive, but the 
incompatibility with polytheism.  If even many of the references to God have 
cognates in polytheism, there would seem to be little in the poem that is 
incompatible.  The governing structure, insofar as it employs a poly-agent schema, 
resists only the omni-agent schema.  This latter is postulated in various parts of the 
poem.  However, it is not conclusively demonstrated in the poem’s action.  It does 
not dominate the poem to the extent it does The Life of St. Cuthbert or Augustine’s 
autobiographical Confessions.  The deference shown to God in Beowulf is not 
deference to a higher power in a centralized hierarchy.  There is no evidence of 
conversion, but rather inclusion.  The poem, besides the interpolations in the 
narration, exhibits the same sort of syncretism as that shown by kings which Bede 
calls apostates.  Whether the Christian coloring was deeply believed by the redactor 
that added it or was only added by political necessity (to justify the use of church 
parchment and man-hours against any overzealous Alcuins or Olafs), it functions 
like the post hoc theological correction exhibited by Justin Barrett’s test subjects.  
These described an anthropomorphic god in narrative but added abstract 
propositions asserting God’s omniscience and omnipotence to accord with locally-
mandated orthodoxy.  So too, Beowulf describes the miraculous accomplishments of 
an anthropomorphic god peppered with theologically correct but narratively 
incongruous assertions of divine providence.  In the case of Beowulf, however, the 
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anthropomorphic god and the omnipotent god are two different gods.  The threat he 
poses to the hierarchical social order demanded by Christianity is affirmed by 
Augustine’s and Alcuin’s demonization of Dido and Ingeld.  Neither Dido nor Ingeld 
were gods in the sense that they had cults or received sacrifices, but as mythic 
figures they clearly dissipated the centralized hierarchy of Christianity and the 
central role of God as the source of all agency.   
Reading the poem without Christian monotheism is not so invasive a 
procedure as to result in “the death of the patient” as Irving argues.  It is quite 
superficial and easy to see around.  However, this does not mean that it has no 
function.  Beowulf shows diplomatic tact before Hrothgar when he defers credit for 
his own action to the God Hrothgar repeatedly refers too.  In doing so, he soothes 
the shame of an old king who is unable to defend his own hall and depends on a 
young warrior of another tribe.  He invokes God as a means to avoid bragging in a 
manner found in small-scale societies across the world.  In deferring credit to God, 
he made himself less of a social threat to the society he addressed.  Likewise, the 
poem’s occasional affirmations of the omni-God reduced the perceived social threat 
the poem itself posed to the focused sociality of Christianity.  Without these lines 
affirming theologically correct abstractions, however unnecessary to the narrative, 
Beowulf would have been regarded as another of the damned kings wailing in Hell 
alongside Ingeld.  His story could not otherwised have bypassed the Alcuins of the 
11th century to find transcription onto vellum—likely church property inked by 
man-hours otherwise dedicated to exclusive service to Christ.  The degree to which 
one or several poets or redactors believed in the necessity of God’s inclusion in the 
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poem is less relevant to a reading of the poem than the function these isolated and 
abstract theological corrections serve in the social world of the manuscript’s 
production—and only in that social world.  A multiplicity of authors poses a threat 
to those who uphold an omni-agent preference.  Perhaps this explains Stanley’s fear 
that the poem will “disintegrate” if readings of the poem do not keep a close orbit 
around centralized authority of a single author.   Tolkien’s comparison of such 
criticism to the destruction of the labor of one by the curiosity of many resembles 
Stanley’s insistence on unified authorship, not only in its rejection of heterogeneity 
in the poem, but in its privileging of an omni schema in literary criticism.  As a 
critical approach, the omni schema looks to an ultimate authority in the author.  
Critics are constrained to a search for the author’s will in the way that Augustine 
sought only the will of God.  The critic metarepresents the omni-author only to the 
extent that he searches for that author’s intent.  Such criticism refrains from looking 
into the author’s limitations.  It ignores the possibility that a work could be more 
fruitful than even the author realized.  For an approach to the poem, poly schema 
critics may take Beowulf as a model of metarepresentation.  He knows Unferth’s 
story about him is a story with a purpose.  However, he recovers the telling of that 
story and recaptures control of his own autobiographical self.  In a world in which 
the only reliable afterlife is, as the Havamal says, “fame for one who wins it,” the 
continuity of that fame depends on the retelling of the autobiographical self after 
“the death of the patient.”  Fame, in other words, requires metarepresentation.  If 
each metarepresentation were constrained by the validation of every individual at 
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every intentional level between the character and the reader, we would have little 
attention left to fleshing out that character. 
Nor does looking past the author’s reflective interpolations necessarily imply 
disrespect.  Richard Lee’s !Kung informant shows no disrespect to his fellow hunter 
when he looks beyond the obligatory refrain, “Ah, I’m no good for hunting.  I saw 
nothing at all, just a little tiny one.”  He metarepresents his kinsman’s mind and 
guesses at what cannot be said.  “Then I smile to myself because I know he has killed 
something big” (187).  If we look past the socially-mandated deference of agency to 
God—if we recognize it as affirmation rather than explanation, the way the !Kung 
recognize the hunter’s disavowal of achievement.  Just as the !Kung smiles when he 
recognizes the incongruity between public profession and actual deed, the 
Beowulfian may smile in recognizing both hero and poet employing such necessities.  
Theological correction is required precisely because the action is such an 
achievement.  Because he has succeeded where others have failed, Beowulf shows 
respect by divesting himself of agency and inserting God’s aid in his 
autobiographical representation.  At a time when the English demonstrated their 
willingness to burn the last remnants of heathenism, including the heathens 
themselves, the preservation of a poem with mythic sympathies requires similar 
insertions of obligatory humility.   
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